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Abstract: 
The thesis is a contribution to the understanding of the relationship of the dialectical 
thought and method of G. W. F. Hegel and K. Marx. The aim of the thesis is to ascertain 
what the relation and the difference between the two contrary forms, of the idealist and the 
materialist dialectic, actually is. The thesis consequently attempts to make sense of Marx's 
view that his application of the dialectical method was not only different from, but also the 
"direct opposite" of his idealist predecessor. This theme, itself the source for the enigmatic 
nature of the inversion, is developed by ascertaining some of the core elements that lie 
behind and underpin Marx's own comment; that the rational kernel of Hegel's mystical 
form of dialectic could be discovered if it was "turned right side up again. " 
The thesis also explores the relationship between the early Marx's critique of Hegel, 
contained in the 1844 Paris Manuscripts, with the later Marx's comments on his view of 
the relation of his dialectic to Hegel's. As such, the thesis argues that there is both a 
continuity and a development in Marx's critical attitude to Hegel's dialectical thought. 
The core elements of the rational kernel of Hegel's dialectic for Marx lies, as the thesis 
will argue, in the Hegelian account of the general form of working of the dialectic, and in 
Hegel's explication of the laws of dialectics. The thesis thus explores the intimate relation 
of these two interconnected themes from the point of view of Hegel's systematic idealism, 
and in Marx's materialist application of these rational elements to his critique of political 
economy. 
This involves endeavouring to elucidate, both the nature of a dialectical account of 
contradiction, and the related explanation of nomological activity or law from a dialectical 
perspective. The thesis also attempts to explore the fundamental contrast of the materialist 
from the idealist elucidation of these core elements. The focus for the summation of this 
difference is discussed in the final chapter, by developing the materialist view of the 
fundamental contradiction contained in Hegel's idealist account, that of the open-ended 
nature of the dialectical method and Hegel's philosophical system. 
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THE ENIGMA OF THE INVERSION: 
A STUDY IN THE DIALECTICS OF HEGEL AND MARX. 
PART ONE: 
THE CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL MYSTIFICATION. 
CHAPTER ONE. 
THE DIALECTIC DE-MYSTIFIED. 
1. Introduction: The Enigma Outlined. 
"Aphorism: It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially 
the first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of 
Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood 
Marx!! " ' 
The general aim of the present thesis is to contribute to an understanding of the intellectual 
relationship of Marx to Hegel; a relation that, as Lenin noted, had still to be fully understood 
in all of its complexity. Failure to adequately grasp this relation has, moreover, had 
deleterious theoretical consequences for the understanding of the nature of dialectics itself. 
Marx, more than once, pointed out the need to "divest" or "strip away" the mystical veil that 
surrounds the rational element contained in Hegel's philosophical thought. His suggested 
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method, by which that rational kernel could be discovered from within the idealist mystical 
shell, was by turning it right side up again. 
This problem, which I call the enigma of the inversion, has though to be seriously and 
critically addressed if any real progress is to be made in deepening our understanding of 
what, precisely, is the nature of a dialectical method. If the relation of Hegel and Marx's 
dialectic is poorly appreciated, then consequently a fuller comprehension of the nature of 
dialectics is too. 
That there are problematics involved in understanding the relation of Hegel to Marx is 
generally accepted by a wide spectrum of opinion. Yet this theoretical question still remains 
of fundamental importance, for if analysed correctly, it should take us to the heart of what a 
dialectical account is. Why though is it problematic? 
Firstly, Marx himself never fully settled his accounts with Hegel in writing, though his 
intention to do so, as we shall see, was one that remained with him for a number of years. 
Secondly, an adequate explanation of what the specific nature of this inversion actually 
entails is also seen to face great difficulties in being gleaned from Marx's scanty comments 
on this issue. Marx's suggestion, or clue, has been viewed as not containing either sufficient 
explanatory power, or content, to afford a coherent strategy for developing a rational 
account of a dialectical methodology. 
Indeed, many commentators hasten to point out the very problematical nature of Marx's 
suggestion that the dialectic should be "turned right side up again" in order to discover the 
rational kernel contained in Hegel's dialectical thought. 
For example, in the work of L. Althusser, there is no rational kernel to be extracted from the 
mystical shell; the Hegelian kernel itself is infected with idealist and ideological 
mystifications. Turning it upside down does not extract any rational content from this 
I V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Progress Publishers (1972. ) Volume 38. P-180. 
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process, as there is no fundamental relation between the process of inverting and the process 
of extracting. "How can an inversion be an extraction" as Althusser puts it? 
In his account, there is no working concept behind Marx's idea of inverting Hegel's 
dialectic; the thought of it being turned right side up again being "merely gestural, even 
metaphorical". That there is a working concept behind the inversion is, I believe, the case. 
That concept is the dialectic itself, what other concept could be informing Marx's 
observations? ' 
This critical interpretation of Marx's comments has also been viewed as being the case by 
those on the opposite end of the scale from Althusser; that is, by those more sympathetic to 
a Hegelian interpretation of Marx. Here, C. Arthur raises the following question that 
challenges Marx's own clarity on this issue. 
"The question of how Marx's critique of political economy benefited, in its 
presentation at least, from his appropriation of Hegel's logic. It is my belief that 
Marx himself was not clear about the answer to this question; the relatively sketchy 
and enigmatic remarks in his prefaces may be a sign of this. Although Marx 
acknowledged the influence of Hegel's dialectic on his Capital, he failed to explain 
how an idealist logic could assist a materialist science. He left the impression that 
one could preserve a logic while inverting its ontological presuppositions. This 
introduces a dichotomy of form and content that is itself undialectical. "3 
C. Arthur's "belief" that Marx himself was not clear how his critique of political economy 
benefited from his appropriation of Hegel's Logic seems to me a highly implausible solution 
' Louis Althusser. For Marx. Penguin Press. (1969. ). Althusser's work is a semi-systematic attempt to 
rid Marx of any Hegelian influence. As a result, there has to be a widespread revision of the centrality of 
dialectical contradiction as a form of polarity that is contained in the work of Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
Trotsky, etc. In a nutshell, the classical approach to dialectics, defended in the present thesis, was thrown 
overboard to meet the requirements of what he regarded as uniting theory with practice. The question is 
though, which practice did Althusser wish to theoretically underpin? 
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or, more correctly, explanation to the problem. Similarly, that Marx "failed" to explain how 
an idealist logic could assist a materialist science is problematic, only if you posit the view 
that he left the "impression" that this entails that the idealist logical form is preserved while 
its ontological assumptions are inverted: I 
In my view, it is not just Marx's "presentation" of his critique of political economy that- is 
influenced by his appropriation of Hegelian logic. His employment of a dialectical method 
of treatment of the nature of the substance and form of value is the primary source of his 
critique of political economy. A method of treatment that is, moreover, the result of his own 
materialist appropriation and critique of Hegel's dialectic. 
The ontological inversion of *Hegel by Marx does, and has to, alter Marx's view of the 
Hegelian logical form. The de-mystification of the dialectic by Marx also applies to Hegel's 
logical thought content; the critique of Hegel's logic by Marx will also be exhibited as 
having a twofold form and content, being both rational and mystical in its nature. 
Marx's failure to fully settle his accounts with Hegel's dialectic is more plausibly explained 
by lack of time and pressure of work, rather than lack of clarity in Marx's thought process. 
All the evidence from Marx's comments on this subject points in this direction. Marx 
expressed, on more than one occasion and spanning a number of'years, his desire and 
intention to settle those accounts if circumstances permitted. Marx did not so much fail; it 
was more a question that he did not have the time to devote to it, hence the resultant esoteric 
nature of his comments. 
That Marx's methodological remarks are "relatively sketchy and enigmatic" is undoubtedly 
the case. However, it is not sufficient evidence to warrant the inference that Marx "himself" 
lacked clarity in understanding his relation to Hegel's dialectic. That there are genuine 
problems inherent in Marx's inversion of Hegel, and that those problems are fraught with 
3 C. J. Arthur. Hegel's Logic and Marx's Capital. Contained in Marx's Method in Capital. A Re- 
Examination. Edited by F. Moseley. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 63- 64. 
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theoretical and intellectual difficulties for a coherent understanding, does not negate the 
need for both clarity and explanation. 
The necessity to do so remains an important and fundamental question that has far reaching 
theoretical and practical consequences. It is not a luxury of theory, it has never been so; it is, 
on the contrary, a theoretical imperative. Any argument, from whatever quarter, that points 
in the direction of closing the door on any possible fruitful outcome of investigation should 
therefore be rejected. 
C. Arthur, unlike Althusser, does offer a positive and partial resolution to the problem of the 
enigmatic relation of Hegel and Marx's dialectic in the following form. That the relation of 
Hegel's logic to value theory centres on Hegel's concept of a systematic totality, a 
systematic totality that Marx employs in his critique of capital. That the Hegelian view of 
this is an important and central influence on Marx's account of capital as a systematic whole 
is, in my view, undoubtedly correct. 4 
The question still remains though, in what way does Hegel's account of this systematic 
totality relate to the wider point of Marx, that of inverting the mystical form of Hegel's 
dialectic in order to extract the rational kernel? Moreover, how does that, in turn, relate to 
the question of the apparent undialectical. dichotomy of an idealist logical form and a 
materialist ontological content? Alternatively posed, in what way does the materialist 
critique of Marx impact on Hegel's account of a logical system itself? 
What is central to a fuller answer to this question is Marx's critique, and application of 
Hegel's account of the laws of motion of dialectical contradiction, the motor force of the 
development that coheres both Hegel's and Marx's view of a systematic totality. This 
4 The work of both C. Arthur and T. Smith in this very area, that of the relation between Hegel's logical 
system and Marx's critique of capital, must be given due credit. Whilst their work is not the last word on the 
subject, they have both made valuable contributions to our understanding of many of the issues that result 
from this fundamental relationship. C. J. Arthur. (op. cited. ) T. Smith. The Logic of Marx's Capital. S. U. N. Y. 
Press. (1990. ) 
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primary and essential problematic of dialectics, its account of systematic nomological 
activity, in both or either of its idealist and materialist forms and content, as well as their 
relationship, has, so far, not been fully, and hence successfully extracted by commentators 
on the relation of Hegel and Marx's dialectic. 
The central question that continues to beset the development of a clear and lucid account of 
scientific dialectics, and which has therefore been a theoretical problem of human thought 
that is getting on now for nearly a hundred and fifty years, is the following one. How does 
one go about successfully divesting or stripping away the mystical form in which Hegel had 
enveloped the dialectic? Lack of clarity on this central question of the evolution of 
dialectical method and thought entails the continuation of the enigmatic nature of the 
dialectical relation and difference of Hegel and Marx. 
Consequently, the nature of dialectics itself as a rational and scientific method, remains, like 
Hegel's own idealist variation, still largely shrouded in mystery. The key here to untangling 
this dilemma, is to view Hegel and Marx's relation as itself a dialectical one, as the 
expression of the movement of a contradiction. This is to formulate the relational problem 
within the classical Hegelian sense of aufheben, where the question becomes not only what 
is cancelled, but also what is preserved or retained in the process of supersession. 
Indeed, the solution to the enigma of the inversion hinges, by and large, on developing the 
analysis and argument along this very conceptual framework of development. This is the 
essence of the dynamic contained in Marx's supersession of Hegel's thought. The difficulty 
of the analysis is to work your way through the logic of the relations contained in this 
process of supersession. 
The aim of the thesis is to provide a contribution to what the possible foundations and 
beginnings of an answer to this problematic of the nature of the inversion of Hegel, 
contained within Marx's dialectic, actually is. Given that none other than Marx himself 
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bequeathed this theoretical quandary to us, it cannot be ignored, wished away, or treated as 
either a non-question or, for that matter, an unanswerable one. 
The inversion that Marx suggests applies, in my view, not only to the idealist foundations 
but also the idealist subject matter of Hegel; a materialist method requires a materialist 
subject matter as its presupposition. It is necessary to invert not only the ontological 
presupposition of Hegelian logic, but also its idealist ontological form and content; as the 
alienated expression of "pure thought" in the guise of a mystical supersensible subject, the 
absolute. 
This was, in my view, the route and journey that was taken by Marx. All the evidence, 
which will be cited in the present argument, points in this direction. Moreover, this entails 
that Marx had already traversed his own suggested path of turning Hegel's idealist method 
and dialectic upside down. That journey, ftom the early criticism of Hegel's speculative 
dialectic to the later criticism of capital, is a long road. At the same time it is also an 
interconnected journey that spans the intellectual movement of a single subject, namely 
Marx himself. 
For a full and comprehensive understanding of Marx's dialectical method can only be 
generated by working through both his early materialist criticisms of Hegel's mystical form 
of dialectic, and his own later critical application to political economy of the materialised 
form of dialectic. The question is what rational elements of Hegelian dialectics are retained 
in this process, given that Marx's characterisation of Hegel's dialectic itself takes a twofold 
expression, as itself having both a mystical and a rational form and content? 
By understanding the nature of the tensions and contradictions in the relationship between 
Hegel's idealist form of dialectic and the dialectic in the real world, in real nature and in real 
society, is the key to understanding how the inversion of Hegel was initially developed by 
Marx himself. When this earlier critique of Marx is, as it should be, combined with Marx's 
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later application of the dialectic to political economy, then the fuller content of the rational 
form of dialectics itself can begin to emerge. 
At the same time, what still remains of rational use and value in Hegel's method should then 
be more able to be definitively extracted. This orientation would also avoid or circumvent 
the "impression" of an undialectical dichotomy of an idealist logical form and a materialist 
content that Arthur alludes to in Marx. 
2. Rational Kernel and Mystical Shell. 
The starting point of the present study will aim to show, through analysing Marx's own 
correspondence and writings, that contrary to some widespread misconceptions, Marx did in 
fact have a consistent thread to his view of Hegel that spanned his early, mature, and later 
years. Despite the changes in tone, emphasis, and subject matter of Marx's criticisms and, 
for that matter, the changes of emphasis and weight of his overall appraisal of Hegel's 
philosophy, there still remains, in my view, a thread of continuity in his assessment. 
The guiding thread of this continuity in Marx's thought is contained in his assessment that 
there was a fundamentally contradictory element and dynamic contained in Hegel's own 
account of dialectic. Its twofold form and nature was, paradoxically, both mystical and 
rational. Firstly, what evidence is there in Marx that would lend aid and support to this 
viewpoint? 
Secondly, what other reflections are there on Hegel, that Marx makes over the years, that 
could give some more clues and insights into, not only Marx's critical assessment of Hegel, 
but also what still remains in his thought that could be considered of rational scientific use? 
Let us investigate the second question first, before seeing what evidence there might be for 
the idea of a thread of continuity in Marx's critical assessment of Hegel. 
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Despite their sketchy nature, the methodological remarks in the afterwords and prefaces 
written by Marx, supplemented by some letters of correspondence, can, in my view, yield 
some interesting and fruitful lines of investigation. The only available empirical data for 
analysing the relation of Hegel to Marx are the above, and the primary texts of Hegel and 
Marx. We have no other substantial material at our disposal to work with. It therefore 
requires thoroughgoing analysis to see what they can yield. This is the strategy adopted in 
5 the present work. 
The correspondence cited here dates from the period when Marx was compiling his 
Grundrisse notebooks to a few years after the publication of Capital volume 1. Roughly, the 
years from 1857 to 1873. The correspondence analysed here broadly highlight areas why 
Marx may have, not only benefited as he put it "by mere accident" from re-acquainting 
himself with Hegel's Logic, but also why he thought it necessary to endeavour to ascertain 
the rational core of Hegel's work. 
The following letter to Engels is dated 16' Jan. 1858, when Marx was busily working on the 
Grundrisse. 
"I am, by the way, discovering some nice arguments. E. G. I have completely 
demolished the theory of profit as hitherto propounded. What was of great use to me 
as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had another look BY 
MERE ACCIDENT. .. If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I 
should very much like to write two or three sheets making accessible to the common 
reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only discovered but also 
mystified. " 
I This is not entirely true, we also have the work of F. Engels, which, despite whatever misgivings 
some people may have, are a highly valuable resource on both dialectics and Marx's thought. I am, here, also 
making a distinction between what I would call the primary material of Hegel and Marx that is the necessary 
core of the research, from the secondary material and literature on the subject. 
I Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 40. Lawrence and Wishart. (1983. ) P. 249. 
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Four months later in a letter to Lassalle dated 31" May 1858, Marx writes on a similar 
theme: 
"This dialectic is, to be sure, the ultimate word in philosophy and hence there is all 
the more need to divest it of the mystical aura given it by Hegel. "' 
Some ten years later, in a letter to J. Dietzgen dated 9' May 1868 he writes: 
"When I have cast off the burden of political economy, I shall write a 'Dialectic'. 
The true laws of dialectics are already contained in Hegel, though in a mystical form. 
What is needed is to strip away this form. "' 
Finally, for the present, the above remarks should be combined with the following 
(in)famous passage from the Afterword to the second German edition of Capital, which was 
written five years later in 1873: 
"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents 
him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive 
and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right 
side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel in the mystical shell. "' 
We can now pose another question for the present investigation. How do these remarks in 
the Afterword relate to the other comments of Marx that are cited here, and which are spread 
over a period of some fifteen years? What results from analysing the above comments of 
Marx, in my view, are the following points. 
Firstly, due to the significance of Hegel's dialectical method, Marx put settling his accounts 
with Hegel second only in importance to his work on political economy; at least as far as his 
'Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 40. Lawrence and Wishart. (1983. ) P. 316. 
8 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 43. Lawrence and Wishart. (1988. ) P. 31. 
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theoretical and methodological output was concerned. Marx, unfortunately, never gained the 
time to fully "cast off the burden of political economy" in order to write his dialectic. 
Secondly, and most importantly for the present investigation, is that according to Marx, 
already contained within Hegel's work and thought is the "rational aspect" of the method 
that Hegel, not only "discovered" in dialectics, but at the same time formulated and 
interpreted in a mystical form. This rational aspect of the dialectical method is the core of 
what still remains of lasting value in it; what are we though, to make of this discovery of 
Hegel's that Marx attributes to him? 
To discover something is to unearth and to bring into view or ascertain, a truth that was 
already in existence, but hidden from perception and/or cognition. In the case of Hegel's 
dialectic, the discovery itself has to be critically analysed, in order to divest and strip away 
its mystical aura, and reveal the rational kernel in the mystical shell. The inversion of Hegel 
itself being described as a method of discovery by Marx, and the product or result of this 
activity, what is to be discovered, or more accurately re-discovered, is the rational kernel 
contained within Hegelian dialectics. 
In my analysis the usage here by Marx of "rational kernel" is a reference back to the 
previous point in the 1873 Afterword; namely that of Hegel being the first to present, in a 
comprehensive and conscious manner, the general form of working of the dialectic. The 
point being made by Marx, and this is largely missed, is that it is the general form of 
working of dialectic that is standing on its head. It is then, according to my analysis, the 
general form of working of dialectic that Hegel not only discovered, but also mystified. 
The rational kernel to be discovered by inverting Hegel is then this generalform of working 
of the dialectic. This is the core of the rational aspect of Hegel's dialectical method for 
Marx. This still leaves open, of course, what the nature of this general fonn of working of 
' K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 29. 
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the dialectic could be, and, moreover, what employment Marx utilises of it in his analysis of 
political economy. 
In turn, and given the intimacy of their relation, the question also becomes in what way is 
this rational, general form of working of the dialectic, linked and related to the comments in 
the correspondence that the "true laws of dialectics are already contained in Hegel"? In both 
cases, as Marx's writings and correspondence tells us, these rational core aspects of Hegel's 
dialectic are enveloped in a mystical form that needs to be stripped of this same form. It is 
by inverting that mystical form, that we can, at the same time, divest or strip away that 
idealist veil. 
To answer the question of their relation more directly, then it would appear that they are a 
reference to the same thing, or to be more precise, the same process. For the laws of 
dialectics cannot, in my view, be logically separated off from its general form of working. In 
turn, the general form itself has to be the basic and primary ontological categories and laws 
governing both being and thought, as well as the relationship of being and thought. 
These are the rational aspects gleaned from Marx's own correspondence and writings, which 
I will argue, remain of Hegel's dialectic. The related question that arises from this is what 
rational form do these elements take in its inverted materialised form of Marx's dialectic? 
These are the central themes and topics of the thesis as a whole. 
It is by attempting to make some headway in this task that we can begin to more fully 
answer C. Arthur's pertinent question of how an idealist logic can assist a materialist 
science. The ascertaining of the nature of the laws of dialectics, and its general form of 
working, being key elements, I would argue, in answering that very question. 
The general form of working and the laws of dialectics find their meeting point, in my view, 
in the analysis of a dialectical account of systematic nomological behaviour. Hegel 
predicates this systematic nomological activity within an idealist foundation and framework 
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that sublates the object as the product of a mystical subject; through analysing the generic 
ontological concepts, categories, and predications contained in substance, as the idealist 
movement of the categories that generate real, material, and objective substantial activity. 
These laws and their general form of expression are the foundational principles and primary 
ontological categories that are involved in the analysis of the nature of the necessary activity 
of a systematic and substantial subject. They are the core principles and categories for 
understanding the nomological basis for the phenomenal form of appearance of that 
substantial subject. What though is the dynamic motor source of this nomological motion of 
the idealist categories and concepts inherent within manifested substantial being? 
The principle of change and alteration inherent to a dialectical account of nomological 
activity is based on an architectonic of posited and resolved contradiction; this process of 
the systematic movement of a substantial contradiction is the core dynamic behind the 
general form of working and the laws of dialectics. As such, it is an essential feature of 
dialectics in both its mystical and rational forms; this is their commonality of source and 
meeting point. 10 
What my analysis in the thesis will aim to show is the interrelation between these three 
aspects of Hegel's idealist account of dialectic. The nature of the general form of working of 
dialectic, its laws of motion, and their essential correlation and expression in the dynamic 
principle of change and alteration contained in the systematic movement of the ontological 
categories and predications of a substantial subject. 
Dialectics is about the movement and development of the contradiction of an interconnected 
whole, expressed by Engels, as the "science of universal interconnection. " Its aim is to 
demonstrate the necessary nexus or inner connection that is the mediation between the polar 
extremes that contain the parameters of the process of movement and change of a substantial 
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subject. Marx and Hegel's distinction between the essence of the substantial activity 
expressed in that inner connection, -and its phenomenal form of appearance lies precisely in 
this area. 
The question, and inherent difficulty in any attempt to understand what exactly is entailed 
by inverting Hegel, is to separate out and not conflate, the rational and mystical sides of his 
dialectical method from Marx's materialist perspective. The other central question and 
problem generated by this activity is to ascertain what is left of this Hegelian method, 
stripped of its idealism, that continues to remain rational? 
In order to retrieve that rational element of the Hegelian method it had to be not only 
critically examined, but also at the same time put on a material foundation and basis. Marx 
himself had to'go through this very process when de-mystifying the Hegelian dialectic. ý 
Marx's foundation for the dialectic lies in the material changes and motions in nature not 
spirit. In particular, the major emphasis of Marx is on the human expression of its 
relationship with nature, namely labour. Labour, moreover, that is in an oppressed, 
exploited, and alienated condition. 
This process finds, as we shall shortly investigate, its first concrete expression in the Paris 
Manuscripts of 1844. This inversion of dialectical subject was necessary, for both Marx's 
own theoretical self-clarification, and for developing the grounds for a materialist form of 
dialectical method to begin to emerge in his work. 
The inversion of Hegel and the application of the dialectical method to political economy 
are intrinsically bound together. Even if for no other reason than the simple one that, a 
materialist ontological presupposition and foundation needs and requires a materialist 
ontological subject matter and content for dialectical investigation. It is then, a fundamental 
component of the materialist inversion of Hegel's dialectic by Marx. 
" This commonality of the systematic movement of a contradiction should also not blind us to the 
differences that pertain to an idealist and materialist analysis of the ontological nature of both contradiction 
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The scientific importance and contribution of Hegel's dialectic is not what Marx is calling 
into question. Marx is, in fact, stating the opposite in quite unambiguous terms; though what 
the rational content of the idealist form of dialectic that remains of scientific value does 
remain ambiguous, and hence needs to be theoretically clarified. 
What is puzzling is Marx's suggestion of inverting it. It is a mistake however to infer from 
this position that though turning it right side up again, in order to discover the rational 
kernel is itself posed by Marx in a form that is problematical and enigmatic, then the 
importance of Hegel's dialectical method for Marx is so also. The conclusion does not flow 
from the premise. 
Nor does it flow from any of the available evidence in Marx. What is unclear and 
problematic is only our understanding of the relation of Marx to Hegel and, even more 
importantly as it is the crucial result of this relation, the nature of a rational form of 
dialectics itself. 
One can be critical of the means suggested by Marx, but what is relatively clear is the end 
aim of the activity, to extract the rational kernel from the mystical shell. It would appear 
then, from all the available evidence, that Marx would have rejected Althusser's assertion 
that the kernel itself is infected with mysticism and ideology; that it is in fact rotten to its 
idealist core and fit only for the dustbin of history. 
It is no accident that Marx kept on returning to this common theme of his relation to Hegel; 
as we shall see, it is a theme that generated its own variations over a number of years. When 
this commonality of theme is combined with both his felt desire to, and the theoretical need 
for, clarifying what was still rational in Hegel, then this would seem to indicate that Marx 
did have a relatively clear conception of his own relation to Hegel's dialectic. 
and system. 
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3. In Defence of the "Dead Dog". 
The viewpoint that attempts to deny or neuter the influence of Hegel on Marx, for example, 
the Althusserian position that the mature Marx's thought owes virtually next to nothing to 
Hegel's dialectical method, is, for its adherents, unfortunately contradicted by the mature 
Marx himself. 
We have already seen some evidence for this position, but there is still more contained in 
the mature Marx's writings, to confirm that, if anything was the case, Marx had reassessed 
his relation to Hegel more positively than in his younger days. Here is some more of the oft- 
quoted view of the 1873 Afterword. 
"The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a 
time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of 
"Das Kapital", it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigones 
who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in the same way as the brave 
Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, i. e. as a "dead dog". I 
therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and 
there, in the chapter on value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to 
him. "" 
Marx is here referring to a trip he made to Germany in April and May of 1867, to oversee 
the publication of the first edition of Capital. The analogy he uses with Spinoza's treatment 
is not an isolated one. There is a further reference to this dismissive treatment of Hegel 
contained in a letter to Kugelmann dated 27" June 1870. 
"And what this Lange has to say about the Hegelian method and my application of 
the same is simply childish. First, he understands rien about Hegel's method and, 
therefore, second, still less about my critical manner of applying it. In one respect he 
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reminds me of Moses Mendelssohn. That prototype of a windbag once wrote to 
Lessing asking how he could possibly take that "dead dog Spinoza" seriously! In the 
same way, Mr. Lange expresses surprise that Engels, I, etc. take seriously the dead 
dog Hegel, after Buchner, Lange, Dr. During, Fechner, etc., had long agreed that 
they - poor dear - had long since buried him. Lange is naive enough to say that I 
"move with rare freedom" in empirical matter. He has not the slightest idea that this 
"free movement in matter" is nothing but a paraphrase for the method of dealing 
with matter - that is, the dialectical method. "12 
What is of interest here is not only that Marx takes the dead dog Hegel seriously, but that 
entailed in doing this is both his critical adoption and his critical manner of applying 
Hegel's dialectical method. Marx also appears to be suggesting here that one has to have 
some real knowledge of Hegel's dialectical method before an understanding of his own 
critical application of it can be fully grasped. This could also be interpreted as a point that 
apparently confirms Lenin's famous aphorism cited earlier, on the relation of Hegel's Logic 
to Marx's Capital. 
It is precisely due to Hegel's discovery of the comprehensive operation of the general form 
of working and the laws of dialectics that Marx ranks Hegel's thought as being the "ultimate 
word" in philosophy. It is by attempting to analyse and understand how that general form 
and the laws of dialectics operate in Hegel and Marx's work, that we can build up a clearer 
picture of their relation, and begin to further ascertain the rational kernel in the Hegelian 
mystical shell. 
Going in reverse chronological order, there is yet a third reference by Marx, on Hegel and 
his dialectic being treated as a "dead dog". In a letter to Engels, written on the 11' Jan. 1868 
he also states the following: 
K. Marx. Capital. Volume I. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 29. 
Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 43. Lawrence and Wishart. (1988. ) P. 528. 
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"The gentlemen in Germany (with the exception of theological reactionaries) believe 
Hegel's dialectic to be a "dead dog". Feuerbach has much on his conscience in this 
respec . 
9913 
From the above letter it is clear that not only is Marx prepared to defend Hegel, with only 
the dubious company of "theological reactionaries", he seemingly blames Feuerbach for 
being a central contributor to this sorry state of affairs. 
A position that is apparently radically different from his early writings. In particular, and as 
we shall shortly see, one can cite evidence ftom the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844 (E. P. M. or Paris Manuscripts or Manuscripts) for proof of this. 
In that work, Feuerbach was viewed as providing the materialist critique of Hegel's idealist 
dialectic of systematic thought. He is heralded as the person who "has in principle 
overthrown the old dialectic and philosophy" and is "in fact the true conqueror of the old 
philosophy". 
Why then, a quarter of a century later, is Marx going out of his road to defend Hegel from 
what he regards as unjustified and philistine attacks and, at the same time, implicating 
Feuerbach as a pivotal source behind this sorry state of affairs? 
The question generated by this apparent paradox of young versus old is the following one, 
why is there an ostensible and radical about turn in Marx's view of Hegel? This volte-face 
of Marx, however, also appears to raise some problems for the proposition I posed earlier. 
That of the idea, defended in the present thesis, that there is, at the same time, a thread of 
continuity from the early to the late Marx in his characterisation of the twofold rational and 
mystical elements contained in Hegel's dialectic method? 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 42. Lawrence and Wishart. (1987. ) P. 520. 
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What Marx's object of criticism of Hegel was directed towards all those years ago, as he 
tells us in the 1873 Afterword, was the'"mystifying side" of the Hegelian dialectic. The 
implication of this being that there is another side to Hegel's thought, a rational side. It is, of 
course, precisely because of this rational element contained in Hegel's dialectic that he 
cannot simply written off as a "dead dog" for Marx. 
However, this twofold nature of Marx's analysis does not appear to be driving his earlier 
1844 explication and analysis of Hegel's philosophy; this takes the form of a critique that is 
dominated by the impact of Feuerbach's demolition of speculative idealism. 
The question is, does the appearance of the earlier critique contradict the essence of the later 
criticism here, or does the appearance also belie some other form of movement, closer to the 
later twofold rational and mystical analysis and characterisation of Hegel by Marx? 
4. Marx's Apparent Volte-Face. 
This conspicuously apparent volte-face in Marx's view of Hegel, here expressed through a 
radical change in his attitude to Feuerbach has, like the enigma of the inversion, never been 
adequately or fully explained. The two questions being merely different facets of the same 
problem. 
The'question is, how do we understand and interpret the dynamics of Marx's own 
intellectual development in order to explain these two viewpoints, expressed nearly thirty 
years apart, and which if viewed solely on the surface or factually reductive level, are 
apparently in contradiction with each other? Let us start the analysis with his earlier 
viewpoint, expressed in the Paris Manuscripts, one that is still clearly reverberating under 
the bombastic impact of Feuerbach's explosion of Hegel's systematic idealism. 
In the E. P. M., Feuerbach's "great achievement" for Marx was contained in the following 
gains that he contributed to the critical development of thought. Firstly, he proved that 
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philosophy is an estranged and alienated condition that is nothing else but religion rendered 
into thought and is the divine expounded by thought. In other words, Feuerbach exposes 
philosophical thought in its apposite condition, as an alienated and estranged expression of 
the essence of man. 
Secondly, by making the social relation of "man to man" the basic principle of the theory, 
he establishes "true materialism" and "real science" for Marx. Finally, Feuerbach's 
"opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self- 
supporting positive, positively based on itself. "14 
Feuerbach, according to Marx, highlights Hegel's failure to resolve the alienation inherent 
in his idealist dialectic; furthermore, he also shows that Hegel ultimately affirms that 
alienation after having rejected it. Philosophy itself, at least in this its idealist form is shown 
to be riddled with theological thought and presuppositions. 
Consequently, and this is no small or mean achievement, it was by showing that alienation 
is inherently expressed and manifested, in an alienated way in the idealist view, that gives 
value to Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's philosophical negating and then reaffirming of 
religion. Hegel's philosophical system is shown to be the product of an alienated 
philosophical mind that affirms theology after having negated it. 
By doing so, Feuerbach had laid bare the material, natural, and social basis for religious 
thought and belief as an expression and product of alienated humanity itself. By inverting 
the ontological foundation of that speculative system, he was thus able to show the resultant 
descent of spirit from the heavens, to its more mundane origin in the human condition; 
whose alienated conditions of existence are seen as ultimately residing in nature and society, 
its true, objective and material foundations. 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 328. 
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Here, idealist thought finds its inverted and naturalised rooting of the prime relation and 
subject matter of investigation to that of the relation of man to man, which itself is reflected 
in the relation of the individual to civil society. The importance of the Feuerbachean critique 
lies in the inversion of the foundations of absolute idealism, and in the replacement of those 
idealist foundations in real, natural, material and social relations, their true source. 
By doing so the speculative system of Hegel is blown apart and philosophy, rescued from 
the realms of the absolute, is now given a fundamentally natural, anthropological, and 
psychological foundation for the analysis of the human condition. However, Feuerbach's 
immediate impact on Marx, and his intellectual development, was, despite the earth- 
shattering nature and extent of it at this point, still relatively transitory and short-lived. How 
are we to explain this? 
Furthermore, is there any indication, within the E. P. M., that Marx already appears, at least 
in any embryonic form, to be in the process of distancing himself from, or at the very least 
qualifying, his positive view of Feuerbach's outstanding achievements? If so, where does 
this difference or qualification begin to emerge? The question is can a critical analysis of the 
Manuscripts reveal the sources for those soon to be emerging differences? " 
The primary reason for this fundamentally important but transitory impact of Feuerbach's 
naturalism and materialism on Marx, in my view, was that Marx had a grasp of dialectics 
that was ultimately superior in knowledge and scale to Feuerbach's. Marx does not follow 
Feuerbach's rejection of Hegel's speculative dialectic as a rejection of the application of 
dialectics per se. This difference, as we shall see, is already evident in Marx's own critique 
of Hegel's speculative form of dialectic in the 1844 text. 
11 Feuerbach's work was both a revelation and a liberation from the shackles of idealism. Hegel's 
system was at last exploded and cast aside. "Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. 
How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much - in spite of all critical reservations - 
he was influenced by it, one may read in 77ze Holy Family. " F. Engels. Marx-Engels. Selected Works. Volume 
2. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 333. As Engels then goes on to point out, to discard a system does not 
mean that that system has been disposed of by the mere assertion that it is either false, or by it being ignored. 
This important theoretical omission is one of the central limitations of Feuerbach's critique of Hegel. 
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Marx's Strategy. 
"The time was ripe for a critical settling of accounts with the mother of Young 
Hegelianism - the Hegelian dialectic. "" 
Marx himself expresses the overall need of the philosophical criticism, contained in the 
Manuscripts, in the above manner. What Marx intends to do in order to settle those 
accounts, as he also tells us in his prefatory remarks of the analysis, is to engage in "a 
critical discussion of Hegelian dialectic and philosophy as a whole". This critical form of 
analysis he considers not only "to be absolutely necessary", but more importantly for the 
present line of investigation, he also regards it as "a task not yet performed. "" 
This necessary critical settling of accounts is still posited though, within the parameters and 
gains of Feuerbach's own "theoretical revolution"; the only genuine advance in philosophy 
since Hegel according to Marx. However, what the above also tells us is that Marx saw the 
need for Hegel's philosophy to be criticised in a more generalised fashion, as a systematic 
whole; secondly, that the humanistic and naturalistic criticism by Feuerbach of Hegel still 
required further proof. As Marx himself expresses it: 
"How far, on the other hand, Feuerbach's discoveries about the nature of philosophy 
still, for their proof at least, called for a critical discussion of philosophical dialectic 
will be seen from my exposition itseIL"" 
The question raised here is what is the relation between these twin tasks, that of the 
generalised critique of Hegel's dialectic and philosophy as a whole, and Marx's attempt to 
provide the proof of Feuerbach's discoveries through this critical vehicle? Feuerbach's . 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 328. 
"Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 232. 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 234. 
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critique then, though philosophically liberating, still lacked a sufficient generalised form of 
proof for Marx. 
This lacuna is not, however, posed in the form of a criticism of Feuerbach; indeed, Marx 
himself sought to furnish the necessary proof that would confirm the Feuerbachian account. 
The intriguing question that this generates is what impact did the attempted providing of this 
proof have on the intellectual development of Marx himselp. Indeed, what form and content 
does this proof take in order to underpin the naturalised and materialised foundation for the 
criticism of idealist and speculative thought? 
Marx aims to outline and highlight, in the course of his general analysis and exposition, the 
difference between what could be described as the abstract idealist and critical materialist 
form of dialectic. He expresses this inverse dialectical relation in the form of a contradiction 
that is latent within the idealist view; a contradiction that is brought out in this its critical- 
materialist form. 
This inverse relation of the contradiction between the abstract philosophical and the critical 
materialist form of dialectic is characterised in the Paris Manuscripts by Marx in the 
following terms, as "the critical form of this in Hegel still uncritical process. "" 
Marx, through this formulation, not only wishes then, to confirm and provide the proof of 
the Feuerbachian critique, via this approach, he also aims to generalise the criticism of 
Hegel in this form. The interpretation and logical development of this self-characterisation 
of his overall strategy, if adequately unpacked, is the key to a more comprehensive 
understanding of both Marx's own positive account of the dialectic in the Paris Manuscripts, 
and his own intellectual development. 
How are we to interpret this overall approach to the problem and Marx's own self- 
characterisation of it as "the critical form of this in Hegel uncritical process"? What is also 
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important to ascertain is if this critical form of Marx's analysis of Hegel, contained in the 
Manuscripts, relates to the more general question of the thesis, what the nature of the 
materialist inversion of Hegel's dialectic entails. 
If this indeed turns out to be the case, and there is a relationship between the earlier and later 
forms of Marx's criticism, then in what manner can it aid our understanding of Marx's own 
intellectual development, and his later correlated strategy of inverting Hegel's dialectic? 
What does Marx mean and intend by posing the problem in this form? Furthermore, is this 
formulation merely an earlier variation on the later theme, of there being a rational kernel 
contained within the mystical shell of Hegel's dialectic? If so, then what would the nature of 
that connection be? 
Does this "critical form of an uncritical process" foreshadow later writings on the subject; 
do they represent the first formulations of a common theme that straddles Marx's later 
pronouncements on his relation to Hegel's dialectic? Is this proposition then merely an 
earlier variation of how the dialectic in Hegel glorifies and mystifies existing states of 
affairs, whilst the dialectic is, in its essence, critical and revolutionary? 
If this is indeed the case it may also be the key then to ascertaining the bedrock that forms 
the continuity of the dialectic on which the development of the mature Marx's thought is 
based. If so, then an important, not to say foundational, link will have been made with 
regards to the question of the relation of the early to the later Marx. Is there then such a link 
in these Paris writings that would indicate real continuity in the critical development of both 
his later dialectical thought, and in his critique of Hegel's idealist and speculative variation 
of the dialectic? 
To pose the question more starkly, is Marx, here in the Manuscripts, stating that the critique 
of Hegel that he attempts will also bring out important elements of the critical and rational 
form of dialectic that is contained within Hegel, but posed by him in an uncritical and 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 329. 
24 
mystical fashion? Is this the same process as turning Hegel right side up again in order to 
discover the rational kernel that is contained within the mystical shell? Is there any further 
evidence, contained in the Paris writings, which would allow this interpretation to be 
legitimated as a valid proposition? 
It is now time to analyse this criticism of Marx, contained in the 1844 Manuscripts, of 
Hegel's account of the negation of the negation as a fundamental principle involved in 
dialectics, in order to see what it can reveal for the present discussion and subject matter of 
investigation. 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
THE DIALECTIC OF NEGATIVITY. 
"All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism 
find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this 
practice. " K. Marx. Thesis 8 'On Feuerbach'. " 
1. The Dialectic of Negativity. 
Marx's analysis of Hegel in this early work is, in my analysis, like his later pronouncements 
on the subject of Hegel's dialectic, twofold and contradictory. His dialectical critique is, 
however, undoubtedly and asymmetrically weighted in the E. P. M. to exposing the mystical 
idealism and foundation of Hegel's thought. That the emphasis in the work is primarily 
directed against the mystical and alienated form that Hegel's dialectic takes, is not 
unsurprising; as it is a critical settling of accounts with Hegelianism and the Hegelian 
dialectic that is Marx's aim in that work. 
What Marx attempts to ascertain, through his analysis, is a generalised form of criticism of 
Hegel's dialectical thought; this is achieved via the development of a critical form that 
converges on Hegel's analysis of a central principle and law of the general form of working 
of the dialectic. As such, Marx's critical analysis of this dialectic of negativity focuses on 
the discussion of the role that negation of the negation plays in Hegel. This discussion being 
central for Marx to achieve his desired aim, that of a "critical settling of accounts" with the 
Hegelian dialectic. 
" Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 5. Lawrence and Wishart. (1976. ) P. 5. 
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Nevertheless, the criticism also contains within it some positive affirmations of certain 
aspects of Hegel's dialectical method. Whilst the emphasis, necessarily at this time and 
stage of Marx's own intellectual development, is on the critique of the mystical form of 
Hegel's dialectic, there are also some allusions, as we shall shortly see, to the rational and 
positive form that is inherently contained in the Hegelian dialectic. 
This generalised critique, as we shall see, not only "at least" provides the proof of 
Feuerbach's discoveries; it will also point beyond them, through the positing of the real and 
concrete material source and content that is lurking behind Hegel's form of mystical 
dialectic. What Marx actually does then, in my analysis, is to not only provide the necessary 
proof of Feuerbach's discoveries, but by doing so he is also in the process of going well 
beyond Feuerbach's parameters and viewpoint. 
What will also be argued for then is that Marx, not only criticises Hegel's mystical idealism, 
but at the same time he also highlights some fundamentally important elements of 
dialectical reasoning and analysis contained in Hegel, that are both retained, and critically 
applied by Marx to a new subject matter. There is, even within this early work, an 
expression of both the twofold rational and mystical sides of the operation of Hegel's 
dialectic that are exposed and expressed in Marx's generalised form of critique. 
At the same time, Marx is also developing his own materialist foundation for the dialectic to 
be applied in a critical manner, and to a materialist subject matter. In the 1844 Manuscripts, 
Marx is already then, inverting the dialectic from Hegel's philosophical head and standing it 
on terra firma. His criticism remains, despite the open and welcoming embracement of 
Feuerbach's gains, one that still remains rooted in a dialectical foundation. 
This distinction itself separates off Marx from Feuerbach; this differentiation, whilst not 
expressed as either a conscious criticism or difference with Feuerbach, is already in 
operation within the Manuscripts. That these differences are either latent within the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, or largely remain below the surface level as 
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unresolved tensions and antinornies, does not mean that there is no tentative expression of 
them. 
Marx's glowing advocacy for Feuerbach will, in my analysis, ultimately prove to be unsure 
of its footing; this being due to the inherent dynamics of the dialectics that are involved in 
the positive and negative aspects of Hegel's thought that are both outlined, and critically 
analysed by Marx. 
That Marx wholeheartedly accepts the core of Feuerbach's critique is not the issue, he 
clearly does. The problem is in explaining how that Feuerbachian critique is interpreted by 
Marx in conjunction with, for example, his apparent retention of what he considers to be the 
core rational element that remains of the Hegelian dialectic of negativity. " 
The further question generated by this is the following one, are these rational elements the 
source of the critical form of dialectic that is contained, within this Hegelian mystical guise, 
as an uncritical process? If so, what is their positive nature? The dialectical nature of the 
critique, contained in this process is already embryonically reflected and contained, as the 
analysis will attempt to show, within Marx's discussion of Hegel's dialectic of negativity 
and negation of the negation in the Manuscripts. 
In order to answer the above questions more fully then the following strategy has to be 
employed; it is necessary to separate out Marx's twofold analysis of the abstract idealist and 
the critical materialist form of dialectic contained in his criticism. At the same time both 
have to be related and integrated into the investigation of the core elements of his argument. 
11 Whilst Feuerbach signals a huge leap forward for critical thought, his naturalism and materialism is 
not dialectical and active, but contemplative and passive. The critical explosion of Hegel's idealist foundation 
for thought, contained in Feuerbach's theoretical advance, and its replacement with a material and natural 
foundation as the source for a naturalised ontology and epistemology is, however, not the same thing as an 
inverted material, natural, and social form of dialectic. This difference in the philosophical basis for Marx's 
critique, though not yet consciously expressed here by Marx, will shortly manifest itself in the theses on 
Feuerbach. 
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Otherwise, it would be impossible to expound what Marx characterises as "the critical form 
of this in Hegel, uncritical process. " 
This dialectical form and exposition of the critique is necessary, in order to show how Marx 
reveals both the mystical and rational elements contained in Hegel's method. The dialectical 
character of the critique should also exhibit how Marx's own critical form of dialectic is, 
paradoxically, both contained in, and the inverse of, the abstract idealist form; this can only 
be achieved by demonstrating how it emerges out of his general criticism of Hegel's idealist 
dialectic. 
Failure to do so would raise serious doubts as to the validity of trying to make sense of 
Marx's suggestion, here contained in its earliest form of expression, of the need to invert the 
Hegelian form of dialectic. This primary dialectical principle of change and alteration 
contained in the law of the negation of the negation should, therefore, -logically take both a 
critical and uncritical form in Marx's exposition, if the above interpretation contains any 
efficacy. 
As we shall see, this dialectical principle and law of motion does take a contradictory form 
in Marx's analysis of Hegel's exposition. It contains both genuine and important theoretical 
insight, and an alienated and mystified form of expression that is grounded in an absolute 
form of idealist ontology. Herein lies the real difficulty for the analysis of the rational form 
contained in Hegel; it lies in unearthing this critical form, which in Hegel is still left at the 
level of an uncritical process; a process that is subsumed and blunted by his idealism. 
This twofold character of Marx's analysis of this fundamental principle of the negation of 
the negation, as a principle that pertains to all forms of being, is now, due to its centrality for 
explaining and resolving the above problem, now posited as the subject matter for our 
investigation. 
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2. Negation of the Negation. 
First of all for the investigation, just what role does the negation of the negation play in 
Hegel's philosophical analysis? In the Phenomenology of Spirit, for example, it takes the 
following form for Marx. The negation of the negation is the process of the coming to be of 
self-consciousness and self-affirmation through the supersession of its own form of 
alienation and estrangement; a form that is itself expressed in the relation of consciousness 
to objectivity. This process, in turn, becomes expressed in Hegel's idealism, as a dialectic 
between consciousness and self-consciousness; that is, as a dialectic within consciousness 
itself. 
Alternatively expressed, it is the act of self-reference in alienation by the supersession of 
that alienation. It is the superseding of alienation by the active negation, by the subject, of 
its own alienated condition; a condition that takes the form of its relation to its direct 
opposite, its dialectical pole, its own other as Hegel expresses it. It is the active subject 
resolving its contradiction by negating and incorporating that opposite pole as a moment or 
determination of its own activity; by doing so it affirms itself as the subject of the process. 
As such, it is a core element in Hegel's account of the general form of working and the laws 
of dialectics. The concept is here at the level of abstract definition; the aim is that this will 
be investigated and teased out in a variety of fashions, and in more concrete detail, as the 
thesis develops. 22 
11 This key concept of Hegel's dialectic has, in my analysis, more than one logical and ontological 
application and usage. It applies to both the operation of a systematic subject in its dialectical activity of 
positing and resolving the primary contradiction in its nature, and, in the more traditional and "orthodox" 
Marxist sense and usage; that of a subject superseding itself and positing a new specific form of systematic 
activity. Capital, as the systematic exploitation of commodified labour power, would be an example of the 
former. Labour, in its evolving social forms, with its dialectical transformation and supersession into higher 
historical social forms of development as an example of the latter. 
Hegel also applies this key concept to the analysis of substance, as the fundamental ontological 
category of being; indeed the logical, historical, and objective elements in Hegel's thought are united in the 
idea of the process of how substance becomes subject. This application of the negation of the negation to 
substantial activity will have its resonance in Marx's dialectic of labour and value. It is an important and 
fundamental relation that cannot be stressed highly enough, and will be the subject of investigation as the 
thesis develops. 
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Hegel views this alienated form of speculative dialectic as being ultimately the expression 
and product of the movement contained within pure logical thought itself. The absolute 
nature of thought is revealed in the process of conceptual development; as a universal 
interconnection of the categories of thought that are conceptually integrated by Hegel into a 
cohesive and self-moving logical totality. 
A self-moving logical and systematic totality that objectifies itself in manifest nature, and 
subjectifies itself in society as human spirit or mind; this latter shape is itself expressed in its 
highest form by pure, logical, speculative, philosophical thought. 
We shall start off the analysis with the central points of the criticism, contained in the 
E. P. M., of Feuerbach's view of Hegel's the negation of the negation. The criticism takes the 
following forms in Marx's exposition; forms that are derived from and summarise 
Feuerbach's from Marx's perspective. 
Feuerbach's Critique. 
Feuerbach's importance for Marx is that he represents both genuine insight and a real gain 
for critical thought in his explication of the contradiction contained in this core principle of 
Hegel's speculative idealism. In the Feuerbachean critique, it is posed as a contradiction 
within Hegel's philosophy that it affirms theology after having denied it, and which it 
therefore affirms in opposition to itself. 
In broad terms, the negation of the negation in Hegel is the self-confirmation of alienated 
consciousness in its own alienation. The positive side of the negation of the negation in 
Hegel, the self-affirmation contained in it, is viewed, by Feuerbach, as a position that still 
has not overcome its opposition. 
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The "positive position" of the self-affirmation and self-confirmation that is contained in the 
negation of the negation is therefore not proven in Hegel. It is still "burdened" with its 
opposite, nature. Hegel's view thus does not demonstrate itself by its existence. As the 
speculative idealist account does not prove itself objectively in existence, it is, therefore, for 
Feuerbach's naturalism, "confronted by the position of sense-certainty based on itself. "" 
The General Form of Marx's Critique. 
Marx is in broad agreement with the above criticisms of Feuerbach. At the same time there 
is the need to generalise the critique of Hegel's dialectic and this fundamental principle of 
all activity pertaining to it, to widen and extend its nature. Due to this very need for a more 
generalised settling of accounts with Hegel's dialectic, there is inevitably a difference 
expressed by Marx between the scope and range contained in Feuerbach's, and his own 
form of criticism and investigation. This is so for the following reasons. 
Firstly, whilst Marx accepts the Feuerbachian analysis, it is a specific critique of Hegel's 
idealist and theosophical viewpoint. One that is still contained, by and large, within 
traditional philosophical boundaries and parameters. Feuerbach limits his critique of Hegel's 
application of the negation of the negation to Hegel's theosophical and philosophical 
relation, expressed as a contradiction of philosophy with itself. 
" Feuerbach thus conceives the negation of the negation only as a contradiction of 
philosophy with itself - as philosophy which affirms theology (the transcendent etc. ) 
after having denied it, and which it therefore affirms in opposition to itself. 9924 
23 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 329. In a note in the 
text here by Marx, he also expresses this in the following manner. "Feuerbach also defines the negation of the 
negation, the definite concept, as thinking surpassing itself in thinking and as thinking wanting to be directly 
awareness, nature, reality. " 
24 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 329. 
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Feuerbach, according to Marx, does not see the positive side of the negation of negation as 
self-affirmation and self-confirmation, because Hegel's absolute idealism fails to 
demonstrate its existence in the real world. The world remains unaltered by the activity of 
speculative idealist thought for it has only overcome that world in thought, and posited that 
world as the product of thought. 
By implication, Marx sees the critique, inherent the negation of the negation, in a wider 
sense than the expression of an alienated movement that entails the negation of religion and 
its subsequent reaffirmation in the guise of the philosophy of religion. The negation of the 
negation has a universal application and usage in Hegel's philosophy; the materialist 
criticism of Marx reflects this more universal application of this dialectical principle of all 
movement and generation. 
The failure of Hegel's idealist account of self-affirmation contained in Feuerbach's critique 
does not mean that the negation of the negation cannot be applied to other active subjects, 
subjects where it is objectively self-affirmed. By contrast, Marx, as we shall see, is 
attempting to generate just this form of dialectic This generalised form of criticism is 
reflected by Marx in his discussion of the negation of the negation as applying to, not only 
the negating and affirming of alienated religion as philosophy, a la Feuerbach; but also to 
another subject. 
This subject, the inverted materialist form of Hegel's mystical one is nature; this natural 
subject also further includes within it, the essential human activity that is bound up with 
external nature. Dialectics, as the movement of an ontological contradiction, is expressed as 
a necessary relation of the subject to sublate the opposite determination in its own specific 
nature. For Marx this dialectic is expressed through the human activity of labour. 
Paradoxically though, both the positive as well as the negative aspects of Hegel's mystical 
application of this dialectical principle will be brought out in Marx's critical analysis 'of the 
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more generalised form of estrangement and alienation that negation of the negation takes in 
Hegel. 
That is, both the rational and the mystical elements will be represented in his critical 
analysis of this pivotal Hegelian concept and dialectical categoryAt is by counterpoising 
Hegel's idealist account of spirit's relation to nature with labour's relation to nature that 
Marx generates this dialectical paradox. It is this inversion of the dialectic within all activity 
that will fundamentally separate Marx's critique from that of Feuerbach's. 
There is, for Marx, still a positive aspect to this, failed idealist dialectic; this is implicitly 
revealed in the following usage by Marx of a qualifying "but". Marx himself proceeds to tell 
us what the nature of that qualifying "but" actually is. 
"But because Hegel has conceived the negation of the negation, from the point of 
view of the positive relation inherent in it, as the true and only positive, and from the 
point of view of the negative relation inherent in it as the only true act and 
spontaneous activity of all being, he has found only the abstract, logical, speculative 
expression for the movement of history, which is not yet the real history of man as a 
given subject, but only the act of creation, the history of the origin of man. "' 
Secondly, and directly related to the view that Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's philosophy, 
whilst undoubtedly correct for Marx, has to be expanded in its range and scope. There is yet 
another qualifying "but" to Feuerbach's argument that is pregnantly inserted into Marx's 
account in the Manuscripts. This qualification reinforces the earlier need to generalise the 
criticism of Hegel through this his core principle. 
"Here is the root of Hegel's false positivism, or of his merely apparent criticism: this 
is what Feuerbach designated as the positing, negating and then the re-affirming and 
25 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 329. 
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re-establishing of religion or theology - but it has to be expressed in more general 
terms. Thus reason is at home in unreason as unreason. "" 
This aspect of my analysis is in disagreement with C. Arthur's view, which attaches no 
significance to the earlier point made by Marx. That of how Feuerbach criticised the 
negation of the negation in a specific form, that is, only as a contradiction of philosophy 
with itself. This formulation, according to Arthur, cannot be taken as indicating any real 
criticism of Feuerbach's analysis by Marx; this is due to the following reason. 
To interpret Marx's comment here as being more negative than "either an endorsement" or a 
"neutral report" with regards Feuerbach, is to "read too much into the text". The reason for 
this, according to Arthur, is that "no other remark in the 1844 Manuscripts can be said to be 
critical of Feuerbach, so the balance of probability is that this is not either. "2' 
It seems clear though, that there is a form of relation between the above quoted two forms of 
employment, by Marx, of the qualifying use of "but", and how Hegel's negation of the 
negation is interpreted by Feuerbach only as a contradiction of philosophy with itself. " 
Firstly, because Hegel has encapsulated the dialectical polarity of the principle of negativity 
as "the only true act and spontaneous activity of all being" and the "abstract, logical, 
speculative expression for the movement of history" entails that its application is wider than 
Hegel's theosophical contradiction. It is by showing how Hegel's thought, is not only in 
contradiction in its philosophical expression of its relation to religion, that it precisely 
requires to be widened in its scope. 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 339. 
11 C. Arthur. Dialectics of Labour. Blackwell. (1986. ) P. 122. 
28 G. Lukacs. The Young Hegel. Merlin Press. (1975. ) Pages 547-561. G. Lukacs takes a similar view 
to the position outlined in this section of the thesis. See P. 559-560. However, he does not link the second 
qualifying "but" to the first, to produce the critique inherent in Marx vis a vis Feuerbach. In my view, to do so 
adds further strength to the viewpoint that does see that, even within the E. P. M., there are some implicit if not 
explicit criticisms of Feuerbach's analysis of Hegel's negation of negation at work. The real question, and 
problem, is to understand the fluidity and dynamics involved that are forming Marx's intellectual development 
at this particular period. 
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This naturally leads on to the second qualifying but of Marx, one that does clearly connect 
with the need for a wider critique than Feuerbach's view that the negation of the negation 
expresses only a contradiction of philosophy with itself. It is also because it is a generalised 
philosophical principle with a wider application to all being that it is characterised, by Marx, 
as an alienated philosophical form that expresses a more generalised condition. 
For example, Hegel's thought contains an inverted and mysticised account of human 
rationality that is also in contradiction with both its relation to nature, and its alienated 
social condition. This is also why it is generalised, by Marx, in the form of how "reason is at 
home in unreason as unreason. " This is why his alienated form of reason, and his 
application of his dialectical principle, as Marx puts it, "has to be expressed in more general 
terms. " 
In my perspective, both the above remarks, combined with Marx's expression that the 
critique of Hegel has to be generalised and aimed at Hegel's dialectic and philosophy as a 
whole, entails that if taken together, and viewed as being in some form of intellectual and 
theoretical relation, amount to more than just "an endorsement" or a "neutral report" on 
Feuerbach. As such, they indicate, at the least, an immanent criticism, or an underlying 
tension. 
The situation can also be posed, perhaps more accurately, in the following fashion, as being 
both an endorsement and as a going beyond the parameters of Feuerbach's critique, to a 
wider and fuller form. Marx's attempted proof of Feuerbach's achievements would though, 
take his general form of criticism into uncharted regions, well beyond the topography of 
Feuerbach. 
This, I believe, captures the dynamics of the relation more accurately. To see the 
interconnection between these two qualifying statements by Marx is to trace out, what was 
already in the embryonic process of becoming a significant difference between Feuerbach 
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and Marx. The two remarks are, in my view, related and have a widespread significance and 
implication for understanding Marx's own critique of Hegel. The question is what are the 
implications of the dynamic inherent in this more generalised form of critique of Marx? 
Marx's critique of Hegel's idealism is posited by him in a more generalised form whose 
specific aim is not just to show Hegel's philosophical thought as expressing an alienated 
philosophical and theosophical form; a form which has its roots in nature and civil society. 
There would be no point, that specific criticism of Hegel had already been achieved by 
Feuerbach and accepted wholeheartedly by Marx. 
The materialist critique of Marx aims to demonstrate that the negation of the negation, when 
critically applied, for example, to Hegel's alienated expression of social thought, reveals 
that "this lie is the lie of his principle. " The problem with Hegel's account is that it 
rationalises that alienated condition in its alienated fashion, and cognises it as the product of 
abstract philosophical mind. 
"The man who has recognised that he is leading an alienated life in law, politics, 
etc., is leading his true human life in this alienated life as such. Self-affirmation, self- 
confirmation in contradiction with itself - in contradiction with both the knowledge 
and the essential being of the object - is thus true knowledge and life. "" 
What Marx seeks to add to the Feuerbachian account is a generalised form of criticism, and 
a generalised proof of this criticism. This generalised disapprobation would, if successful, 
seem to be a more damning criticism than Feuerbach's, and in many ways it certainly is. 
However, and paradoxically, this generalised form of criticism also allows for the positive 
and rational element, contained within the idealist conception of the dialectic of negativity, 
to begin to emerge more clearly. 
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Marx's incisive analysis is of a central concept and fundamental principle in Hegel's 
philosophy. By honing in on the dynamic contradiction that is expressed within it, the 
criticism can then be applied to the "the entire compass of abstraction" contained in Hegel's 
thought. This will, paradoxically, both deepen and comprehensively extend the materialist 
critique of Hegel, and at the same time draw out the positive aspects of the principle of the 
negation of the negation contained in Hegel's work. This is brought out precisely by 
showing how "reason is at home in unreason as unreason. "'o 
Marx's critique is a critique that posits that the totality of Hegel's view of activity, including 
the objective world and nature, is itself posited in an idealist and alienated fashion as 
ultimately the work of thought. It is this very objectivity itself that Hegel has to annul by the 
movement of self-consciousness, by idealist philosophical thought. The critique inherent in 
Marx then, is not only limited to the inversion of ontological primacy, but also of an idealist 
subject of dialectical activity and its replacement with a materialist subject of dialectical 
activity. 
The emphasis Marx places on the positive form of the Hegelian dialectic of negativity as the 
self-movement of a contradiction, the essence of the dialectical method, marks him out from 
the Feuerbach critique. What separates Marx from Feuerbach in the Manuscripts, and this is 
of vital importance for understanding the nature of Marx's inversion, is the attempt to 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 339. Marx then goes 
on to say the following. "There can therefore no longer be any question about an act of accommodation on 
Hegel's part vis-A-vis religion, the state, etc., since this lie is the lie of his principle. " 
11 This leaves us with a problem that requires some explanation, one whose answer will challenge the 
view that Hegel's dialectic is rotten to its idealist core; how, for the critical materialist, can reason be at home 
in unreason as unreason? Before we can even begin to answer this question we will have to introduce yet 
another element into the argument. In my analysis, this further element has not been sufficiently integrated 
into the analysis by commentators in this area of historical research. This element being Marx's designation of 
Hegel's philosophy, and his view of the essence of it, as a form of "alienated science thinking itself". This 
unusual formulation of Marx can also be, in my account, interpreted as an alternative way of expressing his 
generalised criticism that in Hegel's thought, "reason is at home in unreason as unreason. " 
The discussion of this relation between reason being at home in unreason as unreason, and its relation 
to Marx's designation of Hegel's Logic as a form of alienated science, will be discussed later in the thesis. 
(See chapter four. ) Before we can do so, it requires yet further analysis of Marx's critique of Hegel's idealist 
dialectic to prepare some more groundwork for a more fruitful discussion to take place. 
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disengage Hegel's methodological insights from his idealist system. This strategy is not part 
of Feuerbach's philosophical criticism. " 
It is time now to begin to take a more in depth look at the core elements of Hegel's account 
of the dynamics of the process and movement of dialectical thought, and the areas where 
Marx develops his generalised form of criticism of Hegel's alienated form of expression of 
dialectic. Hegel's application of the principle of change and alteration inherent to the 
dialectic of negativity is to the development of mind as self-consciousness; in a process of 
sublating its opposite, nature, in order to affirm itself as logical speculative mind. 
The objectivity of external being is cognised as merely the alienated form and manifestation 
of the activity of absolute thought, manifested and expressed in that thought's own 
estranged form of existence, the objective natural totality. ý The result of this mystified 
dialectical process and supersession of Hegel is the creation of a totality of logical 
abstraction. This is expressed by Marx as the "dialectic of pure thought" that revolves 
within its own circle, in its own peculiar, speculative, and alienated form as philosophical 
logic, and containing its twin dialectical poles of abstract nature and abstract mind. 
How does Hegel end up with an idealist account of the dialectic that mystifies rather than 
clarifies that real relation? How does Hegel arrive at this peculiar position of abstract 
thought being its own subject and object, its own self-contained totality according to Marx? 
3. Hegel's Double Error. 
The explanation of the sources of Hegel's speculative leaps and somersaults involves what 
Marx calls Hegel's "double error"; the critical analysis of this twofold error by Marx attacks 
11 This separation of method from system will prove to be fundamentally important for the 
development of Marx's critical thought. The contradiction in Hegel between method and system, later 
highlighted by Engels, is already in operation here. These differences, of a materialist subject of the dialectic, 
and the separation of the dialectical method from an idealist system, constitute what would become a 
fundamental separation of Marx from Feuerbach. The full ramifications of which, Marx had yet to develop, 
never mind fully think through. 
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the philosophical foundation for Hegel's idealist illusions. What Hegel takes to be the 
criterion of the estranged world, is, in fact, itself an alienated expression of that 
estrangement for Marx. This is Hegel's first error. What are posed, as the criterion of the 
estranged world, are the philosopher and the activity of philosophical thought. 
"The whole history of the alienation process and the whole process of the retraction 
of the alienation is therefore nothing but the history of the production of abstract (i. e. 
absolute) thought - of logical speculative thought. "" 
Objectivity becomes interpreted as an abstract objectivity, with the ongoing and developing 
forms of consciousness viewed in an unfolding dialectical and historical relation; a relation 
that results in the realisation of its true nature, as self-conscious mind that contains 
knowledge of the absolute. The Phenomenology of Spirit, as the historical result of this 
development of abstract philosophical thought, has realised its teleological goal, as absolute 
knowledge. 
The core of the alienation process is contained within the parameters of the dialectic of 
subject and object; with the object cast as the idea in itseýf, as nature, and the subject cast as 
the ideafor itseýf, as mind. Estrangement, is the direct oppositional form of this objective 
dialectical relation between nature and man that is contained in this contrariety of in itself 
and for itself. The opposition is also manifested, according to Marx, as that between abstract 
thinking and sensuous reality "or real sensuousness within thought itself. " 
The objective relation is itself subjectivised and sublated in thought by Hegel's idealism; the 
objective relation is internalised within the subject, and is now expressed in the form of the 
dialectic of consciousness and self-consciousness. As the object now appears as a form of 
consciousness, it is in the process of being superseded by the realm of thought. 
32 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 331. 
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The object then appears only as an external manifestation of abstract consciousness, as an 
externalised thought-entity or concept; this is its idealised form of being. The subject, as 
man, appears only as self-consciousness; the dialectic of self and other, of subject and 
object, is now integrated within the process of thought itself. This relation being the posited 
essence and source of the objective estrangement that is to be superseded in thought and by 
thought. 
This process, of estrangement and its supersession, is all the entire work of the movement of 
the categories of thought. Estrangement lies in the form of the opposition of the 
objectification of natural man, in contrast to his truer and higher nature, as abstract thinker. 
The appropriation of objectivity and the annulling of the estrangement occur in the realm of 
thought, as a movement and process belonging only to pure thought. 
The second error that flows from this is that mind is posited as the essence of man. As the 
philosopher, the abstract form of estranged man, is the criterion of the estranged world, then 
mind, whose essence is alienated abstract thinking, appropriates the estranged world in an 
estranged way; in the active form and mode of abstract philosophical thought. 
As the external objects, both natural and social, are ultimately seen as thought- 
determinations, as conceptual thought-entities, then the idealist dialectical paradox that 
ensues is that they are then both objectively estranged from, and at the same time contained 
within, abstract philosophical thought. As the product of abstract mind, and as the 
phenomenal form of the movement of the categories of thought, they are phases of mind or 
conceptual thought-entities. The true appropriation of objectivity occurs then, only in the 
form of abstract thought, that is, in the estranged form of abstract philosophical man. 
Consciousness, in this its dynamic dialectical movement, becomes self-consciousness. The 
process and the result of this idealist dialectic is absolute mind, which is thinking returning 
home to its point of origin. The historical result of this process being the dialectic of pure 
thought, with the true form of mind as logical, speculative mind. 
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As such, the dialectic of consciousness and self-consciousness becomes generalised in an 
alienated philosophical form, as pure logical thought. Alternatively expressed, it is alienated 
thinking contemplating itself in an alienated fashion, and, moreover, taking that alienated 
expression as its true and real expression. As this is abstract thought that abstracts from real 
nature and from real man, it is an abstract totality of thought that becomes indifferent to all 
real determinateness. 
In Marx's view the activity of the philosophical mind, the essence and criterion of all reality 
for Hegel, is "nothing but the estranged mind of the world thinking within its self- 
estrangement - i. e., comprehending itself abstractly. "33 
This view is, in itself, a more generalised criticism of Hegel's philosophy than that of the 
negating of religion and its philosophical reaffirmation through the negating of that 
negation. This "double error" in Hegel gives rise to the speculative illusions that are 
expressed in his inverted and mystical form of dialectic; a dialectic that contains its own 
specific form of idealist presuppositions as its foundation. 
Speculative Illusions. 
"The issue, therefore is to surmount the object of consciousness. Objectivity, as such 
is regarded as an estranged human relationship which does not correspond to the 
essence of man, to self-consciousness. The reappropriation of the objective essence 
of man, produced within the orbit of estrangement as something alien, therefore 
denotes not only the annulment of estrangement, but of objectivity as well. Man, that 
is to say, is regarded as a non-objective spiritual being. "" 
33 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 330. 
34 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 333-334. 
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The movement of the negation of the negation in Hegel is characterised here by Marx as 
"the movement of surmounting the object of consciousness. " The exposition of Hegel's 
account of this process, contained in Marx's criticism, and outlined here, will concentrate on 
the mystical and uncritical form of the idealist dialectic before drawing out, later in the 
thesis, some of the more positive or critical aspects that are entailed in this Hegelian 
principle of the dialectic. 
First of all, it is important to be clear what Marx means here by his use of the phrase "the 
movement of surmounting the object of consciousness. " What is referred to and entailed in 
the use of this phrase by Marx? Hegel, for Marx, regards the externalised and alienated 
objectivity of nature as an estranged relationship that does not correspond to the essence of 
man, that is, to man in his apposite form as rational and speculative mind. What though is 
the ontological status of the object of consciousness here? 
The object of consciousness is, for abstract philosophical man, nothing but self- 
consciousness; or alternatively, the object is itself only a form of objectified and alienated 
self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, in fact, presents itself to itself, in the form of an 
object; an object that is destined to be, in this its alien-objective and estranged form, negated 
by the process and movement of self-consciousness itself. The movement of surmounting 
the object of consciousness is then the process of the return of the object into the self, in the 
form of conceptual thought, its true essence and ontological root. 
The movement behind this process takes the form of the negation of the negation, as the 
dialectic inherent in the active thought process. Consciousness, first of all, negates itself by 
alienating itself in the estranged form of the object; this it does in order to then negate the 
estranged nature of the object and return to itself as self-conscious conceptual thought. The 
means by which this process is realised is through the sublation of the alienation of self- 
consciousness through the movement of surmounting that estranged object of 
consciousness, namely objective nature. 
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Self-consciousness posits objectivity itself as a thing whose essentiality lies outside its own 
materialised form; its essence lies in the form of abstract thought. The objectivity of 
material being, as estrangement and alienation, exists then only as a result of the self- 
estrangement and self-alienation of absolute thought. As conceptual thought is regarded as 
the very essence of that estranged and alien objectivity, then by conceptually surmounting 
the object of consciousness, consciousness will, at the same time, realises itself in its higher 
form, as self-consciousness. 
What constitutes estrangement for Hegel's idealism is not the determinate character of the 
object but its very objectivity itself. Self-consciousness "takes offence" not at estranged 
objectivity, but at objectivity per se. It is objectivity itself that is to be annulled in thought 
and as thought. This entails that in the supersession, it is not only the annulment of 
estrangement that takes place, but also the annulment of objectivity itself. This is why, the 
essence of man, as Marx characterises Hegel's view, is ultimately regarded as being that of a 
"non-objective spiritual being. " 
This re-appropriation of man's estranged objective essence is effected through the dialectic 
contained in the alienated form of the natural object outside him, as an object that is 
inherently fated to be subsumed in the process of the production of speculative and logical 
thought. This consciousness realises by replacing the "offensive" objectivity, the 
externalised form of the estranged essence, with a new object that reflects its true essential 
activity; namely, conceptual thought. 
The result of this process of surmounting the object of consciousness is that the object itself 
becomes a moment, a determination of thought; as essentially the product of a conceptual 
entity. This conceptuality is then, both the very essence and the source of the substantial 
being of the object; as a conceptual essence that can only be grasped in and by rational 
thought, its true source and substantial foundation. 
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Speculative thought becomes, through this idealist dialectic of consciousness with self- 
consciousness, its own subject and object; one that merely has an estranged external and 
natural form, but whose true essence lies in the domain of conceptual thought. Nature and 
objectivity are then viewed as being essentially conceptual entities, as the externalised 
material form of the expression of self-consciousness. It is the process where objectivity 
itself is sublated in thought and expressed in its universal form as pure, logical, speculative 
thought. 
Through this dialectical activity of mind, self-critical thought becomes a systematic, rational 
and logical self-consciousness. At the same time, nature is shown to be the product of 
conceptual thought, as its mere phenomenal appearance and manifestation. The real 
alienation, of active objective humanity in relation to active objective nature, is inverted and 
regarded as the form of appearance of the estrangement of self-consciousness. 
The object turns out to be, in this inverted idealist process, the self-estrangement and 
externalisation of thought that is retracted back to its truer and higher form, as rational 
conceptual thought, as knowledge, but in an alienated and estranged fashion that, in Marx's 
critique, only confirms its own alienated and abstract philosophical activity. 
How does this process and movement unfold that would underpin and confirm the idealist 
viewpoint for Hegel? The answer to this idealist process ties in with the previous criticism 
of Marx, the "double error" in Hegel discussed in the last section. 
As mind is the true human essence for Hegel, then the development of mind is in the 
overcoming of this its alienated condition. As abstract philosophical man, the criterion of all 
knowledge, is in this view self-consciousness, then the objective estrangement is the 
estrangement of self-consciousness from realising itself in its true nature, as logical, 
speculative mind. Alienated self-consciousness posits that estranged objective essence as an 
abstraction, as an abstract object; the result of this positing is that external being is itself 
reduced to a conceptual abstraction, namely "thinghood". 
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Thinghood, as the abstract form of external nature, is the estranged form of that objective 
essence; as the dialectical opposite and negative identity of alienated self-consciousness 
itself. In this alienated form, self-consciousness posits itself as object, and the object as 
itself. This it can do only through the positing of thinghood as the reduction of the objective 
concrete determination to an abstract thought determination. 
"And what is posited, instead of confirming itself, is but confirmation of the act of 
positing which for a moment fixes its energy as the product, and gives it the 
semblance - but only for a moment - of an independent, real substance. "" 
This idealist abstraction, posited by the alienation of self-consciousness, entails that 
objectivity and thus thinghood is inherently non-independent; what it is dependent on is the 
activity of conceptual thought. The determinate character of the object and its very 
objectivity are negated and cancelled by this process and act of abstraction; this only serves 
to confirm objectivity as both the self-alienation and dialectical return of abstract 
speculative thought to itself. 
Thinghood is thus both a product of, and posited by, abstract thought itself; it is, in turn, 
dependent upon abstract thought for its very existence. This positing of thinghood "is itself 
an illusion of speculation" for this abstract objectification of externality is itself "an act of 
contradicting the nature of pure activity, it has to be cancelled again and thinghood denied. " 
Thinghood does not then confirm itself in its activity; instead it merely confirms the activity 
of abstract thought. 
The object, as it becomes sublated in the form of conceptual thought, is shown to be both 
dependent and self-annulling. The nullity of the estranged object is "precisely the self- 
confirmation of the non-objectivity of the abstraction itself. " Here the nullity of the object 
lies in the non-existence of the distinction between the object of conceptual consciousness 
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and self-consciousness itself, it lies in their direct identity as essentially the product of 
speculative thought. 
At the same time as speculative idealism is showing the essential "nullity" of an external 
object, as an object that is itself dependent on conceptual and abstract thought as its very 
essence, self-consciousness, through the process of re-absorbing that objectivity, realises 
that it is, in fact, at home in its other being as such. Estranged objectivity is thus dependent 
upon abstract thought for its estranged form of existence. 
Knowing has confronted itself with itself, that which appears to it as an object is only itself. 
The outcome of the process is that self-consciousness "knows knowing" as an object, as an 
object that is merely the alienated form of self-conscious mind. Knowing has confronted 
itself with itself, the object is its own estranged and external form. 
The "in itself" of consciousness in its dialectical relation to objective nature becomes the 
"for itself" of self-consciousness as mind or spirit. Mind is thus self-confirmed as the true 
essence of man, and thinking, logical, speculative mind is the true character and the realised 
essence of mind. This is the illusion of thought in its mystical and idealist form, and how the 
principle of the negation of the negation becomes, in Hegel's analysis, the inverted 
confirmation of the pseudo-essence, as abstract, speculative thought. 
The entity that is superseded is the entity as an object of knowledge; what is ultimately 
transcended is a conceptual entity. In turn, as the object is transformed into a moment or 
determination of thought, it merely confirms the abstractions of self-consciousness. The 
result of this idealist movement is the identity of consciousness with self-consciousness in 
the form of absolute knowledge. 
31 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 336. 
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"[T]he movement of abstract thought no longer directed outwards but proceeding 
now only within its own self: that is to say, the dialectic of pure thought is the 
resu t. "36 
In the dialectical movement for surmounting the object of consciousness what is cancelled is 
estranged objectivity, what is retained is that estranged objectivity as a moment and 
determination of thought, as the alienated and inverted contrary form of the dialectic 
contained in conceptual thought. Nature is, by its very externality, absolute thought's own 
estranged form of negative existence. 
Self-consciousness thus realises and affirms itself in its highest form, as a logical, 
systematic, and speculative totality of pure thought. The conceptual identity of object and 
subject is underpinned and hypostasised as the product of pure logical thought, their 
common foundation, one that is conferred with an absolute status. The potentiality of 
consciousness as mind or spirit is actualised in this its divine element and source, as the 
absolute idea. 
This is why self-consciousness can believe itself to be directly the other of itself. Hegel's 
speculative illusions reside in his view that consciousness, as self-consciousness, as it is 
both in direct identity to and the source of that very estranged objectivity, thinks that it is at 
home in its other-being as such. As speculative thought imagines itself to be the other of 
itself, as the essence of the object; then the action of thought is taken to be the essential 
source of the action behind the object. 
As Hegel's illusion posits that self-consciousness is at home in its alienated and estranged 
other, then its materialist critique posits its direct opposite; that knowing pretends to be 
directly that other, the real world, life. As Feuerbach expressed it, thought surpasses itself in 
thought, it does not, however, prove itself in its existence. Externality remains unaffected by 
the activity of abstract speculative thought. This is why Feuerbach posits that, for his 
" Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 332. 
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materialist critique, Hegel's idealism is "confronted by the position of sense-certainty based 
on itself. " 
This supersession in thought then, both leaves the object intact, and at the same time 
believes that it has now subsumed the object in its essential form, as a product of conceptual 
abstraction. This abolition of the estrangement is in fact a confirmation of the estrangement 
in the materialist critique. The estrangement inherent to this idealist dialectic of object and 
subject remains in the sense that the object, nature, is ontologically posited as the idea in its 
alienated and external other-being, its unconscious or non-rational form. 
Estrangement is its very ontological condition; its real essential activity therefore lies 
outside itself, in the subjectivity of self-consciousness, in active mind. This implies that 
when consciousness attains to adequate self-consciousness, when the alienation posited by 
consciousness is superseded as self-consciousness, it nevertheless posits that alien and 
estranged objectivity as the product of thought itself. Estrangement is thus a condition that is 
ultimately posited by abstract thought itself. Estrangement is the inherent condition of 
external nature for the absolute idealist. 
Estrangement, like alienation and religion in the materialist critique, is both negated and 
then reaffirmed; estrangement is then not overcome, but is regarded as a necessary product 
of the dialectical diremption of subjectivity and objectivity; a dialectic whose foundation is 
based on the ontology of absolute idealism. It is absolute thought that estranges itself in the 
form of the alienated object of thought, as its own alienated essence in an estranged 
objective form. 
Objectivity is confirmed as an alien and estranged objectivity that does not correspond to the 
real essence of nature. More importantly, it does not correspond to the real essence of man, 
to self-consciousness; that is, to thought elevated from the animal to its higher form, as 
absolute spirit or mind, as the divine and rational element in man. The result of Hegel's 
Logic is the process then whereby systematic abstract thought confirms itself; it confirms 
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itself in its own alienated activity for it has absorbed nature as an abstract systematic totality 
that now proceeds within its own self, as the dialectic of pure thought. 
Marx's argument finds its inspiration and parallel with Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's 
negating and reaffirming of religion. Marx's critique of Hegel's dialectic though is of a 
more generalised form, impacting on the very core of the dialectical principles and 
foundations of Hegel's speculative and logical system of thought in its relation to objective 
nature. The reason this is so, is that Marx does not simply counterpose to Hegel's 
speculative thought, Feuerbach's view that it is "confronted by the position of sense- 
certainty based on itself. " 
What Marx inverts and counterposes to Hegel's idealist activity of thought, as we shall see, 
is what he regards as the real essential activity of humanity. This estranged and alienated 
form of the dialectic of negativity of Hegel will be inverted by Marx and put to use in 
understanding real, objective activity. This is one explanation why Marx, in distinction from 
Feuerbach, expresses this inverted and mystified idealist dialectic of subject and object in 
Hegel as the condition where "reason is at home in unreason as unreason. " 
5. Supersensible Subject. 
Hegel's critique of nature as being estranged from consciousness of itself, its own 
conceptual essence, also applies to man's alienated relation to his real essence, the divine. 
Hegel's absolute idealism posits thought as its own autonomous subject that realises itself 
through this dialectic of object and subject, of nature and spirit. Philosophical estrangement 
and religious alienation are thus inherent to the human condition. It is the philosophical 
expression of "the alienation of man who knows himself" in his alienated being, and thus 
posits a subject higher and distinct from himself. 
"This movement, in its abstract form as dialectic, is therefore regarded as truly 
human life and because it is nevertheless an abstraction - an estrangement of human 
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life - it is regarded as a divine process, but as the divine process of man, a process 
traversed by man's abstract, pure, absolute essence that is distinct from himself. "37 
The result of this process being "the self-knowing and self-manifesting idea. " This is 
expressed in pure thought in the universal and systematic logical categories that are posited 
as the higher form-of both nature and spirit, as their common content and divine source. 
Logical and systematic thought is hypostasised and conferred with the status of the 
autonomous subject. 
"This process must have a bearer, a subject. But the subject only comes into being as 
a result. This result - the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness - is 
therefore God, absolute Spirit, the seýf-knowing and sey-manifesting idea. Real man 
and real nature become mere predicates - symbols of this hidden, unreal man and of 
this unreal nature. Subject and predicate are therefore related to each other in 
absolute reversal -a mystical subject-object or a subjectivity reaching beyond the 
object - absolute subject as a process, as subject alienating itself and returning from 
alienation into itself, but at the same time retracting this alienation into itself, and the 
subject as this process, a pure, incessant revolving within itself. "" 
The idealist and mystified dialectic requires, in my reading, an idealist and mystified 
subject, a supersensible subject. In that sense Marx is entirely correct to draw attention to 
this expression of Hegel's -idealist subject. Those of a Marxist persuasion have not 
necessarily followed him on this theme of Hegel's idealist subject. For example, T. Smith 
denies that there is such a supersensible subject in Hegel. The dialectic, even in its Hegelian 
mystified form, is interpreted by him as being fundamentally that of a dialectic between 
humans and nature. 39 
"'Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 342. 
38 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 342-3. 
3" T.. Smith: The Logic of Marx's Capital. S. U. N. Y. Press. (1990. ) P. 10-13. 
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Posed in the more traditional and abstractly philosophical terms, as subject and object, there 
are, for the materialist, no rational and divine source for either the subject or the object. This 
is only the case when that Hegelian dialectic is viewed on one level. In the materialist 
critique of Hegel's idealism, it is true, there is the understanding of the dialectic as being 
contained within the parameters of human labouring activity and nature. Marx clearly 
reflects this in the Manuscripts; he does not however leave his critique of Hegel solely at 
this level. 
In order to criticise this speculative and systematic account; a speculative subject has to be 
understood as underpinning Hegel's idealist and 'absolute form of dialectic. Hegel's 
objective idealism, in opposition to materialist realism, views that inherently rational form 
a: nd basis, contained in the dialectic of the objectivity of being and human subjectivity, as 
the product of not just human mind, but that of an absolute mind. Nature and man are seen 
as the product of divine, rational, and speculative thought. 
Moreover, the objective and subjective idea has to have an absolute subject, as their 
common identity,, in order for thought to take these twofold objective and subjective forms, 
in order for thought to become its own subject and object. In order for there to be ultimately 
a direct identity between thought and being. The product and result of Hegel's dialectic of 
subject and object is the higher form and unity of the two, the Notion or Logical Idea. This 
is clearly reflected in Marx's critique where real nature and real man become mere 
predicates of this unreal and abstract subject. 
That there is an alienated and pseudo-subject, a product of human thought with no other 
existence except as the systematic expression of alienated thought, does not downplay either 
Hegel's dialectical achievements nor the significance this absolute foundation has for 
Hegel's idealism. To recognise this to be the case leads to not only a fuller understanding of 
the Hegelian variation of idealism, but also the dialectical critique and materialist inversion 
of Hegel. 
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It also, and this is of central importance for the materialist analysis, tellingly impacts in the 
critique of Hegel's idealist and absolute foundations for a closed philosophical system. The 
Logical Idea is, as I will later argue later in the thesis, an alienated and abstract account of 
both scientific method and substantial objectivity; in order to posit their ultimate identity as 
a result of a systematic. philosophical process, Hegel has to promote this outcome to a more 
elevated and Olympean plateau. 
To put it another way, it is logic and science seen as the expression of a divine subject, the 
product of alienated and estranged thought itself, pure thought, but raised to a divine state 
that is autonomous from its own creations in nature and humanity. 
The architectonic inherent in Hegel's idealism posits a telos or final cause that can only be 
seen as being ultimately divine. It may, in the materialist critique, be a piece of speculative 
idealist fantasy, but it is necessary for the source of the final cause; a final cause that gives 
the coherence and binding totality to Hegel's system, and at the same time confirms its 
idealist ontological foundation. It also represents the closure principle for the whole system 
where the "divine dialectic" revolves within its own circular, self-contained, and 
hermetically sealed abstract totality. 
To reject that Hegel has a supersensible subject would be analogous to Marx analysing that 
commodity production and its realisation in circulation, through the exchange of 
commodities andponey, did not produce capital as a subject, but merely the polarity of 
production and circulation and the exchange between commodity and money. 
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CHAPTER THREK. 
BEGEL'S PARADOX. 
1. Pseudo-Essence and Real Essence. 
A central issue in Marx's critique of Hegel's idealism in the Paris Manuscripts is the 
counterposition'of what he calls real objectivity in opposition to the abstract and idealist 
account of objectivity in Hegel. Marx's materialist inversion of Hegel then has to 
counterpose what that real objective activity, the real essence that affnimis itself by 
superseding its objective relation, actually is, in contrast to the activity of speculative mind. 
Marx does not reduce that objectivity, through the philosophical abstraction inherent in the 
Hegelian concept of "thinghood", to an entity that is destined to find its essence outside 
itself, in conceptual thought. Nor does he counterpose to this idealist sublation, in the 
manner of Feuerbých, nature in the form of immediate sense-certainty as the source for true 
contemplative philosophical thought. By contrast, Marx counterposes to all forms of 
abstract philosophical activity, the active objectification in nature and society, of the 
subjectivity of concrete labour. 
"Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly in the solid ground, man 
exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature, posits his real, objective essential 
powe. rs as alien objects by his externalisation, it is not the act of positing which is 
the subject in this process: it is the subjectivity of objective essential powers, whose 
action, therefore, must also be something objective. An objective being acts 
objectively, and he would not act objectively if the objective did not reside in the. 
very nature of his being. He only creates or posits objects, because he is posited by 
objects - because at bottom he is nature. In the act of positing, therefore, this 
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objective behig Ooes not fall from his state of "pure activity" into a creating of the 
object; on the contrary, his objective product only confirms his objective activity, his 
activity as the activity of an objective, natural being. "' 
Marx expresses this essence of human species-being, contained in the Manuscripts, via the 
critical analysis of alienated wage-labour; a process that is itself reflected in its own alien 
social product. The productive process, and the alienated form that labouring activity takes, 
is the external result and the real outcome generated by that objective dialectic of humans 
and nature, a predicament that is socially reflected in the conditions of alienated labour in its 
oppressed relationship to the power of money. 
This important distinction and difference between Feuerbach and Marx's criticism of Hegel 
is already being expressed in the Manuscripts. The full consequences of this distinction of 
the inversion in the subject matter, generated through this form of criticism, have only 
begun to reveal their consequences for Marx; the impact this will have for his relation to 
Feuerbach has still to play itself through. 
This inversion of the active subject of the process becomes the materialist source for Marx's 
generalised form of criticism of Hegel. Marx both counterposes and replaces the activity of 
speculative and logical thought, as a process of divine creation and the essence of man, with 
alienated labour; labour that is an evolving, objective activity, one that is fundamentally 
dialectical and material by nature. For Marx, objectivity and activity necessarily resides in 
the very nature of essential being. 
'Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 336. This highlights 
the fundamental and central importance of activity in Marx's thought. "Here we see how consistent naturalism 
or humanism is distinct from both idealism and materialism, and constitutes at ; he same time the unifying truth 
of both. We see also how only naturalism is capable of comprehending the action of world history. " 
Naturalism, in Marx's "consistent" form, becomes active materialism based on a dialectic of negativity. The 
importance of this stress on real objectivity and real activity is further developed, under the rubric of 
theoretical praxis, in the Theses on Feuerbach. The primacy of activity as the mediating relation between 
humans and nature, and the critique of an idealist view of it, is the core of Marx's solution to the defects of all 
preceding materialism. 
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"A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, and 
plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is 
not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has 
no being for its object; i. e., it is not objectively related. Its being is not objective. 
A non-objective. being is a non-being. "" 
Marx here, is both. exposing the mystical form of Hegel's negation of the negation, and also 
positing the rational form that it objectively takes. What is to be in Hegel's view annulled, is 
the objectivity that is the condition of mind's self-estrangement; this annulment takes place 
in the realm of thought. Objectivity is negated in order to affirm it as the active product of 
speculative thought; at the same time, by thought subsuming objectivity it turns it into the 
product of a systematic self-generating thought whole. 
By doing so, thought confirms itself in thought, and by the activity of thought it produces 
itself. It is then a product of a systematic abstraction and totality of thought, a non-being, 
whose essence lies, not in objectivity, but solely in the realm of pure thought, the alienated 
and estranged form of itself. This is the inevitable consequence of the mystified form of 
expression of the dialectic in Hegel; it is the dynamic whereby the pseudo-essence is 
confirmed as the real essence. 
"In Hegel, therefore, the negation of the negation is not the confirmation of the true 
essence, effected precisely through the negation of the pseudo-essence. With him the 
negation of the negation is the confirmation of the pseudo-essence, or of the self- 
estranged essence in its denial; or it is the denial of this pseudo-essence as an 
objective being dwelling outside man and independent of him, and its transformation 
into the subject. ""2 
Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 337. 
Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 339 - 340. 
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As a result, it takes its alienated philosophical form of expression as being its real and true 
expression. Here, the negation of the negation, if you will excuse the inference from the 
above of Marx, is the confirmation of the pseudo-essence, precisely through the negation of 
the real essence. By confirming the estranged form, in this its alienated thinking, the act of 
self-reference is validated in its mystical and fetishised form. Hence, Marx's 
characterisation of Hegel's dialectic in this its general form of criticism shows how, as a 
result of Hegel's own mystical inversion of the dialectic, "reason is at home in unreason as 
unreason. " 
What is also missing for Marx, in Hegel's dialectic of negativity, is what he terms the last 
act of self-reference in alienation. What does he mean by this phrase? The process of self- 
reference in alienation and its supersession, viewed in Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's 
idealism, as speculative thought still being burdened with its opposite, the sensory world, is 
generalised here in its criticism by Marx, as the stopping at the last act, the act of self- 
reference in real objective activity. 
Feuerbach's critique propounds, in opposition to Hegel's mystical and speculative subject, 
the self-supporting positive based on itself. For Feuerbach, the philosophical solution to 
speculative idealism is posited in the contemplation of immediate sense-certainty based on 
itself, through the analysis of the relation between consciousness and the external nature that 
generates it. 
For Marx, it is "the subjectivity of objective essential powers, whose action, therefore, must 
be something objective" that is the solution to speculative idealism. The real activity is 
externalised in opposition to itself, in the form of the product of labour. The objective 
product of that social labour only proves or confirms that objective activity in the external 
and alien product of that activity. Marx's dialectic in contrast to Hegel's is concretely 
annulled objectively, only in and through labouring activity superseding both its alienated 
condition and its alienated product, as the last act of self-reference in alienation. 
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This concrete objectification is in stark contrast to the non-objective proof of Hegel's 
subsumption of nature as the product of the "pure activity" of logical thought; with the 
"entire compass of abstraction" locked up in an estranged and alienated form; as the product 
of the systematic totality of mind. Alternatively posed, it lies in the distinction between the 
real essence of labour and the pseudo-essence of alienated philosophical mind. 
The application by Marx of the dialectical method, itself a not unimportant differentiation 
from Feuerbach's critique, is already being applied to labouring activity and the product of 
that activity; this objective relation constitutes the real social essence and species-being of 
man. That is, it is already posited here as being the inverted and direct opposite of the 
idealist Hegelian form. The real critical form in opposition to the uncritical process of 
abstract philosophical activity or speculative thought. 
Hegel is clearly though, a contradictory figure for Marx; the dialectic expresses itself in both 
a positive and negative fashion in his work. On the one hand, this idealist "philosophical 
dissolution" of the existing empirical world, seen as a product of mind in its realised and 
essential form of the Logical Idea, is the source of both Hegel's justification for, and the 
"uncritical positivism" of, his restoration of that existing empirical world. A world that is 
both sublated and, in turn, glorified as the product of an idealist and alienated conceptual 
totality of thought. 
"Consequently, despite its thoroughly negative and critical appearance and despite 
the genuine criticism contained in it, which often anticipates far later development, 
there is already latent within the "Phenomenology" as a germ, a potentiality, a secret, 
the uncritical positivism and the equally uncritical idealism of Hegel's later works - 
that philosophical dissolution and restoration of the existing empirical world. iý43 
That reconciling of the heart and mind to its alienated condition by the activity of 
speculative thought; as a mystified form of thought that is at home in both its estranged 
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natural form and its alienated social form. By doing so, Marx shows how, in Hegel, the 
dialectic of negativity and the negation of the negation, as the moving and generating 
principle, becomes the "lie of his principle". It thus provides a philosophical underpinning 
for the false consciousness of both bourgeois ideology and divine creation. 
On the other hand, his thought does also contain far-sighted and genuine criticism; the 
motor source for that genuine criticism itself lies in that same dynamic form of the dialectic 
of negativity. The problem is to unearth the rational form of the dialectic from the mystical 
form of Hegel's exposition. The'emphasis, necessarily at this point of Marx's intellectual 
development, largely resides in the need to critically settle accounts with Hegel's'idealist 
mysticism. 
Marx's analysis in the E. P. M. does not, however, entirely confine itself to this framework; 
he also draws out some positive aspects contained in Hegel's dialectic. The critical elements 
contained in this application of the dialectic of negativity nevertheless "lie concealed" and 
hidden within this mystical form of expressing it. 
"The Phenomenology is, therefore,, a hidden, mystifying and still uncertain criticism; 
but inasmuch as it depicts man's estrangement, even though man appears only as 
mind, there lie concealed in it all the elements of criticism, already prepared and 
elaborated in a manner often rising far above the Hegelian standpoint. "44 
Despite the mystifying form, Marx also draws out that Hegel's thought does contain, even if 
in an estranged form, critical-dialectical analyses of whole areas and spheres like 
conventional religion, the state, civil society, and natural science. The entity that Hegel 
supersedes though is not the real thing, but the concept of the thing. He stands in opposition, 
according to Marx, both to the real thing and to the conventional concepts of those real 
things; this latter point of Marx is viewed as not being entirely negative. 
43 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 331-2. 
"Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 332. 
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The point, from Marx's 1873 Afterword, that Hegel's dialectic appears to glorify existing 
states of affairs while the dialectic is, in its essence, critical and revolutionary, the Hegelian 
paradox and its negative expression, had already been largely made, or first developed, in 
the Paris Manuscripts. 
Hegel's Paradox. 
Paradoxically then, contained within this mystical form of dialectic, lie all the elements for 
its critical application. These dialectical elements frequently go well beyond the Hegelian 
standpoint. The real critical application of those elements required that the dialectic of 
negativity, and the process of supersession entailed by that activity, in order to take a 
rational form, had to be inverted into a materialist ontology; that is, it had to be developed 
from and applied to real, objective, practical, human labouring activity, as the moving 
source for human development. 
There is then, a twofold mystical and rational character in operation in Marx's dialectical 
critique of Hegel. It is now time to further develop this analysis of the twofold nature of the 
contradiction contained in Hegel by further examining the "critical form of this in Hegel 
uncritical process. " 
Despite Hegel's failure to apply that dialectic in a materialist manner, and to a materialist 
subject matter, it would appear from Marx's comments in the Manuscripts that this did not 
preclude him from outlining the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating 
principle underlying the process of all change. That is, to use a later formulation, it by no 
means prevented him from consciously and comprehensively outlining the general form of 
working of dialectic itself, Marx is already making, more or less, this point in the 1844 
Manuscripts. 
60 
Marx's own supersession, through this critical settling of accounts, lies in precisely applying 
"all the elements of the criticism" prepared and elaborated by Hegel, but now applied in a 
materialist manner, and to a materialised subject and relation, nature and alienated 
humanity. By doing so, Marx now has the foundations for developing his own form of 
dialectic, in a manner that now goes well beyond Hegel's idealist confines and orientation, 
precisely by drawing out the contradictions that lie contained within Hegel's account of the 
general form of working of the dialectic. 
According to Marx, a "peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding in which 
denial and preservation, i. e. affirmation, are bound together. " The "peculiar role" of 
supersession, in Hegel's idealist application of it, as we have seen, is to mystify and invert 
the real process and relation between subject and object. This general principle, as a process 
applied to the subject's alienation and the overcoming of it through the dynamic vehicle of 
negation of the negation, clearly still has some positive aspects for Marx, even in this its 
alienated idealist expression. 
"Supersession as an objective movement of retracting the alienation into seýr. This is 
the insight, expressed within the estrangement, concerning the appropriation of the 
objective essence through the supersession of its estrangement; it is the estranged 
insight into the real objectification of man, into the real appropriation of his 
objective essence through the annihilation of the estranged character of the objective 
world, through the supersession of the objective world, in its estranged mode of 
being. " 
Marx retains the essential dynamics of the analysis of the process of alienation and 
estrangement. Where Marx differs from Hegel is that the estrangement and alienation can be 
overcome subjectively and objectively by the activity of labour itself-, there is no necessary 
ontological condition of nature as being inherently a form of estrangement, due to its very 
externalised and non-conceptual form of being. The act of supersession is achieved for Marx 
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by overcoming the negative condition, precisely through the self-affirming dialectical 
activity of self-reference in objectivity. 
There is also then, a potentially more positive form for this "peculiar role" of supersession 
contained in Marx's comments. The reason that Marx can posit that this is the case, is that 
the very essence of the dialectic, as self-affirmation through negation; is due to the analysis 
of all processes of change as being the expression of the movement of a contradiction. 
What Hegel does, is to pose in an abstract and idealist fashion, the conceptualised form of 
the social relations and/or logical categories as interconnected "moments of motion". The act 
of supersession is therefore cognised as a process that has determinate moments; these 
moments are the universally interconnected and necessary determinations of the particular 
subject in process. It is through the methodical application of the general form of dialectic 
that the external motions can be conceptually grasped. "In their actual existence this mobile 
nature of theirs is hidden. It appears and is made manifest only in thought, in philosophy. "" 
The "moments" are expressed through the conceptualisation of the determinate forms and 
relations of the substantial subject, with a moving internal principle of change and 
alteration, expressed in the positing and resolving of the contradiction in its nature, that 
links all these conceptualised determinate moments together. That contrariety contained in 
all movement, and its adequate cognition, requires understanding the specific form of 
contradiction that drives the substantial activity as a form of determinate negation. This 
materialised specification of the dialectics of motion provides the basis for the development 
of Marx's own critical form of dialectic. 
This general critique of Marx, and the paradoxes in Hegel derived from it, go well beyond 
the criticisms of Feuerbach. The inherently critical form of Hegel's dialectic applies, not 
only to specific spheres of human activity and their conventional conceptions, but also to the 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 341. 
46 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 340. 
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process of development and change in general; as the source for their general laws of motion 
and self-activity. 
The essential point for Marx is that Hegel has captured the essence of movement and change 
as the dialectic of negativity, as the movement and development of a contradiction. Even in 
that alienated form, it is the explicit view of being for self or affirmation through its 
negative other, its own alienated form of being, and, in turn, the negation of that alienation 
as the process of self-determining and self-affirming activity. 
This critique of Hegelianism, as the preceding analysis of Marx's view attempted to show, 
had to be generalised to develop what for him was the necessary task of settling accounts 
with the Hegelian dialectic and philosophy as a whole. At the same time, this generalised 
form of Marx also furnished the proof that would underpin Feuerbach's criticism; that of 
Hegel's positing, negating, and then re-affirming of religion or theology. 
The criticism had to be generalised, not only in order for it to be extended to cover all the 
areas of Hegel's philosophical subject matter; but also to draw out the full implications of 
Hegel's dialectical idealism and its alienated and speculative form. Marx's general strategy 
was to dialectically bring out and highlight, both the mystical and the rational forms that are 
inherent in Hegel's dialectic; even within the mystical guise that the dialectic has in its 
idealist imposed parameters and boundaries. 
Alternatively expressed, it was to extract the critical form of Hegel's account of a dialectical 
process. In order to do so, Marx had to draw out the logic of the contradiction that is 
fundamentally contained within Hegel's thought. By drawing out the inborn contradictions 
in Hegel's dialectic, Marx is able show how there is an inherently critical form contained in 
this dialectic; a dialectic, which in Hegel, is cognised as an uncritical process of affirming 
that self-alienation in its alienated form. 
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3. Hegel's Outstanding Achievement. 
t 
Hegel's concept of negation of negation, despite the mystical veil that he envelopes it 
within, is nevertheless still of central importance in understanding Marx's evolving 
materialism. His general critique of this fundamental generating principle of Hegel's 
dialectic, with its consequential inversion of ontological presupposition and subject matter 
of investigation, allowed the application of the dialectic to be turned right side up again. - 
This idealist inversion of reality in Hegel notwithstanding, it nevertheless still entailed that 
he had, according to Marx, discovered in this principle, the abstract, logical, and speculative 
expression for the movement of history. This mystically interpreted by Hegel as the history 
of spirit, of the evolution of the philosophical idea, that is, as the abstract history of 
intellectual thought. 
That historical development of the idealist subject shortly becomes, in the development of 
Marx's critique, materialised as the evolution of social labouring activity, as the inverted 
and real objective basis for the species-being of man, and the source and true nature of man 
as a historical subject. 
Even within Hegel's idealist expression of an estranged human condition, Hegel still grasps 
labour, in the alienated form of the intellectual labour of mind or spirit, as the true essence 
of being human. The only labour that Hegel truly recognises for Marx is "abstractly mental 
labour. " This idealist paradigm of Hegel's is cognised as the very species-being and activity 
that marks humanity off from the rest of nature. Despite entrapping objectivity within the 
confines of an idealist view of estrangement there is, however, genuine insight into the 
contradictory nature of the process of supersession. 
"Thus by grasping the positive meaning of self-referred negation (although again in 
an estranged fashion) Hegel grasps man's self-estrangement, the alienation of man's 
essence, man9s loss of objectivity and his loss of realness as self-discovery, 
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manifestation of his nature, objectification and realisation. < In short, within the 
sphere of abstraction, Hegel conceives labour as man's act of seýF-genesis - 
conceives man's relation to himself as an alien being to be the emergence of species- 
consciousness and species life. > 
"47 
Hegel, for Marx, and here he is in distinction from Feuerbach, holds to the view that despite 
his idealism Hegel still grasps the "positive meaning of self-referred negation". The central 
problem lies in his idealist approach to the question of self-referring negativity, not to the 
category or principle behind the process of self-movement. Accordingly then, for Marx, all 
this mystical inversion of reality by Hegel does not negate the "outstanding achievement" 
and the result of the Phenomenology. 
This achievement is attained in its highest form precisely through the conceptual exposition 
and employment of the "dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle". It is 
through this "outstanding achievement" of Hegel's analysis of a dialectical process that the 
substantial being realises its essential form activity as subject, and therefore receives its 
adequate conceptual generalisation and expression. 
This dialectical principle is the core of the positive aspect of the critical form, a form that is 
inherent to Hegel's dialectic for Marx. This is what Marx's critical settling of accounts with 
the Hegelian dialectic also seeks to extract. That extraction of the rational kernel is derived 
precisely through Marx's materialist inversion of this Hegelian principle. 
This dialectic of negativity or self-referring negation is then a key element in the analysis of 
the process of the materialist inversion of Hegel's idealist content and form. It appears, from 
all the evidence of the E. P. M., to be retained as an essential element of the rational kernel in 
the mystical shell. There is no evidence of Marx ever having changed his mind on the 
central importance of the dialectic of unfree and free labour in his work. 
"' Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 341. 
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Marx's early emphasis on the alienation process of labouring activity had still though, to be 
underpinned with a scientific analysis of the nature of value itself. To be more accurate, that 
understanding of the alienation process of labour in the Manuscripts, whilst not incorrect, 
had yet to receive its concrete scientific foundation, in the critical analysis of value as a 
specific form of alienated social productive activity. 
The "burden" of political economy had only just begun. What has been developed here are 
some of the major philosophical and scientific presuppositions of the method that Marx is 
going to employ in his critique of political economy. The negation and polarity contained 
within contradiction, as the dynamic source of the movement and development of the 
opposition, is central to Hegel's influence on Marx's dialectic of labour. 
Even within Hegel's idealist analysis of estrangement, the emphasis on labour, even in its 
abstract philosophical guise, still retain some positive aspects and merits for Marx, precisely 
as it is based on the abstract form of negation of the negation. Hegel's "outstanding 
achievement", despite his mystifications, lies then in his very application of this dialectical 
principle of negativity. 
"Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as 
loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus 
grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man - true, because real 
man - as the outcome of man's own labour. "48 
If Marx does not retain this "outstanding achievement" of Hegel's Phenomenology, then he 
retains virtually nothing of Hegel's work that could be described as a rational element, as 
this principle is at the very heart of his dialectical view. Even if labour is conceived by 
Hegel, either as an abstract logical philosophical activity, as the labour of spirit, or, through 
"the lie of his principle" in its alienated social form, its subsumption under value. 
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"Let us provisionally say just this much in advance: Hegel's standpoint is that of 
modern political economy. He grasps labour as the essence of man - as man's 
essence which stands the test: he sees only the positive not the negative side of 
labour. Labour is man's coming-to-be for himseýf within alienation, or as alienated 
man. The only labour which Hegel knows and recognises is abstractly mental labour. 
Therefore, that which constitutes the essence of philosophy - the alienation of man 
who knows himseýf, or alienated science thinking itsetf - Hegel grasps as its essence; 
and in contradistinction to previous philosophy he is therefore able to combine its 
separate aspects and to present his philosophy as the philosophy. "49 
Marx's critique of the philosophical essence as being the "alienation of man who knows 
himself, or alienated science thinking itself" also demands some further analysis. The earlier 
criticism of Hegel's philosophical illusions was expressed in its generalised form by Marx 
as the condition where "reason is at home in unreason as unreason. " The relationship of this 
earlier formulation to "alienated science thinking itself" has now become the subject matter 
of investigation. 
Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 332-3. 
Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 333. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
ALIENATED SCIENCE. 
1. Alienated Science Thinking Itself. 
Marx's description of the essence of philosophy in general, and Hegel's apotheosis of 
philosophy in particular, as the "alienation of man who knows himself, or alienated science 
thinking itseýr' raises the question of what Marx means by this statement? Furthermore, how 
does this proposition square with one of Feuerbach's "great achievements" for Marx, where 
he proved that "philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded 
by thought"? 
What can religious mystification and human estrangement in the form of speculative 
philosophical thought contribute to science? Moreover, why is its contribution, if it is 
"nothing else" but religion rendered into thought, also describable as a form of alienated 
science? There seems to be, to put it at its mildest, a tension contained here in Marx's 
analysis, one that is expressed in the same piece of work. 
This tension is, in my view, generated by the difference of the scope, nature and content that 
is contained in Feuerbach and Marx's criticisms of Hegel. However, this solution also seems 
problematical, given that Marx's aim in the Manuscripts was also to provide the proof of the 
Feuerbachian critique, that Hegel's philosophy was no more than religion rendered into 
thought and expounded by thought. 
My analysis has, nevertheless, attempted to point out that in the process of developing his 
own generalised form of criticism, Marx not only proved the Feuerbachian case, he travelled 
well beyond its philosophical parameters. This being precisely due to his criticism taking 
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both a more generalised, and, more importantly, a dialectical exposition and form. In 
particular, Marx's strategy and analysis consciously attempted to, not only settle accounts 
with the Hegelian dialectic, but also to outline the critical form of the dialectic that in Hegel 
was cognised as an uncritical process. 
As a result of the uniquely dialectical nature of his criticism, Hegel's alienated and 
estranged form of the dialectic was described by Marx within the following general 
proposition and framework; as that of reason being at home in unreason as unreason. Is this 
position, derived from my analysis of the text, also manifested and confirmed in a further 
proposition of Marx, that the essence of Hegel's philosophy is also describable as a form of 
"alienated science thinking itself"? 
The question I am trying to provide a possible foundation for answering can also be 
formulated in another fashion, in the following form. How can that alienated science, the 
product of an idealist mystical inversion of thought, in turn become real science? Allowing, 
for the moment, that it may positively contribute towards a genuine method for scientific 
inquiry; then the question becomes if, and if so how, can it then provide, given that it is 
enveloped within a mystified and alienated form, any genuine scientific insights and 
concepts? 
It is time to posit some initial and tentative steps towards resolving the dilemma of what 
Hegel's philosophy, as a form of "alienated science" actually is or could be. A significant 
part of the answer to this question has in fact already been given; in the form of Marx's 
generalised form of criticism of Hegel's dialectic of negativity. To explain what is entailed 
in Marx's characterisation of alienated science, is to further develop and expound this earlier 
generalised form of criticism of Hegel's thought, of how reason is at home in unreason as 
unreason. 
First of all then, what is the relation between Hegel's alienated form of reason and its 
alienated view of science? Furthermore, what is, to paraphrase Marx's strategy, the critical 
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form that lies within this uncritical process of "alienated science thinking itself"? Just what 
is the dialectic of negativity applied to in this account of alienated science by Hegel? 
To answer the above questions, is to further extricate what Marx considers the important 
and fundamentally rational elements that still remain contained within Hegelian dialectics, 
despite its mystical form. The solution to the above problems have then no little significance 
for understanding the nature and process of Marx's suggested inversion of Hegel's dialectic. 
A fuller answer to these questions can be procured, if this generalised form of criticism is 
integrated with an understanding of what it is, according to Marx, for alienated science to 
think itself. 
The answers to these questions is largely comprehended by working through the 
consequences of what the nature of the real relationships are between that of alienated 
abstract thinking on the one hand, and the real dynamic objectivity of nature and society on 
the other hand, actually are. What is this theosophical and philosophical mystification of 
Hegel's logical thought, as a form of alienated science, actually thinking about other than its 
divine and alienated subject? Marx has his own views on the answer to this question. 
"The rich, living, sensuous, concrete activity of self-objectification is therefore 
reduced to its mere abstraction, absolute negativity - an abstraction which is again 
fixed as such and considered as an independent activity - as sheer activity. Because 
this so-called negativity is nothing but the abstract, empty form of that real living 
act, its content can in consequence be merely a formal content produced by 
abstraction from all content. As a result therefore one gets general, abstractforms of 
abstraction pertaining to every content and on that account indifferent to, and, 
consequently valid for, all content - the thought forms or logical categories torn from 
real mind and from real nature. " 
"Hegel's positive achievement here, in his speculative logic, is that the definite 
concepts, the universal fixed thought-forms in their independence vis a vis nature and 
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mind are a necessary result of the general estrangement of the human being and 
therefore also of human thought, and that Hegel has therefore brought these together 
and presented them as moments of the abstraction process ... But abstraction 
comprehending itself as abstraction knows itself to be nothing: it must abandon itself 
- abandon abstraction - and so it arrives at an entity which is its exact opposite - at 
nature. Thus, the entire logic is the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in 
itself; that the absolute idea is nothing for itself; that only nature is something. "" 
There is again here, a double-edged sword involved in Marx's critical appraisal of Hegel. 
This alienation of systematic thought is the alienation of, not only the thinker estranged 
from himself, but also the thinker estranged from his real essence, nature. The objective act 
of self-reference in alienation, which is the true mode of being of these abstract forms, 
expressed in their real self-objectification and substantial activity in nature, are sublated as 
the product and activity of abstract thought; as the outcome of the movement of the 
categories of pure thought. 
Instead of that real substantial activity, Hegel reduces objectivity itself to a thought entity or 
concept; that is, he views them as abstract nature not real nature, and abstract activity not 
real activity. This means that the principle of the negation of the negation, in the systematic 
form of the Logic is the restoring of that objective totality as a thought totality; objectivity is 
thus systematically subsumed in an alienated and mystical form, as "moments of the 
abstraction process -" 
That is, and here lies a potentially more positive outcome, the essence of that substantial, 
natural objectivity is contained in the generalised logical and ontological categories, 
predicates, and necessary relations that are the conceptual sources for understanding the 
dynamic activities that pertain to a systematic whole. This process unfolds, in both its 
relational parts and as a totality, into a universal interconnection of the categories. 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 343. 
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The outcome of this dialectical process of the alienated thinking of Hegel's speculative 
idealism, according to Marx, is that the logical thoughts "are therefore fixed mental forms 
dwelling outside nature and man. " What Hegel has done is hypostasise them, for he has 
"locked up" these fixed mental forms together and created a totality of abstraction, which 
means that the fixed abstractions become one systematic act of abstraction revolving in its 
own circle. As the dialectical movement of the principle of negativity, in the form of pure 
thought that is now systematically outlined as the logical process of "absolute negativity. " 
These "definite concepts, the universal fixed thought-forms, " as the product of conceptual 
supersession, are the basic categories inherent in all substantial being. Hegel's positive 
achievement is to present them as a totality of interrelated categorial and conceptual 
abstractions. The ontological categories concretely inherent in substantial nature are then 
subsumed and perceived as moments and determinations of the absolute negativity of the 
abstraction process. 
Furthermore, as this absolute negativity is an abstraction, which is fixed, and considered as 
an independent activity, as pure activity, it can only have a content which is the abstract 
form pertaining to every content. At the same time, this entails that it is indifferent to every 
content, and thus valid for all content. It is then a formal and abstract appropriation and 
conception of systematic self-objectification, where the real concrete natural activity is 
reduced to its mere abstraction, as the systematic movement of the categories of "pure 
thought". 
This has to be the central implication of the view that the abstract categories, as the product 
of alienated thinking that abstracts from real nature and real man, paradoxically in turn, and 
by dint of their abstraction and generality, in fact also pertain to that objective material and 
substantial content. As that objectivity is the real source and movement for the dialectic in 
abstract thinking, the totality of abstractions, as Marx points out, are nothing but the 
conceptual abstractions that are "torn from real mind and from real nature. " 
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The result for Marx, though this is far from being entirely negative in my view, is a content 
whose thought-forms or logical categories are both indifferent to and at the same time 
pertain to, every content. This elucidation has to be combined, with yet another viewpoint of 
Marx; that Hegel bequeathed us "the entire compass of abstraction" as now being the object 
of criticism, to more fully answer the question of how "alienated science thinking itself' 
could become real science. 
Despite Hegel's mystifying form and exposition, his logical and systematic whole of 
abstraction has to be seen as a totality that includes the appropriation and criticism of all 
previous philosophical thought. This, in turn, made the criticism of Hegel's philosophy a 
criticism of philosophy in general. 
"This means that what Hegel does is to put in place of these Rxed abstractions the 
act of abstraction which revolves in its own circle. We must therefore give him the 
credit for having indicated the source of all those inappropriate concepts which 
originally appertained to particular philosophers; for having brought them together; 
and for having created the entire compass of abstraction as the object of criticism, 
instead of some specific abstraction. "" 
The above passage also highlights that the critique of Hegel is itself not just a specific 
critique of a specific abstraction, but the "entire compass" of Hegel's summation of 
philosophy that now has to be criticised. This further reinforces the point that Marx's 
criticism is, and has to be, of a generalised nature. This critique of Hegel's systematic 
dialectic entails the overthrow of philosophy in its traditional metaphysical boundaries and 
theoretical presuppositions. 
Paradoxically, not only then does this prove Feuerbach's point that Hegel's philosophy as 
being religion merely rendered into thought, but in this, its highest and systematic form of 
51 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 344. (Footnote by 
Marx. ) 
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expression, it also generates a form of alienated science thinking itself in its alienated 
condition. 
The movement of the real, substantial, objective contradiction, expressed in the principle 
contained in the dialectic of negativity, is reflected in this systematic totality of the concepts 
and categories of the abstraction process itself. The movement of the categories, whose 
initial starting point is contained in its elementary abstract simple universal forms, are then 
further developed through their own specific forms of determinate negation and opposition, 
and resolved in the positing of more complex and determinate categories, concepts, and 
relations. 
The result is the evolution of a conceptual totality of relations, with the positing and 
resolving of contradiction as the motor force of the whole process. Hegel starts with abstract 
thought, and in the process he generates a systematic whole that is abstracted from, 
indifferent to, and valid for, all content. In reality that totality of logical thought is "nothing 
but the abstract empty form of that real living act", nothing but the abstract categories 
generated from real nature, real mind, and real social being. 
Generated though, in an alienated conceptual form and idealist foundation that is indifferent 
to the real determinations and substantial referents, preferring instead their conceptual and 
idealist form as the truth behind, and the origin of, that objective, material reality. 
Thought, alienated from its natural and human essence, is now confined, and abstractly 
summated within an alienated philosophical system of pure logic. The movement of abstract 
thought is no longer directed outwards to its real source in real objectivity, but now proceeds 
within itself; the result is the dialectic of pure thought, as rational self-consciousness or 
philosophical logic. 
As the supersession contained in the dialectic of negativity in its general form, is a restoring 
of these categorial forms in their estrangement; it is also a stopping at the last act, the act of 
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self-reference in real alienation. The self-reference takes place entirely within the realm of 
systematic logical thought. It is also then, for this reason, that Marx describes Hegel's 
thought as a form of alienated science thinking itself. 
The real and objectively moving contradiction is reduced to a contradiction in the process of 
thought. This would seem to point to a not insignificant contribution to a scientific and 
nomological account that is already contained, albeit in an estranged and mystical form, in 
Hegel's thought. Expressed more positively, it is an alienated and idealist account of 
scientific method, that is, alienated in the sense of its ontological foundations and result, 
thought of as proof of his speculative systematic and supersensible subject, but nevertheless, 
still a contribution to a scientific methodology. 
That abstract and empty totality, the Logical Idea, as the autonomous and independent 
subject is, in Hegel's idealist account, also the highest expression and the logical form of 
scientific method. The two are ftised together in Hegel's analysis. What is necessary, for a 
materialist and dialectical criticism of this methodology, to follow Marx's example, is to 
separate out the idealist subject and ontology of the content, from the scientific method and 
the objective, real, material content that it is bound up with. 
That the logic is forced to end by positing its opposite, nature, means, for the materialist 
critique, that it has in fact returned to its real and true point of departure. The idealist 
account has ultimately nowhere else to go other than back to its direct polar opposite and 
material source; otherwise, it can only revolve within its own self-enclosed conceptual 
totality as pure thought. This is why the system of logic is, for Marx, alienated science 
thinking itself, precisely because it is conceived as a totality of logical abstract thinking that 
is independent of, and indifferent to, its real and objective source and substantiation. 52 
5' For Marx, Hegel's Logic is alienated thinking. Idealist thought, by the very nature of its emphasis 
on mind as the human essence, the estranged form that thought takes in philosophical speculation, has to lay 
stress on the ontological primacy of the concept and category. "Logic - mind's coin of the realm, the 
speculative or mental value of man and nature - its essence which has grown totally indifferent to all real 
determinateness, and hence unreal - is alienated thinking and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature 
and from real man: abstract thinking. " Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. 
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Conversely, that an idealist dialectic is ultimately derived from this real nature means, to 
logically invert it and stand it on its feet, that it reflects and pertains to that very same real 
nature. What it does not do is generate that external nature from the activity of the categories 
of thought; to speculate in this manner, is to posit the relation and the explanation in a 
mystified manner that itself cannot contain its own contradictions. 
The autonomous subject, the Logical Idea, turns out, in the course of Marx's critique, not to 
be an autonomous being-for-self, but to be dependent upon its dialectical other, nature, as 
the real being-for-self. As the totality of the categories of abstraction are, in fact, "nothing 
else but abstractions from nature", Hegel is driven from the systematic whole of his logic to 
the direct opposite of the systematic abstractions and categories; that is, he is driven by 
"boredom" according to Marx, back to nature. 
That the thought totality is the product of the concrete totality, as its mystifying inversion, 
by no means prevents Hegel, to paraphrase Marx, from consciously comprehending and 
outlining that dialectical thought totality in its general form of working and operation. The 
Logical Idea is then, a form of alienated science thinking itself, and pretending to be at 
home with itself in that alienated condition. It is, paradoxically, the "alienation of man who 
knows himself'. 
What is however highlighted, and here it applies to the Logic, in the dialectical critique of 
Marx is not only the negative, but also the positive aspect of the principle of the negation of 
the negation that is contained in Hegel. The application of the principle of negativity does 
not appear to deter him from making some genuine insights into the universal 
interconnection of the categories and concepts that generate and explain the methodological 
and scientific basis for analysing the movement and development of a systematic totality. 
(1975. ) P. 330. The Logic is then, a form of abstract thought thinking about itself, or as alternatively expressed 
by Marx, as "the alienation of man who knows himself, or alienated science thinking itself. " 
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A totality that contains a universal principle of change and alteration, namely the movement 
of a contradiction that both posits and resolves itself, and that characterises the specific 
contrariety contained in each of its categorial forms and relations in their ongoing forms of 
development and systematic activity. 
The dialectic of negativity as "the moving and generating principle of all being" has, by its 
very defining terms, a universal application. Once the divine element as the autonomous 
subject is removed, what we have is an abstract and idealist account of how a systematic 
totality and its fundamental categories, derived from nature, universally interconnect and 
operate in a systematic fashion. 
Scientific method is not an independent subject autonomous from nature and humanity; it is, 
in fact, one of the central and hard-won products and dialectical results of that real relation, 
viewed as a body of knowledge and procedure. Furthermore, this systematic totality of 
thought, viewed as independent from nature and mind, are both the product and the 
"necessary result" for Marx of the generalised alienation and estrangement of the human 
condition in its fundamental activity and thought. 
Alienated social activity produces alienated forms of thought. It is capable though, at the 
same time, of producing some rational insight into that alienated condition. The rational and 
the mystical can be, and in Hegel's case are, bound together. This binding together in an 
uneasy alliance is the source for Hegel's own specific form of contradiction, a contradiction 
that points well beyond his own self-imposed idealist boundaries. 
That rational insight itself takes an alienated form, an alienated form that can paradoxically 
both give genuine understanding and at the same time mystify that real relation. This 
alienated expression of supersession entails that what Hegel supersedes is not the real thing 
but the concept of the thing. However, due to the critical dialectical form that is nevertheless 
inherent to this uncritical process, Hegel, at the same time, stands in opposition to the 
following for Marx. 
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"From the one point of view, therefore, he stands in opposition both to the real thing 
and to the immediate, unphilosophic science or the unphilosophic conceptions of this 
thing. He therefore contradicts their conventional conceptions. "" 
The enigma surrounding the inversion of Hegel is, in principle, resolvable. It involves 
though a combination of different strands and elements. What has already been shown to be 
central to this resolution is not only the ontological reversal and inversion in the relation of 
thought to being, but also the necessity of applying that dialectical method to a materialist 
subject matter. 
That Hegel's idealism inverts the categories and dialectical concepts of his analysis does not 
negate the fact that they are ultimately derived from that real material and social basis. The 
question is to separate out the dialectics involved in a nomological account of substantial 
activity from their idealist and mystical foundation, not to mention their bogus, autonomous, 
and divine subject. It is in this sense that it is a form of alienated science thinking about 
itself. 
This generalised critique of Marx showed the need to, not only condemn abstract thought 
for not basing itself ultimately on real, material, natural, social relations, and development, 
it also showed the need to base dialectics upon just such a critical analysis of those very 
same natural, material and social foundations. The alienated science thinking itself is de- 
mystified, and genuine science is realised and materialised, precisely through the rational 
comprehension and practical emancipation of the human condition. 
Despite its mystical form, Hegel's dialectic of negativity provides, as we have seen, the 
grounds and conditions necessary for that materialist succession; with those grounds being 
retained, in their more critical process and form, as the basis for future development. It is in 
this sense that Marx's dialectic supersedes Hegel's. 
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It is also in this sense, to answer Althusser's question, that we can show how an inversion 
can be an extraction; indeed, it is only through the process of inverting those idealist 
presuppositions and subject matter, and applying them to a materialist content and process, 
that the rational core of the Hegelian dialectic of negativity can itself be extracted. 
By positing the source of the development of the contradiction as residing in those same 
objective processes and activities, the resultant aim of conceptual thought is to then reflect 
and correspond to the real movement of the material contradictions in the subject matter. It 
is, furthermore, to derive and deduce those contradictions from the objective movement, 
instead of imposing them abstractly and systematically as the movement of the categories; 
as a conceptual self-enclosed whole that has realised its teleological nature. 
By doing so Hegel thus has to attempt a dialectical balancing of concepts that blunts, both 
the real, material contradictions in operation, and the essentially critical, revolutionary 
content that is inherent to a dialectical methodology; a methodology that itself posits all 
motions and processes as containing constant change through contradiction. Both errors 
have to be committed by Hegel, in order to accommodate and confine the dialectic within 
the idealist foundations and presuppositions of a closed philosophical system, as the final 
and ultimate form of that dialectical method. 
Even in such an early work that is still under the spell of Feuerbach as the Paris Manuscripts 
are, it is clear that Marx applies a double-edged sword to Hegel's dialectical thought. The 
problematic lies in explaining how there can, at the same time, be both positive-rational and 
negative-mystical elements in Hegel's speculative analysis. 
Marx's analysis and critique of Hegel's philosophy has, as I have attempted to elucidate and 
show, itself an inherently dialectical flavour and character. The result is that the uncritical 
process contained in Hegel's dialectic is itself superseded by Marx through the catalyst of 
11 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 341. 
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Feuerbach's materialism and naturalism. What is cancelled is the mystical-idealist 
foundation and explanation, what is retained is the rational element in his dialectical 
analysis of the process of movement and change through the developing and ongoing 
contradiction of a systematic subject. 
A materialist and idealist dialectic are not polar opposites slugging it out for dominance; 
Marx's materialist dialectic arises out of and goes beyond its idealist predecessor. Hegel 
himself has been subjected to his own concept of aufheben. It was by showing how the 
contradictions inherent within Hegel's dialectic, which itself includes laying the grounds 
and foundations through that critique for a materialist dialectic and subject to begin to 
emerge in the work of Marx, that is reflected in the analysis proffered here. 
Marx's settling of his accounts with Hegelianism in the Paris Manuscripts, regardless of 
whether it is viewed as being fully comprehensive or otherwise, is nevertheless primarily 
expressed through this exposition of the dialectic of negativity in its twofold character. This 
is itself expressed in the opposition of the twofold critical and uncritical forms of the 
process that Marx's analysis develops. 
Marx develops this resultant critical form of dialectic, extracted here in its embryonic form, 
through his generalised inversion of Hegel's own mystical application of the negation of the 
negation. One might almost say that Marx turns a fundamental dialectical principle of 
Hegel's right side up again in order to discover and appropriate the rational kernel that is 
contained within it. 
The source underpinning Hegel's illusions, that Marx develops and generalises from 
Feuerbach's groundbreaking innovations, lays the material foundations for that dialectical 
process to be analysed in its more critical process and form by Marx. His treatment of Hegel 
in the E. P. M. exemplifies this approach; he may, over the course of time, change and alter 
his appreciation of Hegel, and, for that matter Feuerbach, but he does not deviate from this 
twofold analysis and characterisation of Hegel's dialectic. 
80 
Marx, unlike Feuerbach, never gave up on dialectics; the question is what rational form his 
dialectic takes in relation to Hegel's mystical variation. Taken together, that fusion of the 
dialectic with the activity of labour already heralds important differences that are emerging 
in the views of Marx and Feuerbach vis a vis Hegel; not to mention the impact they will 
shortly have on Marx's own attitude to Feuerbach. 
It was by basing it on the practical, objective activity of labour as the new subject; as the 
substantial and essential activity that expresses both man's relation to man, and at the same 
time, man's relation objectively to nature, that a rational form of dialectic now becomes 
possible to generate. In this sense Marx was wrong, when he posed, as a positive outcome 
and achievement of Feuerbach's critique, the establishing of "true materialism" and "real 
science"; this now becomes possible only as a consequence of his own work. 
The development of the critique of socially alienated labour in both its social-material 
fetters and in its contradictory conditions of existence, is the core subject matter of the 
Manuscripts. It is not only Prometheus and his gift of labour, but also the dialectic itself, 
that is now potentially unbound and set free from its idealist fetters and chains by Marx's 
critique. 
This not only marks him off from Feuerbach; it also signals the clear attempt to begin to 
apply the dialectic, in a rational manner, to a rational subject. This new subject matter of 
investigation, in combination with its boundless potentiality for free activity, is now posited 
as the focal point and nexus for the further development of both human society and critical 
thought itself. 
This orientation is first posited as the foundation central to Marx's thought in the Paris 
Manuscripts; the consequences and further development of this new subject matter for 
investigation are nevertheless still embryonic in their nature at this point. However, the ball 
has already been sent rolling; the only question is in ascertaining the nature and extent of its 
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accelerating and gathering momentum. That evaluation has to be viewed though as an 
ongoing dynamic process, with the rational form of dialectic itself lying behind the changes 
in Marx's viewpoint and perspective. This is the key to understanding Marx's rapidly 
evolving world outlook. 
The earlier critical weighing of the philosophical scales in favour of Feuerbach, due to the 
very liberating manner of Feuerbach's explosive demolition of Hegel's systematic idealism, 
has its own internal dynamic. The dynamics of this process is largely determined, and 
ultimately measured by, the nature of Marx's own assimilation and further development of 
the materialist application of the rational form of dialectic to the category of labour. 
This asymmetrical weighing of the dialectical scales begins to inevitably tip back in favour 
of Hegel, as Marx evolves his own independent world viewpoint of the dialectics of social 
labour and the critique of value. 
2. Summary. 
It is the view of the thesis that the early and incomplete settling of accounts with Hegel in 
the Manuscripts is viewed in a different light when the application of the dialectic to 
political economy has, by and large, been completed some fifteen years later. The early 
critique of Hegel was centrally aimed towards the mystifying side of his dialectic. Not only, 
46all those years ago" though, did Marx criticise the mystical side of Hegel's dialectic; he 
also outlined, as we have witnessed, some positive aspects pertaining to his thought. 
Marx, later in life, clearly felt the need to draw a balance sheet and clarify his relation to 
Hegel by writing a work on dialectics, but only once the necessary burden of political 
economy had been put on a scientific foundation. Marx's debt to Hegel, as the thesis will 
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later attempt to show, is, if anything, greater when Marx begins to apply that dialectic to the 
systematic laws of motion of capital. 54 
Not only is the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, expressed in 
the law of the negation of the negation retained in Marx's later work, but the other laws of 
dialectics, discovered and logically systematised by Hegel, are also applied to both the 
understanding and the critique of the political economy of value. 
In order to arrive at this point, Marx had to, not only accept the Feuerbachian critique of 
Hegel, though, as I have argued, heavily qualified by Marx's own keen sense of dialectic; he 
also had to develop a materialist critique of Feuerbach's inadequate materialism. The 
positive contribution of Feuerbach largely lies in preparing the conditions for further 
intellectual development through the devastating critique of Hegel's idealist foundation for 
thought. This development culminated with Marx's own critical and materialist form of 
dialectic inherent within labouring activity. 
This was achieved, at least in part, by drawing upon the positive elements in Hegel's 
dialectic of change and activity, and applying them to the study of alienated labour and the 
power of money. It was also achieved by developing a generalised materialist form of 
criticism of Hegel's idealist system; a system that is ultimately in contradiction with both 
the essence and the subject matter of the dialectical method. 
Feuerbach's role in this process is that he bridges the gap in this transition from absolute 
idealism to the critique of political economy and a materialist conception of history. This he 
did by showing that nature and civil society were the true sources of the divine and the 
54 For example, could Marx really have known, at the time of writing the E. P. M. and the German 
Ideology, that, for example, Hegel's dialectic of quality and quantity and their transformation into the category 
of measure, would be of central importance in analysing both the substance of value, and the money form of 
value? Its analysis had barely been put on the agenda at this time, far less understood in a thoroughly scientific 
and dialectical manner through the employment and analysis of these very categories. 
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mystical, and the real foundation by which human understanding and knowledge should be 
55 interpreted, developed and understood. 
Feuerbach's liberating influence, despite his pivotal role for this further development of 
critical thought is, however, both mediatory and transitory. It is in this sense, despite 
Hegel's philosophical superiority, that Feuerbach was "epoch making after Hegel. " Marx, in 
a letter to Schweitzer dated Jan. 24th 1865, where he writes clarifying his relation to 
Proudhon, makes the following interesting comment that relates to the present discussion: 
"Proudhon's relation to Saint-Simon and Fourier is about the same as that of 
Feuerbach to Hegel. Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is extremely poor. All the 
same he was epoch making after Hegel because he laid stress on certain points 
which were disagreeable to the Christian consciousness but important for the 
progress of criticism, and which Hegel had left in mystic semi-obscurity. "" 
Philosophically speaking then, Feuerbach is "extremely poor" in comparison with Hegel as 
a philosopher and thinker. Indeed, Hegel is later characterised by Marx as being the 
"ultimate word" in philosophy, this is why the materialist criticism of the mystifying form 
of the Hegelian dialectic was all the more necessary. Feuerbach's great achievement and 
merit for Marx and Engels, was to produce a materialist critique of that speculative 
philosophical form, by showing that the mystical form of idealism has, in fact, secular, 
material, and natural roots. 
" Engels surnmarises the dissolution of the Hegelian school of philosophy in the following manner: 
"Feuerbach alone was of significance as a philosopher. But not only did philosophy - claimed to soar above 
all special sciences and to be the science of sciences connecting them - remain to him an impassable barrier, 
an inviolable holy thing, but as a philosopher too he stopped halfway, was a materialist below and an idealist 
above. He was incapable of disposing of Hegel through criticism; he simply threw him aside as useless, while 
he himself compared with the encyclopaedic wealth of the Hegelian system, achieved nothing positive beyond 
a turgid religion of love and a meagre, impotent morality. " F. Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of 
Classical German Philosophy. Marx-Engels. Selected Works. Volume 2. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) 
P. 349. See also P. 345 for more on Engels view of Feuerbach's "astonishing poverty" when compared with 
Hegel. 
"I Marx-Engels. Selected Correspondence. Lawrence and Wishart. (1956. ) P. 185. 
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The central importance, the historical relevance, and the "epoch making" aspect of 
Feuerbach's thought, was that his materialist critique of religion and philosophical idealism 
were fundamentally "important for the progress of criticism". That is, he laid the 
groundwork for the further development of critical thought; this culminated in the form of a 
dialectical and materialist analysis to emerge in the work of Marx and Engels. This, despite 
the view that his thought is deemed philosophically inferior and "extremely poor" in 
comparison with Hegel. 
However, as Marx also notes in the correspondence, the "certain points" that Feuerbach 
develops and lays stress on, which were important for further critical development and 
progress; had already been left, by Hegel, in "mystic semi-obscurity". That is, they were 
already contained, at least in the germ in Hegel, but in a mystified and obscurantist form. 
Marx's positive attitude to Feuerbach had though, both theoretical and practical reasons and 
causes. The major theoretical reason is Feuerbach's critical explosion of Hegel's idealist 
system; this greatly influenced and pushed Marx and Engels towards developing their own 
materialist, historical, and dialectical viewpoint. 
The practical reason was that in their early adherence to communism, Marx and Engels 
wanted to win such an important and influential figure as Feuerbach to the communist 
cause. However, there was, after a brief but torrid and seminal flirtation with Feuerbach, a 
decisive rejection and brake with him. 
That Marx grasped, more positively than Feuerbach, the rational and revolutionary element 
in Hegel's dialectics had to be tempered, however, with the fact that it had yet to be fully 
married to his study of political economy in order to generate a new materialist explanation 
of social being that was fundamentally dialectical. 
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Feuerbach, however, has very little to offer on this developing front, in the application of the 
dialectic to labour and political economy; Hegel, by contrast, and as we shall see in some 
detail later, is an entirely different kettle of fish. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
HEGEL'S ILLUSION REVISITED. 
"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct 
opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i. e., the process of thinking, 
which, under the name of "the Idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, 
is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, 
phenomenal form of "the Idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else 
than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of 
thought. " 57 
1. Direct Opposite. 
The nature of Marx's materialist inversion of Hegel's dialectic entails that Marx's method 
and application of that dialectic is, as he consciously expressed it, the "direct opposite" and 
not merely different from his idealist predecessor. The question being, and remaining, what 
is the exact nature of this inverted, directly opposite, or contrary form of dialectic? We have 
already gone some way down the road to answering this, but there is yet further progress we 
can make that will both back up the route taken so far, and lead us into new paths for 
investigation. 
Hegel's idealist and speculative foundation for the dialectic, as part of the criticism 
contained in the Paris Manuscripts showed, is also the source of his idealist illusions. Marx, 
in his later years, also made some comments regarding the nature of the speculative illusions 
that held Hegel in their sway. It is to these comments that we will now turn our analysis 
57 K. Marx. Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. 
(1974. ) P. 29. Jan. 24h 1873. 
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towards, with a backward glance seeing how they relate to Marx's earlier attempted general 
critique in the Paris Manuscripts, and a forward glance that relates to Marx's mature work, 
Capital. 
As regards the question of the continuity in Marx's thought, the evidence from Marx's early 
work is, in many ways, both reiterated and developed within his more mature writings. 
Some of the themes of his later criticisms of Hegelian idealism are, as we shall shortly 
witness, the same as the earlier targets. The vexed question of the continuity or otherwise in 
Marx's critical account of Hegel and the dialectic can now be put under the spotlight for 
further investigation. 
Marx, in his analysis of the method of political economy, contained in the introduction to 
the Grundrisse, and written some thirteen years after the Manuscripts, returns again to the 
sources underpinning Hegel's illusion. Marx's frugal observations here are important, not 
only for the beginning of an understanding of Marx's view of a scientific method of 
cognition, itself a dialectical one, but also why this cognitive dialectic helped to both delude 
and confirm Hegel in his idealist illusions. 
In this later work, Marx offers some further thoughts on Hegel's analysis of a systematic 
whole that brings out more aspects of the argument for the ontological priority of material 
being over consciousness, an early but constant theme of Marx's critique of Hegelian 
idealism. 
He also offers a partial explanation of how Hegel came to have a mystified account of the 
relation in the introduction to the Grundrisse. The source of why this systematic totality of 
thought is viewed in a speculative and alienated manner, as the product of thought, lies in 
Hegel's viewing the dialectical method, inherent in the cognitive process, in an idealist 
fashion. As Marx puts it: 
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"The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, 
hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a result, 
not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and 
hence also the point of departure for observation and conception. Along the first path 
the full conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the 
second, the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by 
way of thought. In this way Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the 
product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself 
out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete 
is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the 
concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete 
comes into being. "" 
The above was written in 1857, which, if taken alongside the passage quoted at the 
beginning of this section from the Afterword written in 1873, still echo that earlier critique 
in the 1844 Manuscripts. A time period of nearly thirty years. There are undoubted 
similarities and continuities of thought contained in the early and mature Marx, and there 
are also nuances within the broad concepts contained in that materialist critique, which point 
to other areas of inquiry. 
In the above two quotes, written sixteen years apart, Marx criticises Hegel's view and 
interpretation of the nature of the "process of thinking. " What are the core elements of these 
two criticisms of the "life-process of the human brain", that is, the process of thinking? 
In the 1873 Afterword to Capital, the "process of thinking" is seen as, and transformed into, 
an independent subject that is the creator of the real world. The world is, in turn, reduced to 
the status of the external phenomenal form of "the Idea". In the Grundrisse introduction of 
1857, the criticism of the "process of thinking" is that concrete reality appears as the result 
18K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) Introduction. P. 101. Aug-Sept. 1857. 
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of the process of concentrated thought unfolding itself out of itself and by itself, in the 
exterml form of the real world. 
Here we have a common perennial theme that echoes the earlier criticisms in the Paris 
Manuscripts of 1844 of Hegel's alienated thought sublating not only nature, but the 
movement of thought itself-, by the positing of a divine subject as the source of the whole 
process; where nature and man become mere predicates of this unreal, autonomous, and 
mystical subject. 
Hegel's illusion is that he conceives the real as the result of the process of thinking 
constructed into a totality of thought, which unfolds and objectifies itself as nature and 
human spirit. In these passages, Marx clearly posits the ontological primacy of the material 
world as the presupposition and real starting point of how the concrete can be captured in 
conceptual thought. The 1857 introduction also echoes the designation of Hegel's 
philosophy in the Manuscripts, as being a form of "alienated science thinking itself. " Here, 
again, are the later remarks of the Grundrisse. 
"Therefore, to the kind of consciousness - and this is characteristic of the 
philosophical consciousness - for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, 
and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of 
the categories appears as the real act of production - which only, unfortunately, 
receives a jolt from outside - whose product is the world; and - but this is again a 
tautology - this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, 
concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any 
way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above 
observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working up of observation and 
conception into concepts. "" 
59 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) Introduction. P. 10 1. Aug-Sept. 1857. 
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In the Manuscripts, Marx had also written about the illusions of speculation. The question 
is, does the earlier critique both reflect and foreshadow his later writings? Hegel's "double 
error" in the Manuscripts was to pose the philosopher as the criterion of knowledge, and 
mind as the essence of man. In the Grundrisse, the variation on the common theme is that 
conceptual thinking is regarded as the real human being and the conceptual world as the 
only true reality. 
Again, the problematic criterion of philosophical man in his essential speculative activity is 
seen as the expression of the real human being, where Hegel's mystical and inverted 
speculative idealism confirms itself in its own philosophical alienation as an alienated 
subject. The essence of Hegel's illusion, where the movement of the categories is mystically 
interpreted as the real act of production, is also reflected in the following remarks from the 
1844 text. 
"[T]he abstract thinker learns in his intuition of nature that the entities which he 
thought to create from nothing, from pure abstraction - the entities he believed he 
was producing in the divine dialectic as pure products of the labour of thought, for 
ever shuttling back and forth in itself and never looking outward into reality are 
nothing else but abstractions from characteristics from nature. To him, therefore, 
the whole of nature merely repeats the logical abstractions in a sensuous, external 
form. He once more resolves nature into these abstractions. Thus his intuition of 
nature is only the act of confirming his abstraction from the intuition of nature - is 
only the conscious repetition by him of the process of creating his abstraction. ' 
2. Movement of the Categories. 
The pieces and extracts, quoted from three different works, span the period from 1844 - 
1873, a period of nearly thirty years. There is, however, a definite continuity and 
consistency in Marx's critique. The "divine dialectic" of 1844 is "nothing else but 
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abstractions from the characteristics of nature. " The Idea, in 1873, is "nothing else" than the 
"material world reflected in the human mind. " 
The 1857 critique posits that the concept does not generate itself "outside" of our 
observations and our conceptions, that is, the Idea does not take an external material form in 
nature; it is merely the product of our reflection of nature in the categories of thought. Nor is 
it "above" conception and observation, that is, its source is not the divine, absolute and 
autonomous subject of the Notion. 
Furthermore, the Logical Idea is not, as in 1873, the "demiurgos of the real world. " The 
"movement of the categories" is therefore not the "real act of production", with the real 
being merely cognised as the "external phenomenal form of the Idea", the product of 
thought unfolding itself out of itself, by itself. Nature, as it is not the product of autonomous 
idealist thought, cannot then, as in 1844, be reduced to the estranged objective form that 
merely "repeats the logical abstractions", the pure products of the labour of thought, in "a 
sensuous, external form. " Marx's criticisms, spanning over three decades, hammer away 
then at some common perennial themes. 
Cognitive Illusion. 
Hegel's illusion is also due in part, and here we have another positive element emerging 
from the idealist philosophical mist, to the application of a dialectical method of cognition 
and its twofold analytical and synthetic paths. The movement from the concrete to the 
abstract, the deriving of the analytical, abstract universal determinations that, as Marx puts 
it, "evaporated" the concrete whole or "full conception", is the abstract starting point for the 
appropriation of the concrete in thought. 
The idealist ontological illusion of Hegel, that it is the result of the categories in operation, 
is then confirmed, for Hegel, by the second opposite path of the cognitive dialectic. Here, 
60 Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 3. Lawrence and Wishart. (1975. ) P. 345-346. 
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"the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought. " 
It is this second motion of the synthetic appropriation of that concrete totality back into that 
full conception, the movement that reproduces the concrete as the concrete in thought, that 
confirms the prior motion in its abstract starting point. It is this standing reality on its head 
that supports the mystical inversion of Hegel's idealism that thought does not, in fact 
presuppose external nature for its starting point, but that the direct opposite is in fact the 
case. 
It is then, due to the ability of the twofold contrary motions, the move from the concrete to 
the abstract and its opposite motion, the move from the abstract to the concrete, that is 
contained in the cognitive dialectic, that not only allows thought to reproduce the concrete 
in thought, but also aided and contributed to Hegel's illusion that the method of rising from 
the abstract to the concrete was, in fact, the way the concrete was itself created. 
The further question for the materialist critique of this idealist form of the cognitive dialectic 
is how Hegel, despite these speculative mystifications of this form of dialectic, generated 
those concepts and categories into a systematic whole, and how that entire compass of 
abstraction relates to the real concrete totality? 
In order to cognitively understand the nature of a concrete totality in its dynamic activity, 
then the major categories of its determinate being have to be integrated in such a way that 
the totality expresses itself in the evolving dialectical oppositions and relations of those 
categories. This evolution, whilst conceptual in its form, aims through its categories and 
concepts, to reflect the process whereby that objective totality makes itself into a unity of a 
manifold diversity. 
This mirroring of the real by cognition is achieved by developing the forms of dialectical 
activity that reflect the motions that manifest themselves in the subject's general 
characteristics of being. These objective ontological forms being underpinned by, and 
understood as, the nomological basis for the substantial activity that is expressed in the 
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principles of change and alteration inherent in those developing and contradictory, but 
reciprocal ontological poles. As the source of the motions that specifically determine and 
individuate the subject into a unified totality embodying its own internal principle of 
movement and self-activity. 
The materialist nature of the dialectic, and its subject matter, means that it is the real 
material contradiction that is the basis for the movement, change, and supersession of that 
subject in all its material activities and contradictions, not its abstract thought forms or 
concepts. The dialectic of negativity applies primarily to the ontology of objective and 
substantial activity. 
In turn, this objective contradiction provides the basis for the dialectic of negativity in the 
cognitive form. This applies in a twofold sense, firstly, in the contrary analytic and synthetic 
forms of motion pertaining to the cognitive process. Secondly, as a conceptual reflection, 
through those analytic and synthetic forms in cognition that allows thought to grasp the 
evolving, specific and determinate forms of the unfolding of the contradiction in objective 
being. 
Those specific determinations are reflected within the ontological forms of the categories 
that are generated by thought, from their simple, abstract universal forms to their more 
developed concrete determinations and relations that allows thought to appropriate the 
ontological relations in the world. This cognitive result is achieved precisely through the 
contradictions that are contained in the categories of conceptual cognition; categories that 
are generated by and the reflections of, their ontological referents in that substantial 
objectivity. - 
In general terms, the analytic form of cognition produces the universal form of abstraction 
pertinent to the subject, the synthetic form of cognition specifies and concretises that 
universal form, by grasping the specific difference that characterises the abstract universal. 
By dialectically relating these two forms and resolving the opposition contained in them, the 
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universal and particular are individuated in the concept that can correspond to the subject 
under investigation. 
The twofold forms of the cognitive dialectic are united into a systematic whole, with a 
central, dynamic and moving principle of change, the positing and resolving of 
contradiction, that unites and universally interconnects all its determinate forms, and reveals 
the systematic activity of the subject. The result is a scientific cognition of that concrete 
totality, not the concrete totality itself. 
The dialectic of negativity in the real world is appropriated through this cognitive dialectic. 
Hegel conflates both processes and posits the ontological source for the former as residing 
in the latter, in the primacy of the dialectic of negativity contained in the categories. Marx 
retains Hegel's cognitive dialectic as a scientific method of cognition, what he negates is 
that the real is the product or result of the movement of dialectical thought. The result is the 
scientific understanding and analysis of the object of investigation, not the proof of an 
idealist ontological basis for the existence of the object. 
The method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is, as Marx points out, only the way 
in which thought appropriates the concrete and reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. it 
is not the way or the process by which that concrete totality comes into existence. There is 
both a mirroring, one is tempted to say an extraction, and an inverting in Marx's critique of 
Hegel's idealist form of cognitive dialectic. 
it would appear then, paradoxically, that Hegel's illusion is caused by an incorrect idealist 
foundation and ontology combined with a correct dialectical method of cognition. A method 
of rising, through the analytic and synthetic forms of cognition, from the abstract to the 
concrete, that allows the concrete to be reproduced in thought. It is again difficult to draw 
out any other contrary conclusion from Marx's comments. This does not entail though, that 
Marx has an idealist account of the process of cognition. 
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That science has to have a materialist grounding is not the question at issue here, but that 
materialist grounding, by no means rules out the point that idealist thought can, and has, 
made important contributions to scientific thought. Marx is merely making the point of how 
a correct conceptual method of appropriating the objective can strengthen and underpin an 
idealist view of them as being the product and result of the subjective. The dialectic between 
the method of inquiry and the method of presentation can, as Marx expresses the relation 
here, also help to further confirm those idealist illusions. 
"Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The 
latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of 
development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the 
actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of 
the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had 
before us a mere a priori construction. "" 
The real and objective contradictions necessarily continue to play themselves out to a 
material conclusion, given the finite nature of objective, material existence. Moreover, this 
produces new dialectical forms of change that are themselves both heedless of, and 
unenlightened by, the illusions of speculative thought in its mystical glorification, and in its 
dialectical balancing of the concepts, of what already exists. 
The dialectics involved in the cognitive process are materialised by Marx as the historical 
result and product of, not only the dialectic in objectivity, but also how that objective 
dialectic between humans and nature is cognitively and dialectically reflected in human 
subjectivity. As the result of the social evolution of the brain, itself the highest product and 
result of the dialectic of human labour and nature. 
" K. Marx. Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I. Lawrence and Wishart. 
(1974. ) P. 28. Written on Jan. 24' 1873. 
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The thinking head, in order to think, has to have a material opposition in order to be able to 
develop the working up of observation and conception into the concepts and categories of 
thought. It is its source, its cause, and its ground, and the categories and their movement are, 
in the final analysis, derived from and presuppose this very material basis. The process of 
thinking, viewed as the process of the movement of the categories, thus reflects 
idealistically the real process in the world according to the materialist critique. 
This is why Marx necessarily posits that Hegel's idealism "unfortunately" has to receive "a 
jolt from the outside" in order to get the whole idealist process of thought kick started and 
moving in the direction of conceptual appropriation of that primary objective activity. 
Materialist Subject. 
Simply positing the inversion of the primary ontological assumptions of idealism does not 
fully exhaust Marx's materialist inversion of Hegel. Marx's rejection of an idealist dialectic 
also entails the rejection of an idealist subject, the Logical Idea. It necessarily in my view, 
and there is more evidence than we have already witnessed in the early Marx to support this, 
entails that the inversion also posits a different subject matter for investigation. The 
theoretical method too, must have a materialist subject. Marx tells us what it is in the 
Grundrisse. 
"The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a 
thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different 
from the artistic, religious, practical, and mental appropriation of this world. The real 
subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as 
long as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the 
theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the 
presupposition. "' 
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That subject matter and presupposition of a dialectical method, from a materialist 
perspective, is nature and man; there are no other subjects, supersensible or otherwise for a 
materialist dialectic to investigate. There is, though in a sense, only one science for Marx 
and Engels, that science is history; that history itself can be further divided in the form of a 
predominant natural history, and its offspring, human history. " 
What I have been arguing for, is that the solution to the enigma of the inversion remains 
problematic, for it remains incomplete in content, if the inversion is left solely at the 
reversal of ontological presuppositions without working through the further consequences of 
this. 
This was reflected in Marx's inversion of the Hegelian dialectic in the Manuscripts was 
necessarily combined with its application to the category of labour in its dialectical relation 
to nature. The social form and mode of production of human evolution being viewed as a 
subject, that in its social movement, is treated as a derivative process of natural history. 
Marx, in the Afterword to Capital, quotes from a Russian reviewer who outlines his general, 
dialectical, realist, and materialist method for the analysis of political economy. The value 
of analysing this review of Marx's method is that it provides a rough sketch of key areas of 
the general form of working of dialectic from his own materialist and historical perspective. 
It is worth extensively quoting to provide further material for the investigation and 
discussion. 
"Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws 
not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on 
the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence .... If 
in the 
K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) Introduction. P. 101-102. Aug-Sept. 1857. 
In the first section of the German Ideology, in a passage of the first version that is crossed out, the 
following remarks are formulated. "We know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at 
history from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of men. The two sides are, 
however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each other so long as men 
exist. " Marx Engels. Collected Works Volume 5. Lawrence and Wishart. (1976. ) P. 28. 
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history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is 
self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject matter is civilisation, can less than 
anything else, have for its basis any form or result of consciousness. That is to say, 
that not the idea, but the material phenomena alone can serve as its starting point. 
Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, 
not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, 
that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, 
each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most 
important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and 
concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present 
themselves. " 
The subject matter then also provides a materialist grounding of the dialectic. What Marx 
analyses in the value form is the development of the contradiction of two facts, use value 
and exchange value, that run all the way through, and take evolving and progressively more 
concrete forms of determinations and relations in the course of the analysis. It is not the Idea 
that is in the driving seat, nor is the understanding of that objective activity based on an 
idealist dialectic of thought and object. 
Marx's materialism and realism entails that the economic laws of motion are independent of 
human thought and volition. The movement of the conceptual categories, portrayed in their 
evolving dialectical polarity, only provides the conceptual framework for reflecting and 
understanding the ý real material basis and characteristic forms of determinations of the 
objective economic laws of motion of the operation of the value form and system. - 
The real point of departure for Marx's materialism and realism is the objective concrete 
totality that is the starting point for the head's appropriation. The subject of Marx's 
" K. Marx. Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. 
(1974. ) P. 27-28. (Jan. 24' 1873. ) 
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materialism is material production, but material production in its historical and social 
specificity, not material production viewed abstractly and ahistorically. 
Those material and social connections are rooted in the concrete historical conditions that 
generate a specific form of material production and its social relations. Those social 
connections are necessary connections for the working of the economic laws of motion of 
the specific mode of social production under investigation. They are not the products of 
accidental relations, but of the historical development of the social conditions of labour in 
combination with, and presupposing as their foundation, objective natural necessity. 
Production is not only the result of specific and evolving forms of production, a historical 
result, but it also generates specific forms and economic categories inherent to that mode of 
production. A definite form or mode of production "thus determines a definite consumption, 
distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between these different moments. "' 
A definite production generates then, historically specific forms that are systematically 
congealed into a unity of the diverse moments contained in that organic totality. There is a 
systematic and reciprocal relation between the different moments, although the point of 
departure and return is that of the productive mode. Marx's subject matter is aimed at the 
analysis of the specific and dominant social form of labour that determines the nature of the 
specific historical mode of material production. 
"In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates 
over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a 
general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their 
particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every 
being which has materialised within it. " 66 
K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) Introduction. P. 99. 
K. Marx. Grundrisse. Introduction. P. 106-107. 
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The general form of working, the essence of the dialectical method, is now applied by Marx 
to the study of the social form of labour, in order to analyse the historical development and 
laws of motion of the historico-specific forms that it takes in its productive modes of 
operation. This includes the arisal, maturity, decline, and transition, to higher forms of 
social labour contained in the dialectic of those specific historical forms. 
That Marx decisively rejects the idealism and mystical inversion in Hegel's thought is a 
constant from his early writings onwards. What is variable is his application of the general 
form of working and the laws of dialectic. It is not until Marx clearly defines his own 
subject matter and parameters of investigation, that the laws of dialectics are applied, in a 
systematic manner, to a systematic materialist subject. 
The complexities of Hegel's dialectical analysis of nomological activity are not brought out 
in the critical discussion of Hegel in the Manuscripts. What the thesis will argue is that what 
is retained and applied, in a materialist manner to political economy, are the general laws 
that Hegel outlines as pertaining to the workings of a systematic whole in its substantial 
process. This is the kernel that contains the rational element in Hegel's dialectic as applied 
to a system. 
Marx does not give up on the laws of dialectics formulated and discovered by Hegel. These 
laws being at the heart of any general form of working of dialectic itself, including Marx's 
own application of the dialectic. Marx does not abandon these at any time, even though they 
may have to be altered and tailored to suit a materialist foundation of the dialectic. This 
important question will be discussed in part two of the thesis. 
4. Summary. 
Turning Hegel's dialectic right side up is, as is generally regarded, a reference to the 
contrary ontological presuppositions of both thinkers. The critique of Hegel's idealist 
totality as the abstract, philosophical expression of the real, its reconstitution as the concrete 
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in thought, is returned to its real point of departure. The solution to the enigma of the 
inversion largely lies in working through what are the ontological and epistemological 
implications of this materialist grounding of the dialectic. 
Not only is there an ontological inversion in the primary foundations, with material and 
social reality replacing thought as the moving force, but also as the thesis argues, this 
necessitates a new subject matter of investigation. It also necessitates viewing the theoretical 
form of the general form of dialectic as itself arising out of the movement of real material, 
natural, and social being. 
What has also been ascertained by the method of investigation employed, is that implicit in 
the above are the following consequences for not only understanding the positive and 
negative sides of Hegel's dialectical thought, but also its ontological inversion in the 
materialist critique. So far, the following consequences have been gleaned from the 
materialist inversion, primarily from the analysis of Marx's early work. 
1. There is a materialist inversion in the ontological primacy from an idealist monism to a 
materialist monism. 
2. The consequences of this is that a new, primary, materialist subject matter, the practical 
activity and historical evolution of the social form of labour, replaces the idealist historical 
teleology of the "Phenomenology of Spirit". 
3. The "Science of Logic" gets demoted from its Pantheonic and Olympean heights to its 
true material origin; as a mystified and idealist account of scientific method that is contained 
in the outlining of the fundamentally dialectical nature of the activity of the ontological 
categories and laws that govern the interrelation and universal interconnection of a 
systematic organic totality. 
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4. The fundamental principles that operate in the analysis of all three elements above are the 
general form of working and the laws of dialectics. 
The relation between the general form of working and the laws of dialectics is expressed in 
the laws of motion of a systematic and substantial subject, as a process and movement 
containing an inherent principle of change and alteration. Dialectics is about the discovering 
of the laws of motion and the driving contradiction that expresses those laws of motion of 
the substantial process. This being the core content of the laws of dialectics themselves. 
What Hegel outlines is the general form of working of these laws of dialectics. 
It would seem unlikely, and it appears contrary to what little evidence we have, that Marx 
would want to jettison what he regarded as Hegel's hard won positive achievements of both 
consciously and comprehensively outlining the general form of working and the laws of 
dialectics, even if they are not ready or tailor made for Marx, but have to be modified in line 
with his materialism. This is a question we are not yet in a position to give a more full and 
sufficient answer to. 
They do provide, however, and this was gleaned from the analysis of the Paris Manuscripts, 
the basis for the critical form of dialectic that inherently lies in Hegel's thought. The 
replacement of the idealist view of the dialectical abstractions with the materialist poles of 
the dialectic, derived from the subject under investigation, are combined with the grounding 
of their activity in that objectivity rather than the categories of thought. This has the 
following immediate result from the materialist perspective. 
It leads to a contrary understanding of the movement of the material poles of the 
contradiction in their development and supersession. It posits an open ended and evolving 
materialist view of the interrelated systems of nature and society, and the dialectical 
contradictions inherent in their specific motions and processes; not the hermetically sealed 
idealist teleology and resolution of the dialectical contradictions within a system of logical 
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thought. It also posits then, the fundamental contradiction in Hegel's thought, of that 
between the dialectical method and his idealist system. 
The point is to unearth the laws of motion of this real movement in its specific 
contradictions, that is, to specify the general form itself in a determinate subject in its own 
specific expressions of those laws. Hegel imposes them on the world, as laws of thought, 
not laws generated from real nature, their true source of origin. It does not stop him though, 
from outlining what the nature of those general laws governing the dialectical movement of 
a totality, actually are. I 
To apply it idealistically is to apply it in an alienated manner, and to impose that logic on 
the world as the laws of motion of thought, instead of deriving it from the real relations and 
the actual facts, is to invert and mystify those real relations and actual facts. Marx retains 
these laws of dialectical development; they are the key to understanding, and the essence of, 
the rational kernel contained in Hegel's mystical inversion of dialectics. 
The fundamental contradiction that inherently lies in Hegel's work, is that it contains both 
metaphysics and science wrapped together in an idealist account. The point is to strip it of 
the contradiction between the metaphysical content and form that Hegel imposes upon the 
scientific content and form. It is by doing so that the rational kernel can be revealed and 
divorced from the mystical shell, and the basis for understanding how that idealist and 
abstract view of the laws of motion and development of a dialectical totality can be an aid to 
a materialist science, finds its expression. 
This is the core content of the rational kernel that is left from turning Hegel's dialectic 
upside down; the systematic materialist result of this inversion was the application, by 
Marx, of this dialectical method to the political economy of value. What the relations are 
between these two processes and what more it can reveal for clarifying the dialectical 
enigma of the relation of Hegel and Marx's dialectic is now the subject for further 
investigation. This is the general theme of part two of the thesis. 
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PART TWO: 
THE GENERAL FORM OF DIALECTIC. 
CHAPTER SIX. 
OBJECTIVE PROCESS AND THOUGHT. 
1. Introduction. 
"Marx was and is the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the 
Hegelian logic the nucleus containing Hegel's real discoveries in this field, and of 
establishing the dialectical method, divested of its idealist wrappings, in the simple 
form in which it becomes the only correct mode of conceptual evolution. The 
working out of the method which underlies Marx's critique of political economy is, 
we think, a result hardly less significant than the basic materialist conception. "" 
We saw, in part one of the thesis, that Marx's characterisation of Hegel's logical thought 
was postulated as a form of "alienated science thinking itself. " A central thrust of the 
materialist critique of this estranged and alienated account of scientific method by Marx was 
focussed on Hegel's illusion that the categories were the source of the movement in the real 
world. 
That the movement of the categories is not the real act of production does not, of course, 
negate that the categories can capture that real movement in conceptual thought; all 
' F. Engels. From a review article [Das Volk, no. 16, August 20" 1859] contained in K. Marx. A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Progress Publishers. (1977. ) P. 224-225. 
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scientific cognition has this as its aim. Furthermore, the critique of Hegel's idealist 
ontological primacy of thought, as we have also seen, does not, for Marx, necessarily entail 
the rejection of the general form of working and the laws of dialectics, only their speculative 
foundation and application. 
We have already partially addressed the nature of the content of this general form of the 
Hegelian dialectic; this we elucidated through Marx's critical analysis, and inverted 
application, of the Hegelian principle of the dialectic of negativity to the category of labour. 
We will, though, have to further investigate how Hegel mystifies the dialectical method that 
is contained in his account of the general form of working and the laws of dialectics. 
The real question, for an understanding of the materialist critique and inversion, is what are 
the consequences for the laws of dialectics, the core elements of the general form of 
working of the Hegelian dialectic, when they are grounded in social and natural being, as 
opposed to Hegel's idealist point of departure and systematic logical thought totality? Our 
spades have, then, some further digging to do in order to provide the groundwork for the 
beginnings of a fuller answer to this historical legacy and problem in theoretical thought. 
In order to more fully comprehend the nature of Hegel's logical system, then the following 
primary constituents have to be viewed as being of paramount importance for understanding 
the dialectical principles underlying the analysis of the Logic. 
The relation between contradiction as the primary moving principle of the system, the meta- 
logical principle of the whole, and its application to the fundamental characteristics, 
predications, and determinations of the generic analysis of substance. These interconnected 
constituents provide the key for gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the rational 
kernel contained in the general form of working of the dialectic. 
Both are fundamentally interlinkcd and united by Hegel in the process whereby substantial 
form activity is interpreted, in its universal forras of predication, as the product of 
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conceptual and logical activity; by so doing it becomes a logical subject and the product of 
pure thought. 
Substance as being-for-self, as subject, is what ties these elements of the Hegelian analysis 
together and determines the self-reflexive nature and reciprocal relation of the concepts and 
categories that make up the essential elements and determinations of the category of 
substance. This ontological category is the product, for Hegel, of the primacy of an idealist 
logical and conceptual ontology. 
2. The Logic of an Idealist Ontology. 
"The tendency of all man's endeavours; is to understand the world, to appropriate and 
subdue it to himself. and to this end the positive reality of the world must be as it 
were crushed and pounded, in other words, idealised. At the same time we must note 
that it is not the mere act of our personal self-consciousness which introduces an 
absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this identity is itself the absolute. "" 
philosophy, for Hegel, is a "peculiar mode of thinking. " It is a mode in which "thinking 
becomes knowledge, and knowledge through notions. " The rational principle behind all 
substantial being is, in this account, conceptual thought as the sole expression of the essence 
of the universal form. Those universal forms are both subjective and objective in their 
manifestation, but their true medium lies in the realm of mind, where they find their 
adequate universal expression in speculative philosophical thought. 
"It will be shown in the Logic that thought (and the universal) is not a mere opposite 
of sense: it lets nothing escape it, but, outflanking its other, is at once that other and 
itself. "" 
68 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. Oxford University Press. (O. U. P. ). (1975. ) Paragraph 42. z. P. 69. Here, Hege 
is reflecting the Aristotelian position expressed in the opening line of Aristotle's Metaphysics. "All men by 
nature desire to know. " 
61 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 20. P. 31. 
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The appropriation of the world is through the vehicle of thought; that vehicle is idealistically 
viewed as being absolute in both an objective and subjective sense. Thought, in the guise of 
speculative philosophical logic, then becomes its own form and content, its own subject and 
object, whose content is "the entire compass of abstraction",. Hegel's aim is to consciously 
develop and systematise this idealist form of "alienated science" contained in logical 
thought. 
Logic, according to Hegel, has, since Aristotle, not lost any ground. However, on the other 
hand it has also not gained any ground either. The conclusion that Hegel draws from this is 
that it is surely "all the more in need of a total reconstruction. " The reason for this necessity 
of logical rebuilding is that the evolution of philosophical thought has itself developed as an 
immanent criticism of inherited philosophical and logical form. 
The absolute nature of logical thought has now revealed and manifested itself, for Hegel, as 
the result of an idealist historical process of spirit; a historical process that is in fact driven 
by these very same conceptual and logical categories. As the logical and systematic totality 
of the speculative notion, in the form of universal thought, conceived as the movement of 
pure reason. The product and result of which, entails that the universal forms of the 
categories of thought can now be conceptually articulated and universally interconnected 
into a systematic logical whole. 
This is achieved through revealing the dynamic manner that the categories both particulatise 
and individuate themselves into a systematic logical totality covering the whole realm and 
content of philosophical endeavour. Hegel expresses this historical development of the 
philosophical idea in the following form. 
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"Spirit, after its labours over two thousand years, must have attained to a higher 
consciousness about its thinking and about its own pure, essential nature. "70 
The problem with the more modern accounts of philosophical logic, for Hegel, is that, not 
only have they failed to theoretically develop the fundamental Aristotelian heritage, they 
have also been infected with a methodology that is largely borrowed from the empirical 
sciences and mathematics. However, these methodological forms are in large part 
responsible for what Hegel calls the "abstract identity" that marks these conceptually fixed, 
and at the same time, contingently and externally related categories of logic. 
The solution to these ossified logical forms lies in a method that can breathe life back into 
the petrified categories. What the logical science aims to capture is the systematic 
integration, development, and interconnections of the categories and universal forms of 
logical thought. 
"Before these dead bones of logic can be quickened by spirit, and so become 
possessed of a substantial, significant content, its method must be that which alone 
can enable it to be a pure science. "" 
Logic had become sterile and lifeless for Hegel; it lacked a principle of movement and 
change that could universally integrate the logical categories in their necessary predications 
and relations. The problem with this fossilised view of the logical categories is that the 
70 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. M. Human historical, social, 
scientific, and religious development, the evolution of spirit, to put it in Hegel's terms, have posed the need 
for the reconstruction of logic in a higher form; a form that is more in accord with these historical advances of 
spirit. The development of Christianity, combined with the principle of individuality that distinguishes the 
bourgeois rational enlightenment outlook, mark the turning point and the fulcrum of "the world revolution" in 
thought for Hegel. Those twin interrelated developments, embodied in Lutheran protestantism and bourgeois 
philosophical and political thought, characterise the essential difference and development that fundamentally 
marks off the modem viewpoint from the ancient and medieval in Hegel's historical analysis of spirit. 
71 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 53. 
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"determinations are accepted in their unmoved fixity and are brought only into an external 
relation with each other. "72 
In order to develop this system of logical thought it is however necessary, according to 
Hegel, to outline the methodological principle of activity that both enables and shows how 
the categories universally interconnect and develop in their systemic relations. At the same 
time, for Hegel, the understanding of the dynamics inherent in this universal interconnection 
will also allow the logical thought process "to ascertain both the systematic connection of 
these forms and their value. " 
Logic, for Hegel, is the study of the form and content of thought, in the realm of pure 
thought; it is the analysis and relation "of the pure thought-forms" through the systematic 
construction of the categories of thought. The aim of the logical reconstruction is to 
integrate the logical categories with the ontological; by doing so he aims to 
comprehensively unify logic and metaphysics through the analysis of the nature and source 
of all being, namely universal thought. 73 
To pose this idealist solution of Hegel in an alternative form. Logic and metaphysics have to 
be synthesised and shown to be the product of absolute speculative thought, as their 
common universal foundation. Accordingly, as the activity of thought, viewed in this 
speculative philosophical manner, "may be termed Objective Thoughts", the following 
consequence ensues for Hegel. 
12 This characterisation is at the core of Hegel's critique of the logical foundations of the metaphysics 
of what he calls the "abstract understanding. " This difference will ftirther manifest itself, later in the thesis, in 
Hegel's critical account of the scientific method and nomological activity that this form of thought generates. 
73 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 24. P. 36. Hegel's Italics. In the Zusatz to this 
paragraph, (P. 39. ), Hegel states the following: "If in pursuance of the foregoing remarks we consider Logic to 
be the system of the pure types of thought, we find that the other philosophical sciences, the Philosophy of 
Nature and the Philosophy of Mind, take the place, as it were, of an Applied Logic, and that Logic is the soul 
which animates them both. Their problem in that case is only to recognise the logical forms under the shapes 
they assume in Nature and Mind - shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure 
thought. " The dialectic of nature and mind are the contrary species or specific difference of a common genus, 
namely logic. The common universal content takes on a twofold contrariety of form. 
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"Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in 
thoughts - thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things. "' 
That "essential reality of things" is developed through the generic ontological category of 
substance. In the Hegelian logic of ontology, the primary ontological category of "being", 
through the dynamic development of its own internal categorial contradictions, makes a 
transition into its higher form, as essence and as substance. As substance is viewed as the 
generic form of all being, then the question of what is being is for Hegel, like Aristotle 
before him, the question of what is substance. 
"This being is substance; as the final unity of essence and being it is the being in all 
being; it is neither the unreflected immediate, nor an abstract being standing behind 
Existence and Appearance, but it is immediate actuality itself and this as absolute 
reflectedness-into-self, as a subsisting in and for itself. "" 
Philosophical essentialism seeks to determine the adequate conceptual forms and categories 
that determine the ontological relations that are inherently contained in the category of 
substance. By doing so it aims to rationally understand substance as the generic type of all 
being in its generalised ontological categories and determinate forms of activities and 
relations - 
This process will prove to be inherently dialectical as the categories and qualities, necessary 
to understand the processes contained in substantial movement, are the direct expression of 
the principle of change and alteration contained within the category of substance. This 
ontological development of the primacy of substance is the dynamic that unites and 
individuates the polar determinations inherent within its necessary forms of ontological 
predication; these, in turn, provide the source for cognising the principle of change and 
alteration contained in all substantial form activity. 
I G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 24. P. 36. 
75 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 555. 
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Substantial essence is the kind as kind, the universal form particularising itself in its 
necessary specificity and individuation. That universal form particularising and 
individuating itself is the product of the activity of logical thought; it is the product of mind 
and spirit in their absolute conceptual form. This universal form is only truly captured in the 
medium of philosophical logic. 
"The universal does not exist externally to the outward eye as a universal. The kind 
as kind cannot be perceived: the laws of the celestial motions are not written on the 
sky. The universal is neither seen nor heard, its existence is only for the mind. 
Religion leads us to a universal, which embraces all else within itself, to an Absolute 
by which all else is brought into being: and this Absolute is an object not of the 
senses but of the mind and thought. "76 
This rational universal, "which cannot be apprehended by the senses", and whose inherent 
medium lies in the realm of conceptual thought, nevertheless, "contains the value of the 
thing - is the essential, inward, and true. " Thought, in this essentialist and idealist account, 
is "the constitutive substance of external things. " 
That essential reality of things, the universal form of all substantial being, is ontologically 
grounded in conceptual and universal thought. The genesis and unfolding of this substantial 
being is, for Hegel, the product of the concept or the notion. The potentiality of the form 
"I G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 21z. P. 34. Thought, in its pure logical form 
becomes its own form and content, its own subject and object, whose facts are the generic logical and 
ontological categories. These are the facts and content of thought, their universal form is the methodological 
and systematic order that they take. "For in point of contents, thought is only true in proportion as it sinks 
itself in the facts; and in point of form it is no private or particular state or act of the subject, but rather that 
attitude of consciousness where the abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to which its ordinary 
states or qualities are liable, restricts itself to that universal action in which it is identical with all individuals. 
In these circumstances philosophy may be acquitted of the charge of pride. And when Aristotle summons the 
mind to rise to the dignity of that attitude, the dignity he seeks is won by letting slip all our individual opinions 
and prejudices, and submitting to the sway of the fact. " G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 23z. 
P. 36. 
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activity actualising itself through superseding its determinate negation or privation is the 
teleological activity of substance as a conceptual subject. 
"In the living organism, on the contrary, the final cause is a moulding principle and 
an energy immanent in the matter, and every member is in its turn a means as well as 
an end The principle of inward adaptation or design, had it been kept to and 
carried out in scientific application, would have led to a different and higher method 
of observing nature. "" 
The genealogy of the logical concepts is elucidated and developed through the genesis of 
substance, and the genesis of substance is the Notion for Hegel. Substance, as the product of 
universal conceptual thought becomes subject; this it does in the actualising of the 
conceptual necessity that is inherent in the form activity. 
"Still, in the sense in which Aristotle, too, defines Nature as purposive activity, 
purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the unmoved which is also setf-moving, 
and as such is Subject. Its power to move, taken abstractly, is being-for-seVor pure 
negativity. "" 
The idealist account of substance as subject entails that it is a being-for-self that has a telos, 
a final cause. The architectonic inherent in substance is located in the expression of the 
development towards its final and end form, its telos or goal. The dynamic behind that 
architectonic is the positing and resolving of the contradictions, the "pure negativity", 
pertaining to its specific nature. 
I G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraphs 57/58. P. 89-90. 
78 G. W. F. Hegel. Preface. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) Paragraph 22. P. 12. 
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This is the source of its activity contained in its concept or notion, and its essence as form 
activity and subject. These are the core elements of the dynamics contained in the logic of 
ontology as objective logic, as the logic of being as substance. " 
How though, does Hegel go about developing this "total reconstruction" of logical thought 
from the logical foundations inherited from Aristotle? This generic aspect of being is 
analysed in its fundamental categories, concepts, - and relations, from their abstract simple 
relations such as quality, determinate being, being for self, to their more complex forms of 
determinations that are necessary for developing a systematically coherent and rational 
account of this universal presentation of all being. 
In Hegel's idealism, the dialectical method is both universal in form and substance, and the 
evolution of the categories contained in the objective logic, the substantial ontological 
content, represent the genesis and the conceptual unfolding of the universal notion. This, in 
turn, gives the categories, concepts, and relations their concrete meaning, function, and 
place in the analysis of a universally interconnected whole, which is exhibited in the 
determinate expressions of its specific differences and individuating forms. 
By reconstructing a logical totality of conceptual thought he, at the same time, outlines the 
rational elements of a dialectical methodology, but envelops that method in a mystical guise, 
in the form of an "alienated science" generated by the contemplative philosopher and 
conceived as the dialectical fusion of logic and metaphysics. 
"Hegel's teleological view of substance is also then derived from his ancient Greek predecessor, 
Aristotle. "Aristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner design, and is thus far in advance of the notion 
of design in modem Teleology, which had in view finite and outward design only. " G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. 
Paragraph 205. P. 269. In The Philosophical Propaedeutic. Blackwell. (1986. ) P. 103. Hegel describes the end 
or the teleological concept in the following form. "There is Internal Purposiveness when an existence has its 
concept within itself and at the same time is end, means and self-realising and realised End in its own self. " 
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Hegel's Dialectical Method. 
"On the other hand, the investigation of the forms of thought, the thought 
determinations, is very profitable and necessary, and since Aristotle this has been 
systematically undertaken only by Hegel. "'o 
Thepethod, for Hegel, is the universal element of the form that the categorial content of the 
logic takes. What ties the method and form to the content is that the inner self-movement of 
the categorial content of the logic is gleaned through the activities and relations of the 
interconnected and universal form activity of the ontological categories. 
"However, the exposition of what alone can be the true method of philosophical 
science falls within the treatment of logic itself; for the method is the consciousness 
of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic. "" 
As a result of this idealist form of ontological primacy, the categories of thought, as Hegel 
tells us, have to be studied "in their essential nature and complete development" in order to 
delineate their inherent limitations, internal contradictions, and necessary relations. This 
"inner self-movement" is the source of the contradiction contained within the logical 
categories. As such, the categories evince their own specific forms of dialectical 
contradictions and relations. 
"So that what we want is to combine in our process of inquiry the action of the forms 
of thought with a criticism of them. The forms of thought must be studied in their 
essential nature and complete development: they are at once the object of research 
and the action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own action 
they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. This is that action of 
thought, which will hereafter be specially considered under the name of Dialectic, 
81 F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 240. 
81 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of I., ogic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 53. 
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and regarding which we need only at the outset observe that, instead of being 
brought to bear upon the categories from without, it is immanent in their own 
ac ion. "82 
The categories themselves are the outcome of dialectical relations, they contain opposed 
determinations, and, at the same time, they are universally interconnected and 
architectonically developed from the abstract simple to the more complex concrete 
categories that can explain their movement into a systematic totality. 
The logical subject becomes a totality by positing and resolving the specific difference of 
the contradiction pertaining to the evolving and interrelated categorial and conceptual 
relations that, at each subsequent and ongoing level of ontological development, makes it 
into a determinate whole. 
The need to develop a universal systematic relation of the logical categories also entails that 
there has to be also a universal method for interconnecting the parts of the logic with the 
whole. What is required is a dialectical method for developing the necessary connections 
between the logical forms and relations of the content of the categories. 
That connection is provided through the motor force of polarity and contradiction that 
universally interconnects the primary concepts and categories in their necessary relations. 
This process of the systematic movement and development, the positing and resolving of the 
contradiction of the logical subject in all its evolving categorial and conceptual relations, is 
essential in understanding the general form of working of the Hegelian dialectic, and the key 
rational element of its operation. 
"All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress - and it is essential to strive to 
gain this quite simple insight - is the recognition of the logical principle that the 
negative is just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve 
81 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 41z. P. 66. 
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itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation 
of its particular content, in other words, that such a negation is not all and every 
negation but the negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and 
consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains that 
from which it results; which strictly speaking is a tautology, for otherwise it would 
be an immediacy, not a result. Because the result, the negation, is a specij7c negation 
it has a content. It is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its predecessor; for it 
is richer by the negation or opposite of the latter, therefore contains it, but also 
something more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the 
system of Notions as such has to be formed - and has to complete itself in a purely 
continuous course in which nothing extraneous is introduced. "83 
This driving contradiction, where the contradiction is both posited in its positive and 
negative forms, and then resolved and sublated in the higher form that unites them, is 
inherent in the entire compass of Hegel's logical abstractions. It is through the development 
of this dynamic contained in a theoretical totality that the method gains its adequate 
expression as the conceptual evolution and activity of the substantial self-moving whole. 
The central nature of contradiction has then to manifest its activity in Hegel's general 
application of it to the conceptual development and categories of the Logic; it could not do 
otherwise. The forms and categories of thought exhibit this deficiency and contradiction as 
an immanent element in their own relational activity. 
What Hegel has contributed to thought, and this is no small achievement, is the conscious 
and systematic ordering of the basic ontological categories into a coherent logical whole, 
with the principle of movement and change, namely posited and resolved contradiction, as 
the dynamic expression underpinning the laws of motion of categorial and conceptual 
thought. This principle is the foundation for their universal interconnection, and the force 
for elevating the logical and metaphysical into a systematic methodology. 
93 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 54. 
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"This movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method in 
general. Regarded as the connectedness of their content it is the necessary expansion 
of that content into an organic whole. "" 
The principle of contradiction, as the motor force behind the process of movement and 
change, is dynamically fused with the logical relations of the substantial categories. The aim 
of this synthesis is to develop the conceptual evolution of an ontological whole of categorial 
thought terms in and through their necessary relations and inner connections. 
It is through developing these twin primary generic principles and categories of substance 
and contradiction that Hegel reconstructs the logic as a conceptual totality and develops the 
conceptual framework and method for capturing the "consciousness of the form of the inner 
self-movement of the content. " 
This elevation, by Hegel, of contradiction into a meta-logical principle of the system is the 
key then, to both the fuller understanding of the conceptual framework of substance, and 
how that generic and universal determination of being particularises and determines itself 
through its individuation. This twofold dynamic is also then, the key to understanding how 
Hegel both inherits, develops, and systematises philosophy from that inherited Aristotelian 
perspective. 85 
The outlining of the method is, at the same time, also the outlining of the ontological 
categories, predicates, and relations, that are involved in the construction of a logical and 
systematic whole; substantial ontology becomes a form of logical necessity. This is why the 
84 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. Preface. O. U. P. (1977. ) Paragraph 34. P. 20. 
85 G. W. F. Hegel. History of Philosophy. Volume 2. Kegan Paul. (1894. ) P. 140. "The principle of 
individualisation, not in the sense of a casual and merely particular subjectivity, but in that of pure 
subjectivity, is peculiar to Aristotle. Aristotle thus also makes the Good, as the universal end, the substantial 
foundation, and maintains this position against Heraclitus and the Eleatics. The Becoming of Heraclitus is a 
true and real determination, but change yet lacks the determination of identity with itself, the constancy of the 
universal. The stream is ever changing, yet it is nevertheless the same, and is really a universal existence. " 
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method is consequently described by him as "nothing but the structure set forth in its pure 
essentiality. " 
Hegel's uniting of logic and ontology, develops the general laws of motion that are 
dialectically contained in the reciprocal and evolving predicates and relations expressed in 
the polarities that make up the category of substance. As they are expressions of 
fundamental ontological characteristics, the contradiction then is expressed in all the 
categories and conceptual forms of determinate being. 
4. Method as Evolution of the Whole. 
"The True is the whole. But the Whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it 
is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in 
this constitutes its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of 
itself. "" 
Dialectical method, according to Hegel, is expressed in the evolution of the whole; the 
evolution of the whole is, for him, the movement of the notion itself. The method is then, to 
surnmarise the analysis so far, the universal element of the form of the logical content, 
encapsulated in the dialectical movement and interconnecting systematisation of the 
categories. 
The aim of Hegel's idealist orientation is that of logically developing a conceptual and 
dialectical totality based on the emergent movement of the categories of thought; that is, 
each of the categories are shown to contain their own polar forms of opposition that are both 
mutually reciprocal and at the same time mutually exclusive. The inherent logical dynamic 
contained in them shows their dialectical resolution and fusion into a more evolved and 
higher developed categorial and ontological concept. 
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This dialectical evolution of the categories, from their primary to their higher evolving 
forms finds its resolution when the categories are integrated into a systematic whole that 
now contains and exhibits a systematic principle of change and alteration, namely, the 
positing and resolving of a determinate totality of contradiction. 
The laws of motion of the subject are, in consequence, based upon how, to put it in Hegel's 
terms, it mediates itself with itself through its negativity. The polar difference is both 
sublated and retained as the specific difference of the universal, as the conceptual source of 
the dynamics of the whole movement and process. The identity is itself the expression of the 
contradiction contained in the conceptual and substantial essence of the subject. 
The "genesis of substance is the notion" for Hegel, and the conceptual evolution of the 
notion that has gained this absolute form, the concept of the concept contained in all being, 
is its true being revealed to itself. For Hegel, the method has emerged as the "setf-knowing 
Notion that has itseýV, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, for its subject matter. " 
The content of that whole has been gleaned through the subjectivity of the notion, its real 
and ideal source; the concepts and ontological categories of which are manifested in 
objective and substantial being that are idealistically sublated as the product of the evolution 
of the general form of working of the conceptual categories of the genesis of substance, 
namely the notion. 
"Further, the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, 
is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the 
mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure simple 
negativity, and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling 
which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity 
and of its antithesis [the immediate simplicity]. Only this self-restoring sameness, or 
" G. W. F. Hegel. Preface. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) Paragraph 20. P. 11. 
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this reflection in otherness within itself - not an original or immediate unity as such 
- is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its 
end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to 
its end, is it actual. "" 
That is, substance realises itself as a logical subject through its essential conceptual or 
teleological activity. At the same time, mind or spirit realises and actualises its autonomy 
and real nature, its being-for-self as a logical subject. This absolute, methodological and 
logical subject unites, in a single identity for the idealist, the subjective and objective 
aspects of cognition and the objective world. 
The method here is not merely, as in Kant, an instrument and means of knowledge, it is, for 
Hegel, knowledge of itself as the essence of all cognitive and objective activity. The method 
is the "instrument and means of the cognising activity, distinguished from that activity, but 
only as the activities own essentiality. " The method has now emerged as rational thought 
conscious of itself in its highest methodological and theoretical form of activity. 
Accordingly, this idealist account entails for Hegel that science itself only really "exists only 
in the self-movement of the Notion. " Its mystical absolute form and mode of expression, as 
an idealist philosophy of science, fetishises the method itself. This is yet another reason why 
Marx describes his thought as a form of "alienated science thinking itself. " 
As the universal form and method that generates both nature as objectivity and spirit as the 
cognitive truth of the substantial process. This twofold form and mode of a common unity 
and content is expressed in the dialectic of objective and subjective logic. This bifurcation 
87 G. W. F. Hegel. Preface. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) Paragraph 18. P. 10. Hegel also 
stresses that this fundamental polar difference between nature and mind is not only the expression of the unity 
and identity of their common content the Logical Idea, but also the expression of the necessary difference of 
the division and contradiction contained within it. Without the polarity and contradiction there is no 
movement and no idealist resolution that sublates that necessary twofold dynamic. Without the common 
identity, and this is fundamental for a dialectical account, there is no specific difference and movement; there 
is no necessary connection between the two poles. 
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of the universal method is reflected in both the dialectic of cognition, and in the analysis of 
the conceptual necessity of substantial form activity. 
"The method is therefore to be recognised as the unrestrictedly universal, internal 
and external mode; and as the absolutely infinite force, to which no object; 
presenting itself as something external, remote from and independent of reason, 
could offer resistance or be of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be 
penetrated by it. It is therefore soul and substance, and anything whatever is 
comprehended and known in its truth only when it is completely subjugated to the 
method; it is the method proper to every subject matter because its activity is the 
Notion. This is also the truer meaning of its universality: according to the 
universality of reflection it is regarded merely as the method for everything; but 
according to the universality of the Idea, it is both the manner peculiar to cognition, 
to the subjectively self-knowing Notion, and also the objective manner, or rather the 
substantiality of things - that is of Notions, in so far as they appear primarily to 
representation and reflection as others. " 
The result of the relation between thought and being is cognitively united in the general 
form of working of dialectic applied to the primary category of substance; as the generic 
ontological basis for the analysis of all being and activity. The method of cognition 
expresses the objective general manner of substance in its categories, concepts, and relations 
via the opposite forms of motion contained in the analytic and synthetic aspects of the 
cognitive method that expresses the interconnected evolution of the categories into a 
systematic whole. 
Method is then on this account consciousness of the notion in this its universal form, a form 
that is determined in and for itself. Subject, object, and method are posited as the one 
identical notion, as the absolute. The method is then, idealistically construed as the notion of 
88 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 826. 
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the notion, or the concept of the concept; alternatively, it is logical thought in the form of 
pure and absolute reason, as a form of "alienated science thinking itself. " 
Hegel in the above quote reflects, albeit in an idealistic form that sublates the polar 
difference as an absolute subject, the materialist separation of the cognitive (subjective) and 
the substantial (objective) forms of dialectic. What he is also telling us here, which is of 
special interest for the investigation of the thesis, is that the method is itself the expression 
of the general form of working of dialectic, applied here respectively to both cognition and 
objective substantiality. A position that is both inverted but at the same time reflected, in the 
materialist critique of Marx and Engels. 
The Materialist Critique. 
The materialist critique of this idealist account of the identity of objectivity and subjectivity, 
is that the ontological primacy and grounding lies in objective materiality, this separates the 
direct unity and identity of thought and being expressed in Hegel's idealism. The idealist 
presuppositions inherent in the identity of thinking and being in Hegel is expressed by 
Engels in the following form. 
"With Hegel, for example, its affirmation is self-evident; for what we cognise in the 
real world is precisely its thought-content - that which makes the world a gradual 
realisation of the absolute idea, which absolute idea has existed somewhere from 
eternity, independent, of the world and before the world. But it is manifest without 
further proof that thought can know a content which is from the outset a thought- 
content. It is equally manifest that what is to be proved here is already tacitly 
contained in the premises. "" 
The separation and difference of the contrary poles is the result in Hegel's view of their 
direct identity. That direct identity lies within their common content and source logical 
123 
thought, as an idealist sublation of the polarity of objectivity and cognition speculatively 
hypostasised as the activity of the notion or absolute idea. 
The target of dialectical analysis for the materialist inversion and its true source was now 
the real world, real nature, and real society, not the philosophical and theosophical view of 
reason as absolute and divine. Here, in the following passage, we have Engels own 
expression and variation on Marx's theme of the materialist inversion of Hegel. 
"This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We comprehended the 
concepts in our heads once more materialistically as images [Abbilder] or real things 
instead of regarding the real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute 
concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, 
both of the external world and of human thought - two sets of laws which are 
identical in substance, but different in their expression in so far as the human mind 
can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in 
human history, these laws exert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external 
necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the 
dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical 
motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head; or 
rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. "' 
The question is what is the nature of the relation of these two sets of laws for the materialist, 
the natural and the cognitive, which for Engels are "identical in substance, but different in 
their expression"? There is, at the bottom of this proposition of Engels, a presupposition 
entailed. This presupposition, inherent to a monistic account, is manifested, but in their 
inverted forms, in both its idealist and realist forms of expression. 
" F. Engels. Marx-Engels. Selected Works. Volutne 2. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 335. 
90 F. Engels. Marx-Engels. Selected Works. Volume 2. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 350. 
124 
We have seen how Hegel views that source as absolute and rational thought, but Hegel's 
absolute form of idealist monism is replaced with a realist and materialist monism. What 
separates the idealist from the realist here is whether these laws find their foundation in 
conceptual thought as in the former, or material reality as in the latter viewpoint. This realist 
and monist materialist difference from, and direct opposition to, a monist idealism, 
nevertheless entails a further theoretical presupposition that Engels draws out in the 
following remarks. 
"The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same 
laws, and hence, too, that in the final analysis they cannot contradict each other in 
their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It 
is the unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought. "91 
The laws of dialectics, whilst they do apply to both forms in the materialist account, 
nevertheless entails that the ontological primacy of the relation is on the objective 
expression of the laws of dialectics; our subjective and cognitive apprehension of them is 
dependent upon that objective operation. In that sense alone they are subject to the same 
laws, the laws of cognition are, in Engels materialist account, both dependent upon and 
reflect, their primary natural nomological forms of necessity. 
This is the inverted materialist reflection of the twofold form and content of the method of 
dialectic expressed by Hegel as the general manner of cognition and the objective general 
manner or substantiality of things. That relation, though, is not one of direct identity, but a 
practically mediated identity between subjectivity and objectivity; the mediating element 
here is both the source and the test of their correspondence. 
91 F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 266. The materialism of the 
eighteenth century investigated this premise as regards its content by restricting itself to the proof that the 
content of all thought and knowledge was derived from sensuous experience. Idealism by contrast, and Hegel 
in particular, investigated this from the point of view of not only the content of logic expressed in the 
ontological and conceptual categories of ontology and epistemology, but also by analysing the active 
interrelations of the predicational forms of these conceptual thought-determinations. 
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The active mediating link that spans that dialectic of human subjectivity in its objective 
relation with nature imposed necessity, is social labour. The development of consciousness 
and rational thought is itself the result of human labouring interaction on and with nature 
itself; any other explanation for the development of human rationality is inherently dubious 
for Marx, and consequently receives short shrift. 
"Since the reasoning process itself arises from the existing conditions and is itself a 
natural process, really comprehending thinking can always only be the same, and can 
vary only gradually, in accordance with the maturity of development, hence also the 
maturity of the organ that does the thinking. Anything else is drivel. "' 
Conscious dialectical thought is, for the critical materialist, then regarded as the highest 
product of human evolution in opposition to the rest of nature, not the source of the proof of 
logical systematic thought standing outside and above real man and real nature, as it is in 
Hegel. 
What Marx and Engels reject is the view that the laws of dialectics are laws of absolute 
thought, and that the material world has to conform to an idealist system of thought. Real 
nature and history have then to acquiesce to an idealist thought totality that is systematically 
imposed on that real, historical, and evolutionary development of nature and society. Both 
of these propositions are rejected in the materialist critique. 
"The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws 
of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and 
often outrageous treatment; the universe willy-nilly, has to conform to a system of 
thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of evolution of human 
thought. If we turn the thing round, then everything becomes simple, and the 
I K. Marx. Letter to Kugelmann. III July 1868. Collected Works. Volume 43. Lawrence and 
Wishart. (1988. ) P. 69. 
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dialectical laws that look so extremely mysterious in idealist philosophy at once 
become clear and shnple as noon day. "" 
Dialectics is reduced from its idealist and mystified form through the gravitational pull and 
force of its real material and social roots to its central and rational core, to the science of the 
general laws of motion of nature and thought. What remains, that still has a rational core for 
Marx and Engels, once the idealist ontology and system has been rejected, is the Hegelian 
account of the laws of motion of dialectics. 
The problem we are then left with, is how to divest these dialectical laws from their mystical 
form and content by both deriving and applying them to real material being. The laws of 
motion of dialectics, in both its cognitive and substantial forms of expression, together with 
its idealist teleological explanation of substantial necessity, had then to be liberated from 
Hegel's balancing of dialectical concepts; they had to be put on a materialist footing. The 
lightning bolt of Hegel's dialectic had to be grounded in its new material content, and in its 
real material roots. 
This rational cognitive result can only arise from deriving the method from the dialectics 
involved in the existing conditions, not from the systematic and hermetically sealed totality 
of the movement of speculative and absolute thought. The dialectical relation of thought and 
nature, mediated through practical activity, is, for all three aspects of the triadic relation of 
nature, thought, and active objective mediation, therefore an open-ended and evolving 
process for the materialist. 
93 F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 62. As to whether they become as 
clear and simple as noonday in such an uncomplicated manner is a more debatable point. The inability of 
socialists, who embrace a dialectical method, to have subsequently done so is testimony to the fact that the 
solution to the enigmatic nature of the materialist inversion of Hegel's dialectic has proven more elusive than 
simple. Hegel's wry critique of Fichte's abject failure to make good his attempt to make subjective idealism 
clear and simple as noonday to everyday thought, as exemplified in the guise of common sense realism, is 
probably the source for Engels choice of words. Opponents of Engels would probably contend that he has 
been hoisted on his own petard. 
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Engels materialism reduces Hegel's idealist account of the laws of dialectics to the science 
of the most general laws of all motion; this entails for him that they apply to the natural 
world, human history, as well as cognitive thought, as the inverted form of Hegel's idealist 
dialectic of substance and subject. 
"Dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motion. This 
implies that its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature and human 
history as for the motion in thought. "" 
The question that still largely remains, however, is how these dialectical laws of motion 
materially operate in nature, human history and thought. Hegel's philosophical and 
speculative thought substituted, for the real but unknown interconnections, the mystification 
of the interconnections of the categories of thought as the source, for example, of human 
historical development presented as the unfolding of the logical and absolute idea. 
In place of the philosophical systems that, as Engels expresses it, "plugged" the factual gaps 
in knowledge, there is now a dialectical method that aims at the comprehension, by means 
of the facts, activities, and contrary relations that are objectively generated, of the universal 
interconnections of a systematic and organic whole. Engels expresses this need for a 
thoroughgoing dialectical dynamic to also be applied to human social development in the 
following fashion. 
"Here, therefore, just as in the realm of nature, it was necessary to do away with 
these fabricated, artificial interconnections by the discovery of the real ones -a task 
which ultimately amounts to the discovery of the general laws of motion which 
assert themselves as the ruling ones in human society. "" 
91 F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 267. The opponents of the view that 
dialectics applies to nature generally centre their criticism on the work of Engels rather than the corresponding 
views of Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky. In my view all four of them hold to this view of the all-encompassing 
nature of dialectical laws. There is no contrary evidence in any of their writings that would tend to cast any 
real doubt on this viewpoint. For example, see S. Hook. From Hegel to Marx. Ann Arbor. (1962. ). P. 75-76. 
11 F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 353. 
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The discovery of the general laws of motion that operate and assert themselves in human 
historical and social development were expressed, in their core form by Marx, in the 
dynamic dialectical relationship manifested in the contradiction between the development of 
the forces of production and the social relations of production. This analysis of the evolving 
contradiction contained in the social productive forms and forces of labour is the driving 
source for Marx's own account of human historical progress. 
Labour, as a historically evolving social genus, a genus that finds its specific and concrete 
expression in its developing social forms and modes of production, is the key to discovering 
the real interconnections and general laws of motion that assert themselves as the driving 
forces in human history and society. These are the real material and social connections of 
the human subject, as opposed to the artificial interconnections and driving force fabricated 
in Hegel's idealist account of the history of spirit. ' 
What Hegel contributed to philosophical logic was a systematic dialectical method. A 
method that outlined the laws of motion pertaining to the principle of change and alteration 
that applies to and interconnects a substantial whole in its process of self-movement. What 
Hegel generates is an alienated account of science, though this is ultimately derived from 
real nature, reduces that natural, substantial activity to abstract nature in the form of an 
idealist and systematic dialectical movement of the ontological categories inherent in 
substance. 
What is central to this "method of science" for Hegel, is the ongoing dialectical polarity and 
development, with the resultant ftision into a new category that marks every stage of the 
interconnected whole of a movement and process. This generalised form of dialectic 
becomes, in turn, and by dint of its universal and abstract generality, the methodological 
96 "Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist 
philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history. " F. Engels Preface to the second 
edition of Anti-Duhring. September 1885. Anti-Duhring. Lawrence and Wishart. (1969. ) P. 15. 
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form that can be applied to the specific and determinate laws of motion of particular 
substantial totalities in their determinate forms of particularisation and individuation. 
A dialectical account of method seeks to capture the universal interconnection of the 
specific categories of the substantial subject in its systematic form activities and 
determinations; it aims to show how it expresses itself in its specific laws of motion via its 
necessary activity as that subject. This requires understanding the contrary forms of motion 
that pertain to the specific predications of the substantial subject in process. These are, and 
have to be for the materialist, derived from the real determinations and facts, from the real 
motions of the subject in process. 
The nature of that universal form activity is encapsulated in the specific identity of the 
subject matter in its determinate moments and necessary categorial predications and 
relations. The laws of dialectics, whilst having universal validity, must also be able to 
capture the contrary motions in the specific forms that are relevant for the subject matter 
under investigation. 
The general form of the method must contain the flexibility to be derived from, and applied 
to, the material facts and activities of the specific subject, in order to gain an adequate 
conceptualisation of it. This test applies to all and any form of general scientific method, not 
just a dialectical model; unless that is, one holds to the view that there is no holy grail that 
can pass for a general form of scientific method. 
The question then is what impact this derivation of the contradictions from the real 
determinations of the subject has for the relation between the idealist predecessor and 
materialist successor in terms of their inverted forms of dialectical method. What impact 
does this inversion have on a materialist as opposed to an idealist conception of laws of 
dialectical motion? The further question is what impact this has on the nature of the motor 
source behind those laws of motion that applies to all substantial being, namely 
contradiction? 
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For example, and this is fundamental, Hegel's systematic balancing of the idealist concepts 
that generate a substantial systematic whole does not take into account the further evolution 
of the real contradictions that both generate and underpin the motions of a substantial 
subject; there is no account in Hegel of substantial motion that not only evolves and matures 
into a systematic subject, but also, through the operation of these same laws of motion, both 
declines in its characteristic form of activity, and creates the conditions for its own 
supersession. 
What Marx had to do, in order to develop theoretical thought, was to scientifically develop, 
from a materialist perspective, the methodological form that would enable the development 
of a generalised concept that could critically encapsulate the nature and characteristic 
activity of the mode of production based on value and capital. This idealist method of 
Hegel, inverted by Marx, armed him with the methodology that would enable him to 
encapsulate the laws of motion and central contradictions that underpin the systematic mode 
of production founded on value and capital. 
This methodological inversion of Marx also entailed showing that the laws of dialectical 
motion that apply to the systematic activity of capital, in turn create the same driving 
contradictions that develop the social relations and material conditions for its supersession. 
A fundamental question that needs then to be addressed, if the nature of dialectics, in either 
its idealist or materialist guises, is to be better understood, is to ascertain what the nature of 
contradiction from a dialectical perspective, actually entails. This is a question that has not 
been sufficiently investigated, but cannot be side-stepped, as it is central for an 
understanding of not only the nature of dialectics, in particular an understanding of its laws 
of motion, but also the relation between Hegel and Marx's inverted forms. 
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In order to begin to answer this fundamental question we shall have to investigate Hegel's 
idealist account before we can generate what the materialist inversion of this process may 
contain. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
CONTRADICTION AND DIALECTIC. 
1. Laws of Motion. 
"There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing 
climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous surnmits. "91 
"Should anyone ask for a royal road to Science, there is no more easy-going way 
than to rely on sound common sense. " - "True thoughts and scientific insight are 
only to be won through the labour of the Notion. "" 
For both Hegel and Marx then, there is no royal road to science, it arises after a long period 
of historical development and is the product and result of hard-won human endeavour, often 
at a high personal and social cost. Science, in this viewpoint, seeks to find the intrinsic 
interconnections, the inner essence and specific difference that is the source and explanation 
behind the changes and processes inherent in the phenomenal forms of appearance. 
The aim of scientific cognition is to understand the forms of motion that expresses the inner 
nature of the contradictions that drive the specific and determinate nature of the form 
activities that are pertinent to the substantial subject under investigation. As Marx notes, 
science itself would be superfluous if the cause of the phenomenal form were obviously 
open to sensory or empirical observation. 
91 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Preface to the French Edition. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 30. 
March 18 Ih 1872. 
98 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) Preface. Paragraph 70. P. 43. "Science 
exists solely in the self-movement of the Notion. " G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) 
Preface. Paragraph 71. P-44. 
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The laws of the celestial motions are not, as Hegel expressed it, "written on the sky"; a point 
that Marx echoes here when discussing the relation between the "general and necessary 
tendencies" that "must be distinguished from their forms of manifestation. " 
"But this much is clear; a scientific analysis of competition is not possible, before we 
have a conception of the inner nature of capital, just as the apparent motions of the 
heavenly bodies are not intelligible to any but him, who is acquainted with their real 
motions, motions that are not directly perceptible to the senses. "" 
The necessity and need for generating a scientific method is manifested then, precisely due 
to the very fact that the phenomenal form does not necessarily openly reveal its inner 
essential being and nature. Contradiction, as an inner difference that manifests itself in an 
external relation and opposition means, that if it remains unfathomed, then the subject 
appears as being solely the product and result of an external property and relation, and 
whose conditions of existence also appear to lie solely in this exterior and apparently 
contingent relation. " 
Marx echoes this view in his critique of value as being a specific and peculiar social form 
that takes on a reified appearance; an appearance that belies its real essential nature and 
inner laws of motion. Value, as a social relation between people that is expressed through 
things, entails for Marx that value, by its very nature, "does not stalk about with a label 
describing what it is. " Marx's attack on vulgar political economy has this crudely empirical 
account of science in mind as the source of his critique. 
K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. P. 300. 
11 "The vulgar economist has not the slightest idea that the actual, everyday exchange relations and 
the value magnitudes cannot be directly identical. The point of bourgeois society is precisely that, a priori, no 
conscious social regulation of production takes place. What is reasonable and necessary by nature asserts itself 
only as a blindly operating average. The vulgar economist thinks he has made a great discovery when, faced 
with the disclosure of the intrinsic interconnection, he insists that things look different in appearance. In fact, 
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"Here it will be shown how the philistines and vulgar economists manner of 
conceiving things arises, namely, because the only thing that is ever reflected in their 
minds is the immediate form of appearance of relations, and not their inner 
connection. Incidentally, if the latter were the case, we would surely have no need 
for science at all. "10' 
The relation between the contingent and the necessary relations cannot be understood if the 
specific nature that expresses the laws of motion is not cognitively grasped. The immediate 
form of appearance of relations then, does not necessarily reveal the nomological 
foundations of those relations; the subjects or entities involved appear as ontologically 
atomised, fixed in their separation and only contingently related to each other. 
Science aims, in the dialectical account, to reveal the source of the laws of motion that 
universally interconnects the subject, and which are expressed through the polar parameters 
of its active principle of change and alteration. That is, if the real motions of substantial 
activity are to explain their apparent motions. 
Value, for Marx, is a universal social form, a social substance that is the product of a 
historically specific and particular mode of labouring activity. The exact nature and 
operation of value itself, as a social substance, is the subject matter of Marx's critical 
enquiries. The aim of the critique in Capital was to lay bare the "economic laws of motion" 
of value through the outlining of the essential forms of the relations, categories, and 
activities that underpin the mode of production founded upon capital. 
Method and proof are united through the conceptualisation of the laws of motion that 
characterises the form activity of the specific determinations of the subject. The tracing out 
of the inner connections and forms of development of the subject, by way of the analysis of 
he prides himself in clinging to appearances and believing them to be ultimate. Why then have science at all? " 
K. Marx. Letter to Kugelmann. 111 July 1868. Collected Works. Volume 43. P. 69. 
101 K. Marx. Letter to Engels. 271 June 1867. Collected Works. Volume 42. Lawrence and Wishart. 
(1987. ) P. 390. 
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the real relations, both reveals, and contains the proof and demonstration of the essential 
activity of the subject. The concept has though to be derived from the real relations and facts 
of the subject and not imposed on them as the product of the movement of the categories of 
conceptual thought. 
I The concept of value is proven and demonstrated by showing how value, as subject, to 
borrow Hegel's expression, "by and from itself makes itself what it is. " That is, by showing, 
through critical analysis, the conceptual and categorial relations and dialectical forms that 
encapsulates the movement in the real relations. 
"The unfortunate fellow does not see that, even if there were no chapter on 'value' at 
all in my book, the analysis that I give of the real relations would contain the proof 
and demonstration of the real value relation. The chatter about the need to prove the 
concept of value arises only from the complete ignorance both of the subject under 
discussion and of the method of science. "" 
The understanding of the nature of the laws of motion, from a dialectical perspective, 
requires the application of the category of contradiction. That contradiction is both the 
essence and the driving force of a dialectical method of analysis is a widespread and 
generally held viewpoint. The analysis of the nature of the method of dialectic, in both or 
either of its idealist or materialist variations requires then, as a necessary element, an 
understanding of the nature of contradiction. 
The point, however, is that this still begs the question, one that is largely unaddressed, of 
what the nature of contradiction, viewed ftom a dialectical perspective, actually is? The key 
question then, for further developing the investigation, and the relation of Hegel's dialectic 
to Marx's, is to attempt to ascertain what the nature of Hegel's view of contradiction 
actually is? 
K. Marx. Letter to Kugelmann. 11' July 1868. Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 43. 
Lawrence and Wishart. (1988. ) P. 68. 
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2. The Source of all Dialectic. 
"John Stuart Mill, on the contrary, accepts on the one hand Ricardo's theory of 
profit, and annexes on the other hand Senior's "remuneration of abstinence". He is as 
much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian 
contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar 
economist to make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as 
"abstinence" from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, 
abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence 
from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over 
Spinoza's: "Determination est Negation. "" 
Marx's comments cited above, albeit limited in their nature, would also appear to confirm 
the following propositional inference. As Hegelian contradiction is "the source of all 
dialectic" it is logically then also the source for ascertaining and discovering both the 
general form of working and the laws of dialectics. It is unthinkable that there is no intimate 
and necessary connection between them. 
However, as Hegel interprets both the general form of working and the laws of dialectics in 
a mystical fashion, then does it not also follow that Hegel's view of contradiction is also 
interpreted in a mystical fashion? Is this connection a logical consequence given that these 
core elements are not only fundamentally interrelated, but that the analysis of contradiction 
is itself the very source of the general form of working and the laws of dialectics? 
Does stripping the mystical veil from Hegel's dialectic entail stripping the mystical veil 
from his analysis of contradiction also? If so, then how does this affect Hegel's account of 
11 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) (Footnote. ) P. 559. Spinoza's dictum 
that "the foundation of all determinateness is negation" is taken up and fully endorsed in Hegel's analysis of 
contradiction and expressed in the form of the dialectic of negativity, as the moving and generating principle 
of all being. 
137 
contradiction? Or, are the general fonn of working and the laws of dialectics, the positive 
forms and rational element of the legacy of Hegel according to Marx and Engels, retained 
by them with an unreconstructed Hegelian view of contradiction? 
Given that Marx tells us that his dialectical method is not only different from Hegel's but 
that it is, in fact, the "direct opposite", then the question that is posed by this is whether this 
inverted and direct materialist contrary of the Hegelian method is also reflected in the 
analysis of contradiction itself? On the other hand, as Hegelian contradiction is the source of 
all dialectic, is it not then also the source of Marx's dialectic? 
Before we can even begin to adequately answer the question of the nature of contradiction in 
Marx, the Hegelian analysis and application of the concept of contradiction has, first of all, 
to be attempted to be understood in Hegel's own terms. Disregarding then, for the present 
moment, whether Marx's view of dialectical contradiction is, or is not the same as Hegel's, 
the following question still remains. What we are to make of Marx's assertion that Hegelian 
contradiction is the source of all dialectic? " 
That contradiction is the driving force of dialectics, in whatever variation and hue, whether 
materialist or idealist, should not in itself be that controversial a question. Most sympathetic 
commentators of the relation of Hegel to Marx would at least pay lip service to this; but 
here, contradiction is itself quite often taken as a presupposition; moreover, one that begs for 
a subsequent and deeper analysis of its determinate and specific nature. 'O' 
1(4 The emphasis of the analysis at present is focussed primarily on what Hegel's account of 
contradiction actually is, and secondly to elucidate the essentials of the rational element of Hegel's dialectic. 
To understand and comprehensively outline the nature of the materialist supersession of Hegel's dialectic 
requires having a thoroughgoing comprehension of Hegel's thought. Both in its own idealist terms, and 
through Marx's critique. Only then is it possible to adequately develop dialectical thought from this 
foundation and historical legacy; the horse has to be put before the cart in order for further movement and 
progress to take place. 
105 That it is contradiction that is the motor force of the process, is, in one respect, generally held, not 
only in non-Marxists like T. Pinkard and K. Hartmann, but also by Hegelian influenced Marxists such as C. 
Arthur, T. Smith, and B. Ollman. The weakness in all their interpretations, in my reading, is in their 
inadequate understanding of the nature of Hegel's account of contradiction, and in the consequent application 
of Hegelian contradiction to the analysis of a substantial system. This weakness in their accounts is further 
exposed, in my view, in the connection that I make in the relation of contradiction and law. 
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Furthermore, the analysis of what makes a contradiction a contradiction, rather than its 
operation, which, I think, can be outlined without necessarily understanding the 
ontologically necessary nature of its polar forms, will in turn provide deeper ground for our 
spades to dig. 
By posing the foundational question of what the nature of contradiction actually is in 
Hegel's account, then a more comprehensive understanding of the rational aspect of 
Hegelian dialectics may emerge. This question is, surprisingly, a little investigated issue 
considering its primary centrality to a rational comprehension of dialectic itself. 
3. Contradiction and Method. 
"Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as 
something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity. " 106 
according to Hegel, contradiction is "the root of all movement", and existence itself is 
only possible through the movement of a contradiction, it then logically follows that it holds 
a principal meta-logical and ontological role in Hegel's account of dialectic. As such, the 
understanding of its specific nature is essential to gain greater clarity into the Hegelian 
explication of the general form of working and the laws of dialectics. 
The principles of change and alteration contained in all substantial form activity are, when 
logically and conceptually developed into a systematic subject, the expression of the 
movement of the laws of motion of a developing contradiction. Contradiction then, as the 
very moving principle of all being, has to be regarded, when properly cognised, as a higher 
The work of T. Smith and C. Arthur, on the relation between Hegel's Logic and Marx's value theory 
is, even if critically assimilated, still quite heavily influenced by the work of K. Hartmann and T. Pinkard on 
the nature of Hegel's logical-dialectical account of a structured and conceptual totality. See, for example, the 
journal Science and Society Volume 62. Systematic Dialectic by C. Arthur. In particular, pages 448452. 
106 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 439. 
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expression of thought than an abstract and formal law of identity that seeks to avoid 
contradiction. 
"On the one hand, it is to be considered as the positive nature of something; on the 
other, it is related to an opposite, and every nature emerging from its innocency, 
from its indifferent self-identity, spontaneously relates itself to its other and thereby 
falls to the ground or, in the positive sense, withdraws into its ground. ... It is of the 
greatest importance to perceive and to bear in mind this nature of the reflective 
determinations we have just considered, namely, that their truth consists only in their 
relation to one other, that therefore each in its very Notion contains the other; 
without this knowledge, not a single step can really be taken in philosophy. "" 
As motion is itself the movement of a contradiction, then the general form of working of the 
dialectic is elucidated through revealing how "opposite determinations" can be 
demonstrated as being predicated of the same subject. Accordingly, the dialectic that is the 
dynamic behind speculative thought for Hegel consists in the ability of thought to go 
beyond an abstract form of identity and to engage with the real determinations and opposite 
relations in their interconnected movements. 108 
A dialectical form of cognition, by contrast to the fixed and contingently related opposites 
of the "abstract understanding" of metaphysics, consists "in the grasping of opposites in 
their unity or of the positive in the negative. " That the object is a rational determination of 
opposites is due to the fact that the concept behind that determination exemplifies a 
dialectical unity in thought. 
101 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 437 and 438 respectively. 
10' "To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered 
one after the other, and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He 
thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antithesis .... For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot 
at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and 
effect stand in rigid antithesis one to the other. " F. Engels. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Marx Engels. 
Selected Works - Volume 
Two. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 120. 
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Abstract and formal thought does not analyse the necessary connection between these 
opposite determinations that are contained within the unity of the subject. It seeks to avoid, 
by the nature of its own philosophical presuppositions, any rationally engagement with 
contradiction as a principle. 
"But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content 
before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which 
the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so 
come before consciousness without reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking 
lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact 
the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking 
does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that 
it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation. "" 
Abstract understanding, in the Hegelian critique, sees in this opposition a fixed and static 
external relation, not one that is inherent and immanent to the specific nature of the subject 
and its activity. Abstract understanding consequently view contradiction as an impediment 
to rational thought, as unthinkable to the abstract universal form of identity that marks 
external reflection in its cognitive standpoint. "O 
"It must not therefore be considered the fault of a subject matter or of cognition that 
these determinations, through their constitution and an external connexion, show 
themselves dialectical. On that assumption, the subject matter or the cognition is 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 835. 
"If in the light of the present discussion we cast one glance more on the metaphysical method as a 
whole, we find its main characteristic was to make abstract identity its principle and try to defend the objects 
of reason by the abstract and finite categories of the understanding. But this infinite of the understanding, this 
pure essence, is still finite: it has excluded all the variety of particular things, which thus limit and deny it. 
instead of winning a concrete, this metaphysic stuck fast on an abstract, identity. Its good point was the 
perception that thought alone constitutes the essence of all that is. It derived its materials from earlier 
philosophers, particularly the Schoolmen. In speculative philosophy the understanding undoubtedly forms a 
stage, but not a stage at which we should keep forever standing. Plato is no metaphysician of this imperfect 
type, still less Aristotle, although the contrary is generally believed. " G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) 
Paragraph 36z. P. 59. 
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represented as a subject into which the determinations in the form of predicates, 
properties, self-subsistent universals are introduced in such a manner that, fixed and 
correct as they are by themselves, they are brought into dialectical relationships and 
contradiction only by extraneous and contingent connexion operating in and by a 
third thing. ""' 
For Hegel, this opposition reflects a necessary internal division and determination expressed 
in the particular form of the universal. This is manifested in a necessary relation that allows 
that specific difference to realise its nature against its own determinate form of opposition, 
its own form of contradiction. The opposite is, in this dialectical view of contradiction, the 
other of itself. As such, for Hegel, it thus includes its own other, and by doing so is the 
contradiction or posited dialectic of itself. 
Thus all oppositions that are assumed as fixed, as for example finite and infinite, 
individual and universal, are not in contradiction through, say, an external 
connection; on the contrary, as an examination of theiý nature has shown, they are in 
and for themselves a transition; the synthesis and the subject in which they appear is 
the product of their Notion's own reflection. If a consideration that ignores the 
Notion stops short at their external relationship, isolates them and leaves them as 
fixed presuppositions, it is the Notion, on the contrary, that keeps them steadily in 
view, moves them as their soul and brings out their dialectic. ""' 
The genuine dialectical element that allows the logical, ontological, and conceptual 
categories to advance is the negative determination that they contain as a fundamental 
element in their inner nature. It is "the inwardness of the content, the dialectic which it 
possesses within itself, which is the mainspring of the advance". All determination contains 
negation, and it is through its negation that it becomes that specific form of determination. 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 833. 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 833. 
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"If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgement, and all the 
determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own 
account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is a solely the fault of a thinking that 
does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the opposed determinations in 
one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. ""' 
Formal thought, with its conception of identity in the form of an abstract universal, seeks 
vainly to avoid contradiction. If the entity, thing, or concept exhibits a contradiction, then 
abstract identity posits this contradiction either as an error in the thought process or the 
concept or as the result of an external connection or relation in the entity. 
Things, in the form of abstract universality either contain one of the poles of the contrary 
predications or do not; it does not, and cannot, contain both forms of the contrary 
predications. It has no way of conceptualising that the thing, concept, or entity embodies 
that contradiction as part of its nature and process of change itself. 
"Contradiction is the very moving principle in the world: and it is ridiculous to say 
that contradiction is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that 
contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when 
cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of the 
contrariety. The proximate result of opposition (when realised as contradiction) is 
the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposited 
to elements in the completer notion. "114 
Identity is, for Hegel, a form of "simple self-negativity. " That is, identity contains not only 
difference, but also that difference is itself cognised as an inner difference, one that is 
expressed in its substantially necessary form activity. As the difference is a difference 
contained within the universal form, it then assumes the status of a universal difference, one 
113 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 835. 
114 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 119 Zusatz. P. 174. 
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that is particularised and expressed as a specific difference or contrariety contained in that 
universal. "' 
The distinction I made earlier between outlining the movement of a contradiction and 
understanding what makes a contradiction a contradiction, though fundamentally connected, 
may not necessarily be distinguished and united in thought. Given that we have said 
something about the necessity of contradiction for all processes and movements according 
to Hegel, and as a necessary ontological characteristic of all being, the question now is, what 
does Hegel understand by a contradiction, what is its specific nature for him? "' 
4. Polarity and Contradiction. 
What is it, according to Hegel that makes an opposition into a contradiction? In the Science 
of Logic, Hegel outlines what he regards are the conditions where an opposition could be 
regarded and described as a form of contradiction. These conditions take the following 
forms. 
I's "If the superficial conception of what the Notion is, leaves all manifoldness outside the Notion and 
attributes to the latter only the form of abstract universality or the empty identity of reflection, we can at once 
appeal to the fact that quite apart from the view here propounded, the statement or definition of a notion 
expressly includes not only the genus, which itself is, properly speaking, more than a purely abstract 
universality, but also the specific determinateness. If one but would reflect attentively on the meaning of this 
fact, one would see that differentiation must be regarded as an equally essential moment of the Notion. " 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 588-589 
116 T. Smith (L. M. C. ) S. U. N. Y. Press. (1990. ) Smith's book contains the following footnote on the 
nature of contradiction itself (P. 227-228). Here he expresses the following view; "In general there are two 
standard types of dialectical contradictions. The first occurs when something (either a category or a material 
reality) is asserted to be a simple unity, but upon closer inspection is seen to include implicitly a moment of 
difference that is not unified. The second occurs when a category or a material reality is asserted to involve 
difference only, and then upon closer inspection an underlying unity is seen to be implicit. Both of these 
"contradictions" can be formulated in a manner that does not involve a denial of the law of contradiction. " 
The key point of contradiction is missing here, that of polarity. Moreover, it is the polarity that is the 
source of the dynamic activity and law, manifested in the principle of change and alteration that is inherently 
contained in the motion of a substantial entity and form. Furthermore, the polarity or "difference" is 
predicated on a common nature or quality as the parameters of the expression of that commonality. It is only 
in the following sense that it does not involve a denial of the law of contradiction. For example, a determinate 
commodity either expresses its use or value forms, not both at the same time. Ile real point is that of grasping 
the inherent contradiction in the opposite predicational motions of the subject. 
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"Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, 
negatively related to one another or sublate each other and are indifferent to one 
another. Ordinary thinking when it passes over to the moment of the indifference of 
the determinations, forgets their negative unity and so retains them merely as 
'differents' in general, in which determinations right is no longer right, nor left left, 
etc. "117 
What do these definitions and forms of relation, expressed by Hegel, entail for the analysis 
of the movement of a contradiction as being that of polar opposition? Furthermore, what is 
the nature of this error that "ordinary thinking" lapses into when focussing on the 
indifference of the poles that it, at the same time, forgets their "negative unity"? Just what 
does it mean to be negatively related to your opposite in the same respect? 
opposition, in the form of contradiction, is a "negative unity" that contains both a common 
content and a difference, this further entails that "its moments are different in one identity 
and thus are opposites. " Opposition, as a self-excluding difference, is more properly 
cognised, in Hegel's account, as a form of polarity, where the positive and the negative 
poles of the relation share a common content that mediates the oppositional forms of the 
relation. 
Each pole of the relation is the opposite or negative determination of the other, and both 
poles are contained as moments or determinations that are the expression of the unity of the 
common mediation or content that underpins their relation. 
"But the positive or negative in itself essentially implies that to be an opposite is not 
merely a moment, does not stem from comparison, but is a determination belonging 
to the sides of the opposition themselves. They are therefore not positive or negative 
in themselves apart from the relation to other; on the contrary, this relation - an 
117 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 441. 
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exclusive relation - constitutes their determination or in itself, in it, therefore, they 
are at the same time explicitly and actually [an und fur sich] positive or negative. "' 
The polar opposition is not just the expression of a relation to something external, that 
externality is itself only the manifestation and expression of its own specific and 
determinate nature; the relation to its polar opposition then is inherently contained within 
itself. As the opposition is contained within itself, then the opposition takes the form of an 
"inner difference. " There is, in a dialectical relation of opposition, both an identity and 
sameness as well as a specific difference or contrariety, in the movement of the polar 
opposites. 
"Difference as such is already implicitly contradiction; for it is the unity of sides 
which are, only in so far as they are not one - and it is the separation of the sides 
which are, only as separated in the same relation. But the positive and negative are 
the posited contradiction because, as negative unities, they are themselves the 
positing of themselves, and in this positing each is the sublating of its self and the 
positing of its opposite. ""' 
Polarity as a form of "explicit contradiction" means not only that both poles are negative to 
each other, but that each of the poles contains, in itself, both its own expression and its 
connection and relation to its opposite. Both poles of the relation thus express, in this 
account, not only their own specific or positive form, but also their own opposite or negative 
form, as the contrariety inherently contained within that specific and positive form of its 
determination; a contrariety that is, moreover, mediated by a common content. 'This 
commonality of content entails, for Hegel, that the opposition can then be characterised as 
one where "the antithesis is contained within the antithesis itself, or contradiction. " 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 427. 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 431432. 
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Here the poles are a contradictory content of "opposite determinations in one relation. " 
Polarity is also expressed by Hegel in the form of a "specialised contrariety and in that way 
a contradiction. " What is it that makes polarity and contradiction a form of "specialised 
contrariety"? To be a "specialised contrariety" or to be "in the same respect, negatively 
related to one another" means the opposition is founded upon a specific and essential form 
of twofold difference. 
The reason that the opposition is a specific contrariety of a twofold difference is that the 
polar opposites are the contrary extremes that are contained within a common genus or kind, 
as the expressions of the contrary predicational relations contained within that common 
genus or kind. Opposition, in the form of contradiction, is then a "negative unity" that 
contains both a common identity, and at the same time, a common difference. This entails 
for Hegel that "its moments are different in one identity and thus are opposites. " 
Difference as opposition, and opposition as contradiction, only operates, as a contradiction, 
when the opposites are reciprocally related poles, where each of the poles are "intrinsically 
conditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. " As the expression of a 
"specialised contrariety" that shares a common content or identity, that is both manifested in 
and contains, both poles of the reciprocal relation. As the parameters that both inform, limit 
and determine the nature of the principle of change and alteration, manifested in the contrary 
forms contained within a common identity. 
Each of the poles, as Hegel expresses it, both includes and excludes the other "in the same 
respect". How does that dialectic of inclusion and exclusion actually operate "in the same 
respect"? Each of the contrary poles of the relation is not only the negative of an other, an 
other with an independent form of existence; that negative is contained as the privative state 
of the positive pole itself. What are the consequences of this self-contained antithesis? 
A dialectic of independence and dependence, of exclusion and inclusion, is then generated 
by the content of this relation. Polarity, as positive and negative, posits the independence of 
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the positive and negative poles. The independence of each of the poles, their exclusiveness, 
further develops from this posited nature of the poles of the contrariety being fixed, static, or 
only contingently related; they are driven to relate themselves to their own opposite form. 
What moves them, according to Hegel, is their self-negation, it is this internal dynamic that 
"transcends the positedness of independence. " 
What becomes exclusive to it is that its own privative form, the inclusive sense of its own 
negation, is manifested in an external relation, as the exclusive sense of its own negation. In 
consequence of this, each of the poles of the relation then both includes and excludes the 
other, accordingly, it follows then for Hegel that in a way it also both includes and excludes 
itself, in this sense, for Hegel, it is a living contradiction. 
The polarity and contradiction involved in the movement is that the self-exclusion, the self- 
existent unity and independence of the polar opposition, gives way to its opposite; by doing 
so, the independence also excludes its own independence; to put it another way, it 
necessarily has to relate to its own opposition. The dialectic of self-negation entails that the 
poles, viewed as fixed and unrelated qualities and entities, cannot remain so. 
"The reflection-into-self whereby the sides of opposition are converted into self- 
subsistent self-relations is, in the first instance, their self-subsistence as distinct 
moments; as such they are only implicitly this self-subsistence, for they are still 
opposites, and the fact that they are implicitly self-subsistent constitutes their 
positedness. But their excluding reflection sublates this positedness, converts them 
into explicitly self-subsistent sides, into sides which are self-subsistent not merely 
implicitly or in themselves but through their negative relation to their opposite; in 
this way, their self-subsistence is also posited. But further, through this their 
positing, they make themselves into a positedness. They destroy themselves in that 
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they determinate themselves as self-identical, yet in this determination are rather the 
negative, an identity with self that is a relation to other. " 120 
It is this self-subsistence and unrelated and indifferent nature of the polar opposites, their 
posited independence for Hegel, "which in truth perishes in contradiction. " Each of the 
poles, both gains its determination in relation to its own negative pole, and maintains itself 
only through its relation to this polar opposite. The parameters of the process of movement 
and change are thus founded in Hegel's view on a dialectic of sameness and difference. 
This dialectical polarity of sameness and difference allows the specific difference of the 
relation, as the contrary species of a common content, to be cognitively comprehended, this 
is achieved by pairing difference with similarity; with the reciprocal relation of the polarity 
of this dialectic of identity and difference constituting the grounds upon which scientific 
generalisation of the nature and activity of the common content of the subject matter can 
now rest upon. 
Here is Hegel's expression of reciprocity as a form of necessary polarity; it is worthwhile 
noting that the specific difference has no real substantial being on its own, it cannot be 
regarded as an isolated abstraction that is self-subsisting. It contains a necessary connection 
to its contrary pole in a reciprocal and reflexive relation of a twofold common content. 
"Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. The two 
however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be transferred to the other. 
Thus, for example, debts and assets are not two particular, self-subsisting species of 
property. What is negative to the debtor is positive to the creditor ... In opposition, 
the different is not confronted by any other, but by its other. Usually we regard 
different things as unaffected by each other .. Everything is thus put outside of every 
other. But the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to ascertain the 
necessity of things. By that means the other is seen to stand over against its other. 
121 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 433. 
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Thus, for example, inorganic nature is not to be considered merely something else 
than organic nature, but the necessary antithesis of it. Both are in essential relation to 
one another; and the one of the two is, only in so far as it excludes the other from it, 
and thus relates itself thereto. ""' 
The basic elements for the operation and understanding of the law of the interpenetration of 
opposites have already been roughly sketched and outlined. The details of which shall be 
developed as the investigation of the thesis ftirther unfolds. The basic nature of the law is 
that the opposition is viewed as a polar relation that is itself the reciprocal expression of an 
essential and specific difference. With the polar extremes, as the contrary poles of a 
common content and relation, defining the specific and determinate parameters of the 
identity. 
This relation of reciprocity or correlation is the basis for the Hegelian law of the 
interpenetration of opposites; expressed in the alternation and interpenetration of the polar 
motions. The reason that the polar extremes reciprocally interpenetrate for Hegel is that 
there is "one identical content, which continues in the two correlatives. " This, in turn, means 
that they "suspend themselves in the immediate transition, the one in the other. The content 
is itself, nothing but their identity. " Alternatively expressed, they are negatively related to 
each other in the same respect. 
Here each of the poles maintains its nature and form by interpenetrating with its direct 
opposition. Likewise, without a universal foundation for the contrariety, the "one 
mediation" of Hegel, there would, in turn, be no basis for the reciprocity or interpenetration 
of opposites inherent to the specific difference expressed in this dialectical law. As such, the 
polar parameters contain the determinate forms and expressions of the movement and 
process of the subject. 
121 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 119z. P. 173 and 174 respectively. 
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The contradiction in the movement is not only posited but also resolved in the movement 
and transition between the poles. Not only then is the opposition and polarity manifested in 
the difference between the poles, but each of the poles sublates itself by its movement to the 
other, the self subsistence of the poles are thus shown to be mediated, each by and through 
the other. To put it another way, the contraries necessarily reciprocally act upon each other, 
their polar opposition interpenetrates and passes into and out of each other. 
What has to be analysed now is the notion of the polar forms as being not just a negative 
unity of opposites, but as poles that are also self-relating and self-moving. This identity, as 
simple self-relating negativity, is characterised by Hegel as an "intro-reflected difference"; 
this is the source for the dialectical process of being-for-self. As movement itself is an 
"existent contradiction" for Hegel; then self-movement is therefore, if you will excuse the 
inference, the movement of a self-existent contradiction. 
5. The Negation of the Negation. 
"Similarly, internal self-movement proper, instinctive urge in general, (the appetite 
or nisus of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple essence), is nothing else 
but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and 
deficient, the negative of itsey. Abstract self-identity is not as yet a livingness, but 
the positive, being in its own self a negativity, goes outside itself and undergoes 
alteration. Something is therefore only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, 
and moreover is this power to hold and endure the contradiction within it. ""' 
The polarity of dialectical contradiction is resolved through the substantial form activity, 
and the form of motion inherent in this process is expressed in the law of the negation of the 
negation. It is resolved contradiction as a self-transcending relation, as the expression of the 
form activity that realises and actualises the substantial nature of the determinate subject, by 
affirming itself through its opposition. 
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Self-exclusion now becomes a process of self-mediation. It necessarily has to determine and 
relate itself to its opposite through its own substantial form activity. Substance, as a 
dialectical unity of form and its privation is the ground for that activity. As the external 
expression of its own contradiction, it has to contain that opposition as a moment and 
determination of itself. By doing so, contradiction resolves itself. Self-movement, for Hegel, 
"is nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, seýrlcontained 
and deficient, the negative of itseV. " 
Again we see, and here Hegel applies it to the process of substantial self-movement, that the 
polar contrarieties inherent to the substantial form activity are necessarily related to each 
other "in one and the same respect". The form and the privation, its "deficient" negation are 
intimately bound together as the parameters of the substantial process. It is that mediation 
through the other that becomes in the course of the process, self-mediation as substantial 
activity. 
Being-for-self, in Hegel's terms, "is the polemical or negative attitude against the limiting 
other. " This negation of the other, because it is already contained within itself as an inner 
negation or privation, is also a negation of itself, a negation of its own negative condition. 
This is why, as the substantial activity is the common ground for the polarity of the contrary 
forms, it is designated as an "intro-reflected" difference. 
Identity is, for Hegel, a negative self-relation that draws a distinction between it and itself, 
this it does by relating itself to its own external opposition. As Hegel expresses this, it is 
"the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all self-movement", 
which consists solely in an exhibition of contradiction. 
In order to affirm itself, as the subject, as the positive pole of the relation, it has to negate 
and contain the other polar form. In one sense, (of the concept of auflieben), it is by negating 
122 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of 1, ogic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 440. 
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its negation that it, at the same time, both negates and affirms itselL This is resolved 
contradiction as substantial ground; as this self-subsistence, it is the unity of essence. 
"The resolved contradiction is therefore ground, essence as unity of the positive and 
negative. In opposition, the determination has attained to self-subsistence; but 
ground is this completed self-subsistence; in it, the negative is self-subsistent 
essence, but as negative; as self-identical in this negativity, ground is just as much 
the positive. Opposition and its contradiction is, therefore, in ground as much 
abolished as preserved. " 123 
This is the basis for the law of the negation of the negation. This negation of the negation is 
the affirmation of self, the process of being-for-self. It first of all posits its negative then 
negates it; the negative other becomes contained and becomes a moment or a determination 
of the self. The idea of containment here is twofold, it means that each pole is contained as a 
moment or determination of the contradictory pole. It also means that in order for either pole 
to affirm itself it must contain its own negation and sublate it as a negative moment of itself. 
This gives us not only contrary motions between the poles, the interpenetration of opposites, 
but this interpenetration, where they both negate and affirm themselves, produces a result. 
The movement and the interpenetration of the poles allows both poles to not only express 
the independence of their polarity, by containing and negating its opposite pole, it also 
posits that the polar extremes are defined by their relation to their specific opposite; this it 
does as it is the negation of itself. 
The fact that it contains both moments entails that the positive result of the process is 
through negating the other, their dialectical opposition, becomes, in fact, a moment of its 
own active self. The polarity and interconnection of the dialectical categories are brought 
out in their reciprocal relation and higher unity; in the resolved dialectic that is the 
realisation of the substantial form activity and hence of its determinate and specific nature. 
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This gives us a third form of containment, the result of which is the expression of the 
common content as the subject with a twofold polar form; the unity within the diversity that 
affirms itself as a specific subject. The mediation of the common content between the 
extremes becomes the autonomous subject of the process, which takes and casts off both 
forms in turn, in order to posit itself as a being-for-self. The polar reciprocity is manifested 
in its necessary form of being, in the fundamental concept of the essential activities that 
express what it is to be just that kind of thing. 
"In general, our consideration of the nature of contradiction has shown that is not, so 
to speak, a blemish, an imperfection or a defect in something if a contradiction can 
be pointed out in it. On the contrary, every determination, every concrete thing, 
every Notion, is essentially a union of distinguished and distinguishable moments, 
which, by virtue of the determinate, essential difference, pass over into contradictory 
moments. This contradictory side of course resolves itself into nothing, it withdraws 
into its negative unity. Now the thing, the subject, the Notion, is just this negative 
unity itself, it is inherently self-contradictory, but it is no less the contradiction 
resolved: it is the ground that contains and supports its determinations. ""' 
Summary. 
To summarise some of the points raised so far in the analysis of this chapter; Hegel defines 
contradiction as a polar opposition, with the poles being negatively related to each other in 
the same respect. Similarly, self-movement is viewed as a process of change and alteration 
with something being both itself and the negative of itself in one and the same respect. 
A specialised contrariety or contradiction entails that the contrary poles are related as a 
twofold form of identity and a difference; this is the source of both their unity and 
123 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 435. 
124 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 442. 
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opposition. Their polar opposition only qualifies as a contradiction if they share a common 
content and ground, that is, if they in fact are negatively related to each other in the same 
respect. 
The nature of "the same respect" is the common identity, the genus, quality, or kind. With 
the subject of the process, as a negative unity, containing this specific difference as the poles 
of its contrariety; as the greatest specific difference contained within that common identity 
or universal form. Or, alternatively, as the parameters of the process of movement and 
change of the substantial subject. 
The central point that has been argued for in the present analysis is the importance of 
polarity as the essence of Hegel's dialectical account of contradiction, and its consequent 
central role as the basis for his dialectical account of law as the movement of a 
contradiction. Hegel's systematic development of this is here combined with some 
important and generalised dialectical propositions of Marx and Engels. Propositions that 
lead to the following consequences for a dialectical viewpoint and analysis. 
1. That the polar opposites are both mutually exclusive and mutually related. 
2. That the polar extremes remain as the parameters of the subject in process. 
That the self-identity of each of the poles is also the result of the relation to its specific 
opposite. [Spinoza's all determination is negation]. 
4. That each pole contains, in itself, its relation to its other, as its negation or privation, its 
direct contrary. 
5. That the poles are in a mutually reciprocal relation, where the polar extremes have a 
mutual action and reaction from and to each other. 
6. That the polar opposition rests on their mutual connection. 
7. That the mutual connection rests on the common identity of their polar opposition. 
8. That the polar opposites then, are both separate and mutually connected, as such, they 
interpenetrate, being the extremes and the parameters of the subject in process in its 
substantial and systematic form activity. 
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9. That by negating its negation, by overcoming its own internal and external 
contradiction, it realises its nature and affirms itself as the subject of the process. 
The essential thing to grasp and hold on to, with regard to a dialectical viewpoint, is the 
centrality of movement, change, motion, and process. What dialectics as a method seeks to 
do is to outline the general form of working of the laws of dialectical motion that are 
universally valid for analysing the change through contradiction that is a fundamental part 
of the central categories inherent in all substantial ontology. 
This fundamental distinction sets a dialectical view apart from what Hegel describes as the 
metaphysical and abstract forms of thought. This form of abstract philosophical thought 
operates, in the dialectical critique, with fLxed and abstract categories that have no necessary 
inner connection or movement towards its fundamental relational opposite. 
The basis for a dialectical account of nomological activity rests upon the understanding of 
the movement and development of the contradiction contained in the specific difference of 
the characteristic form activity of the subject. The laws of dialectics, in this essentialist 
account, apply to the substantial form activity of the subject, as the motor force behind its 
principle of change and alteration. These laws pertain to both the substantial whole and to its 
parts, in their universal, particular, and individuative relations and manifestations. 
What is central to this form of analysis is to ascertain the source of the principle of change 
and alteration that is inherent in the subject's characteristic motion and substantial form 
activity. There is dialectical motion and causation because there are, at the same time, two 
opposing polar forces and forms giving rise to contrary and reciprocal motions in operation. 
The source of this process of movement, change and development is the result of the 
interaction and interconnected unity of the polar parameters contained in the expression of 
the laws of dialectics. It is to the analysis of these laws of motion that the investigation will 
now turn its attention towards. 
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In a letter to J. Dietzgen, (9' May 1868. ), Marx states that the "true laws" of dialectics are 
already contained in Hegel, but in a mystified form that has to be divested or stripped from 
that idealist framework. Marx and Engels conscious aim was to divest these laws of motion 
of dialectics of their mystical Hegelian form and content. Engels outlines what he and Marx 
considered to be a necessary task in order to extract the rational kernel of dialectics from 
Hegel's idealist thought. 
"The laws which Hegel developed in all-embracing but mystic form, and which we 
made it one of our aims to strip of this mystic form and to bring clearly before the 
mind in their complete simplicity and universality. "12' 
Furthermore, the systematic exposition of dialectics postulates that a rational account of law 
is grounded on the movement inherent within a contradiction. Contradiction and law are 
thus inseparably bound together for, not only Hegel, but also Marx. 
Given acceptance of the above elucidation of Hegel's views on contradiction as the source 
of, not only a dialectical methodology, but also of nomological activity, it still leaves us 
with one central task to perform. The remaining question to be answered is what exactly is 
the nature of Hegel's analysis of law and its essential relation to contradiction? This subject 
matter is now the topic for further investigation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. 
LAW AND CONTRADICTION: 
A PERMANENCE OF IMPERMANENCE. 
1. The Limits of Abstract Understanding. 
"Two philosophical tendencies, the metaphysical with fixed categories, the 
dialectical (Aristotle and especially Hegel) with fluid categories; the proofs that 
these fixed oppositions of basis and consequence, cause and effect, identity and 
difference, appearance and essence are untenable, that analysis shows one pole 
already present in the other in nuce, that at a definite point the one pole becomes 
transformed into the other, and that all logic develops only from these progressing 
contradictions. " 116 
Hegel's account of nomological activity or law is one of the most difficult aspects of 
Hegel's thought to grasp and assimilate. It is, however, necessary, in order to ascertain a 
more comprehensive understanding of dialectics, that, at the very least, an attempt be made 
on this key question. To omit this task would inevitably lead to a failure in gaining a fuller 
understanding of dialectics. 
It is, however, notable that this aspect of Hegel's thought is largely side-stepped by 
commentators of whatever shade of opinion; nevertheless, in my view the bullet has to be 
bitten on this one as its nature is of central importance for a clearer understanding of what a 
F. Engels. Anti-Duhring. Lawrence and Wishart (1969) P. 16. 
F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 202-203. Engels then goes on to 
say that this process is "mystical in Hegel himself, because the categories appear as pre-existing and the 
dialectics of the real world as their mere reflection. In reality it is the reverse: the dialectics of the mind is only 
the reflection of the forms of motion of the real world, both of nature and of history. " 
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scientific account of dialectics entails. The analysis of polarity and contradiction, contained 
in the previous chapter, will provide an important foundation for extricating the mystifýdng 
nature of his argument here. "' 
The argument contained in the Phenomenology is a highly complex and tortuous one; 
developed by Hegel in his own inimitable and abstruse fashion. It is further complicated by 
the fact that there is a twofold argument going on at the same time. 
Hegel's intention is to criticise what he characterises as the "Abstract Understanding" and 
the partial and inadequate account of law that this form of metaphysics generates; the 
abstract account of law, produced by this form of thought, Hegel designates as the "first 
supersensible world". The ultimate aim though is to positively set out his own dialectical 
account of nomological activity, characterised by him as the "second supersensible world", 
precisely through a dialectical critique of this abstract account. 
Laws of motion require forces to be in operation; a central component and aim of Hegel's 
account of law is, therefore, to ascertain the nature of the relation between the specific force, 
and the laws of motion expressed in the active subject. This development of the intimate 
connection between force and its dialectical form of expression, and its relation to the 
explication of law, is at the core of his argument. 
Force, as the active source of both the laws of motion, and the principle of change and 
alteration of the subject are, as one would expect if Hegel's thought is to be logically 
consistent, powered by the dynamic of polar contradiction. There is then, for Hegel, an 
intimate connection between polarity and law. 
Whilst the argument is a highly complex and difficult one to follow, there are some key 
issues that arise from it that can be analytically set forth. The summary of the argument 
" The account of nomological necessity and the relationship between force and law is contained, in 
its most condensed form, in Chapter Three of the Phenomenology of Spirit as "Force and the Understanding: 
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presented here is of the general criticisms that Hegel's analysis develops of the abstract 
account. The fundamental problems with this abstract and metaphysical view of law centres 
then on the following areas for Hegel. 
Firstly, the contradiction that is expressed between the "incessant change" and the "unstable 
appearance" of the world, and the abstract view of law which is characterised by him as an 
"inert realm"; the "direct tranquil image of incessant change". This sets up a dichotomy for 
Hegel between the external, phenomenal world and the force that is exerted in it, in contrast 
to the concept of law generated by the "abstract understanding". 
Secondly, this contradiction between the force exerted as an "incessant change" and the law, 
which interprets the "absolute flux" of the appearance as a simple, abstract universal form of 
unity, inevitably produces, for Hegel, a "defect in the law". 
Thirdly, and following on from the above, what is missing in the content of the law, its 
"defect", is the absolute flux of appearance itself. What the abstract account of law lacks is 
the principle of change and alteration that is exhibited in the perceived or sensuous world. 
Fourthly, this "defect" in the "abstract understanding" and its account of law, entails that the 
polar expression of the force when cognised in this account of law, is interpreted in a form 
that is abstractly universal and indeterminate. The polarities of the forces involved are 
collapsed into an abstract simple unity that neither explains the necessity of that division, 
nor its specific difference. 
The polar forms that express the parameters of the force behind the incessant change are 
seen, at best, as the product of an external property and/or relation that manifests itself in the 
form of an external cause and effect. This is due to the fact that the two sides of the relation 
are not necessarily connected as an antithetical opposition, as an intrinsic interconnection 
Appearance and the Supersensible World". 
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contained in a contradictory polarity. The polar divisions are not understood and cognised as 
being related through their own essential nature and inner connection. 
This abstract account of law of the "first supersensible world" cannot therefore explain the 
necessity of the polarity manifested in the expression of force, as it fails to account for it as 
a necessary inner difference exhibited in the law. As such then, there is a divergence and 
contradiction between the manifest expression of force and this abstract account of law. The 
relations of force and law are, according to Hegel's critique of this abstract account, 
indifferent to one another when they should have or share a common identity. 
Finally, for the analysis at present, the abstract account of law also "transcends law" itself 
for Hegel. This is due to the fact that the determinateness of the specific expressions of the 
law, necessary to conceptually capture the flux of the external changes, "still belongs to 
appearance or rather sensuous being". This puts the abstract account in contradiction with its 
desired aim, of conceptualising the nomological activity that can rationally explain the 
external phenomenal flux of the appearance. 
Hegel's strategy is to show that this outcome of the "abstract understanding" cannot, due to 
its own metaphysical presuppositions, fully capture the changes in the appearance in its 
conceptual content of the law. This gives rise, in the Hegelian account, to a fundamental 
problem for the abstract understanding in its elucidation of law. 
The central problem for Hegel, in this account of law, is its confusion over the relation 
between its own generated abstract universal view, and the specific differences that are 
contained in the manifestation of the law. The abstract understanding is driven beyond the 
external play of forces to what it regards as the principle or law inherent or underlying the 
phenomenal expression; this being the law that governs all the manifestations of force. The 
differences contained in the force, and expressed in the law, accordingly become in this 
account, abstractly universal and indeterminate in their nature. 
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The dialectical difference manifested in the force is lost in the abstract unity, and this 
process of abstraction, which, according to Hegel, "absorbs the differences and is indifferent 
to its law - to be positive and negative", means that this view of law and its relation to force 
is thus indifferent to its external manifestation and determinate being. This "abstract law" is 
therefore characterised by Hegel as "only the immediate raising of the perceived world into 
the universal element. " 
In this sense then, for Hegel, this generalised abstract view of law is a "tranquil kingdom of 
law. " The "absolute flux" of appearance in the manifestation of force remains external to 
scientific cognition. The reason this is the case is that it collapses the specific expressions of 
the law into an abstract universal unity. The result of this abstract law is then, "not the unity 
of these specific laws, but a law which leaves out their specific character. " 
By doing so it thus separates force and its specific expression in the phenomenal world, 
from the conceptual understanding of the law of the phenomena. The central problem being 
that this view of law expresses an indifference to this inner difference contained in the law, 
and manifested in the play of forces in the phenomenal world; consequently, the nature of 
the principle of change and alteration inherent in the manifestation of the force remains 
outside of this abstract cognition of the nomological activity pertinent to the subject. 
What an "abstract understanding" account fails to achieve for Hegel is to sufficiently 
cognise and explain the necessity of the inner difference that is contained in the force, and 
which has to therefore find its expression contained within the law. As such, it fails then to 
explain the nature of the specific difference that is contained within its own abstract 
universal form. The difference, as such, is interpreted as remaining constantly selfsame in its 
abstract unity, in that way the difference is abstractly sublated and set aside in the search for 
the abstract simple universal that governs this account of law. 
This is characterised by Hegel as the realm of the "first supersensible world", the 
"immediate copy" of the perceived world, where the external relation and difference is not 
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cognised as a specific difference belonging to the nature of the thing itself. What is missing 
then in this abstract account of law is the "absolute flux" of appearance itself, this is the 
central reason why it is a "tranquil kingdom" of law and only the "immediate copy" of, the 
perceived world. 
The characteristic principle and feature generated by this account of law is that "differences 
arise which are no differences". The central problem for this view is that we are left with an 
abstract and inert unity that does not allow the change, motion, and alteration that takes 
place in the external world to be fully cognised and integrated into the account of the 
nomological activity of the subject. 
To summarise Hegel's argument so far, there is a twofold problem with this abstract 
universal account. The twofold problem generated by the "abstract understanding" is that 
firstly, whilst it may recognise that there is a difference contained in the universal, the 
differences are abstractly absorbed. The law then does not capture the nature of that 
difference; in not doing so, it also transcends both the specific form of the expression of the 
law, and thus transcends a rational account of law itself. 
The second problem generated by "abstract understanding" is that if it does concede that the 
universal is divided in itself, the difference of the polar forms are not then related to one 
another through their own essential nature and universal connection. The determinate 
differences that are phenomenally expressed as independent and externally related 
determinations of force are sublated by the abstract universal unity. The difference is then 
not cognised in the form of a process of movement and change inherent to the subject under 
investigation. 
As this principle is a specific difference, a contrariety contained within the universal itself, it 
is also then a form of universal difference, one that is expressed in the fonn of a polar 
relation; it is, in a nutshell, a form of universal contradiction. Negation, according to Hegel, 
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"is an essential moment of the universal, and negation, or mediation in the universal, is 
therefore a universal difference. " 
The resultant problem, stated in the following form by Hegel, is that the abstract universal 
account of law entails that the external manifestation of force is indifferent to this abstract 
and inert division in the law, and the differences, the parts of the law, are, for the same 
reason, indifferent to one another. Law then collapses that inner difference into a form of 
abstraction that itself absorbs the differences. 
The difference is a difference cognised within the orbit of an abstract universal form. The 
difference, like the universal, is perceived as an abstraction, as an inert and fixed predication 
or quality that is merely attached to or falls under an abstract universal form. As an inert 
unity where the "differences arise that are no difference" for the "difference remains 
constantly self-same" in this abstract universal principle of unity. 
Force and law are thus not reconciled and cognitively united in the active specific difference 
contained in them both; the mutual reciprocity and mutual exclusivity of the poles are not 
connected in their common content, as the determinate parameters inherent to the subject 
under investigation. The specific difference contained in the subject is not understood in its 
reciprocal motions and interrelations, as the expression of a universal difference, as an 
"inner difference" contained within the universal expression of the force in its twofold form. 
The central point of Hegel's critique and his resolution of this problem lies then in the 
explication of this "inner difference" contained in the expression of force and law, and the 
need for it to be interpreted as a universal containing a specific and determinate opposition. 
By cognising this we can cognise the principle of change and alteration that operates in the 
external world. 
To take an example from Marx to help illustrate this Hegelian account of law, classical 
political economy were, in a sense, correct in positing labour in the abstract as the source of 
value, but inadequate in that it could not explain the specific difference contained within 
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labour that could explain the determinate social nature and expression of value. That labour 
is the source of value is formally correct, but not in this case strictly true or scientific, for it 
is a specific mode of expression, a historical and transient social form of labour that is the 
source of the value inherent within the commodity. 
Classical political economy, for Marx, makes this very error when analysing the relation of 
the use value and the value creating aspects of labour, which, of course, is itself the 
expression of a force, one that has a twofold character. Classical political economy, due to 
its abstract and inert uniting of the use and value forms of the commodity, could not 
engender a rational account of the specific difference and relation between the dialectic of 
concrete and abstract labour that is generated by this bifurcation of the labour power 
embodied in the commodity. 
Its account of labour in the abstract is not the same concept as Marx's analysis of abstract 
labour. The difference, for example, between the labour embodied within the commodity, as 
an inner difference, is not exposed in this analysis; it is an analysis that collapses them into 
an abstract unity of human labour as the source of all value. 
Marx's specific form of expression of abstract labour, and its dialectical relation with 
concrete labour, was beyond the comprehension of the methodology employed in the 
classical analysis of political economy; that is why, from the perspective of Marx's 
dialectical critique, it can be designated as a form of expression of Hegel's "abstract 
understanding". 
Whilst there is a very real difference manifested in the social interactions of use value and 
value, of commodity and money, the phenomenal forms of the "play of forces" to use 
Hegel's term, the source for both these forms is cognised within the generalised ahistorical 
abstraction of labour. That labour was the source of value was not the immediate problem, 
on that there was general agreement; but how, and in what specific form labour is the source 
that creates value remained an unsolved problematic. 
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Smith and Ricardo's ahistorical and fixed abstraction of labour and value did not allow the 
specific difference of value, as a particular and historically limited species of social 
production, to be analysed dorrectly. 
"It is one of the chief failings of classical economy that it has never succeeded, by 
means of its analysis of commodities, and, in particular, of their value, in 
discovering that form under which value becomes exchange value. Even Adam 
Smith and Ricardo, the best representatives of the school, treat the form of value as a 
thing of no importance, as having no connexion with the inherent nature of 
commodities. The reason for this is not solely because their attention is entirely 
absorbed in the analysis of the magnitude of value. It lies deeper. The value form of 
the product of labour is not only the most abstract, but is also the most universal 
form, taken by the product in bourgeois production, and stamps that production as a 
particular species of social production, and thereby gives it its special social 
character. If then we treat this mode of production as one eternally fixed by nature 
for every state of society, we necessarily overlook that which is the differentia 
specifica of the value form, and consequently of the commodity form, and of its 
further developments, money form, capital form, &c. We consequently find that 
economists, who are thoroughly agreed as to labour time being the measure of the 
magnitude of value, have the most strange and contradictory ideas of money, the 
perfected form of the general equivalent. ""' 
What was posed by classical political economy as the eternal source of value was the 
abstract universal of labour; an abstract concept of labour that could not capture the contrary 
and opposing forces, the "differentia specifica" behind the phenomenal forms of the 
expression of labour in its commodity and money forms. 
118 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 85. (Footnote. ) 
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Whilst it was a necessary first step in understanding the law of the phenomena, it is 
inadequate, in its own terms, of generating a more concrete analysis of the specific 
difference contained within the law of value. To paraphrase Hegel, it is only the raising of 
the perceived world into the universal element. 
Hegel, not unsurprisingly, is also critical of the viewpoint, which posits that a necessary 
intrinsic relation and interconnection is viewed as merely the expression of an external 
property, connection, or relation. The specific difference, for example, of the positive and 
negative poles inherent in magnetism, is not cognised as an inner essential difference. In the 
abstract account, the specific difference expressed in the force is nullified and absorbed in 
the external manifestation and relation. 
"Even when the specific determinateness - say one like Magnetism, for example, - is 
in itself concrete or real, the Understanding degrades it into something lifeless, 
merely predicating it of another existent thing, rather than cognising it as the 
immanent life of the thing, or cognising its native and unique way of generating and 
expressing itself in that thing. The formal Understanding leaves it to others to add 
this principle feature. Instead of entering into the immanent content of the thing, it is 
forever surveying the whole and standing above the particular existence of which it 
is speaking, i. e. it does not see it at all. Scientific cognition, on the contrary, 
demands surrender to the life of the object, or what amounts to the same thing, 
confronting and expressing its inner necessity. ""' 
Consequently, the twofold polarity manifested in the force is not understood as a necessary 
connection; the positive and negative poles of their nomological expression arc thus left 
essentially unexplained, as there is no account of the necessity of their intrinsic 
interconnection in the subject. This further entails that as the polar forms have no 
explainable necessary connection, they appear indifferent to the inner relation. 
167 
Moreover, the universal form is also then apparently indifferent to its own polar 
manifestation. They merely exert their forces and nomological activity in their external 
relations; the appearance of force and its nomological corollary are thus cognitively 
divorced.. This "notion of force" is then, for Hegel, "an abstraction which absorbs the 
differences of what attracts and what is attracted. " Force and its expression in law are 
inevitably then, a cognitive failure for the critical dialectic of this abstract view. 
What Hegel is essentially driving at here, in his critique of abstract understanding, is that the 
ontological contradiction has to be viewed as an inner difference in the subject's activity 
that determines the nature and parameters of that subject's activity. The polar forms interact 
and interpenetrate through the dynamic contradiction contained in the twofold relation of the 
substantial force that is expressed in its phenomenal manifestations and relations. 
The principle of change and alteration, the movement of the interpenetration of the polar 
parameters, represents not only the specific difference and division within its being, but the 
force expressed in that necessary inner division of the substantial relation has to be reflected 
in the understanding of its nomological form activity. This dialectic inherent in force and 
law for Hegel, is thus the key to Marx's critique of classical political economy and his 
resolution of the nature and substance of value itself. 
Marx's account of the value form will reject the value relation being analysed as merely the 
result of an external property and relation; value is not based on external accident or 
relational contingency, but on a substantial nature that is expressed in its necessary 
determinations and objective relations. 
There is a distinction made in the dialectical critique, between the necessity of the division, 
for example, that the commodity has both a use value and an exchange value form, and the 
necessity of the twofold nature of that division, their nomological division. Classical 
political economy had the former but not the latter in its abstract analysis of value. 
"I G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) Preface. P. 32. 
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This was due to the lack of understanding of the specific difference and expression of the 
dialectic of the twofold concrete and abstract forms of labour, the substantial dialectical 
force and power contained within the twofold nature of the generalised commodity forin. 
Value is the product of the development of the twofold character of the labour power, both 
concrete and natural, abstract and social, that is embodied within the commodity form. It is 
the substantial activity of abstract human labour power, as an alienated social form of labour 
manifested in the product of labour, the commodity, that explains the apparently contingent 
and accidental appearance of the simple value form and its twofold expression in the 
relation of the relative and equivalent forms of value. 
How though does Hegel attempt to dialectically resolve what he sees as the inherent 
problems of abstract understanding in its account of law? By attempting to elucidate this 
essential aspect of Hegel's dialectical account of law, it should in turn, provide valuable 
connections with Marx's value theory that will allow his dialectical method and critique of 
political economy to be more thoroughly investigated and understood. 
2. A Permanence of Impermanence. 
"We have to think pure change, or think antithesis within the antithesis itself, or 
contradiction. For in the difference which is an inner difference, the opposite is not 
merely one of two - if it were, it would simply be, without being an opposite - but it 
is the opposite of an opposite, or the other is itself immediately present in it. ""' 
The resolution of the nature and relation of the specific and inner difference lies in not only 
accepting that there is a common unity that is the underlying source of the twofold form, but 
that this twofold polar form has to be integrated into the account, as a dialectic of identity 
and difference. Hegel's formulation of this transition is quite mystical in its expression, 
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however, there has to be some attempt to make sense of his argument here as it is crucial for 
a fuller account of dialectic. 
What Hegel generates is a second principle, which both supersedes the first principle 
generated by the "abstract understanding" and contains it as moment or determination; this 
is the realm of the "second supersensible world". The ahn of the analysis here is to integrate 
the principle of change and alteration into the account of law in order to adequately capture 
the principle of movement and change in the phenomenal expression of the force 
underpinning the law. 
This dialectic inherent in appearance has to be integrated into what Hegel calls the "law of 
appearance" in order to explain the flux of change in the phenomenal play of forces. The 
"law of appearance" states, like its abstract predecessor that "differences arise which are no 
differences"; this is alternatively expressed by Hegel in the form of the universal abstraction 
that the "seýf-same repels itself from itself". 
What is also contained in the "law of appearance" for Hegel is "that the differences are only 
such as are in reality no differences and which cancel themselves; in other words, what is 
not setf-same is seVlattractive. " Here, we have a principle of dialectical change and 
alteration expounded as a process where "like becomes unlike and unlike becomes like. " 
The dialectic of the forces of repulsion and attraction, as we shall analyse later in the thesis, 
provides the source for this Hegelian account of the phenomenal manifestation and polar 
interaction of the force and law. This dialectic generates a new principle of law that is in 
opposition to that previously generated by abstract understanding. 
"And thus we have a second law whose content is the opposite of what was 
previously called law, viz. Difference which remains constantly selfsame; for this 
new law expresses rather that like becomes unlike and unlike becomes like. The 
130 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 99. 
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Notion demands of the thoughtless thinker that he bring both laws together and 
become aware of their antithesis. The second is certainly also a law, an inner self- 
identical being, but a selfsameness rather of the unlike, a permanence of 
impermanence. ""' 
Only then is it difference as an "inner difference", as a difference in its own self, or, for 
Hegel, difference as "infinity". That is, only then is it a form of nomological and universal 
difference; only then is it a form of universal contradiction. The cognising of the principle of 
change and alteration, as an inner difference, is then the key element of Hegel's dialectical 
resolution and analysis of the relation of force and its expression and law. 
Taken together, both these principles are, for Hegel, the inverted expression of the 
phenomenal world. In this "inverted world" the inner difference contained in the law now 
reflects the contrary forms of the phenomenal play of forces. The result is an "inverted 
world" where the essence is the inversion of the flux in the appearance; an appearance 
where the contrary play of forces were cognised by the "abstract understanding" as 
I externally and not intrinsically related. 
The difference in the flux of the twofold force of external appearance is now cognised as 
being both an inner difference and identity between the polar forces; that difference is both 
posited and cancelled in their dialectical movement and relation. For Hegel, the polar 
reciprocity now contained in the relation of force and law entails that "it is itself and its 
OPPOS I ite in one unity. " 
"Each of the two worlds is really the opposite of itself. The se4fsame really repels 
itself from itself, and what is not selfsame really posits itself as selfsame. In point of 
fact, it is only when thus determined that the difference is inner difference, or the 
difference in its own se4f, the like being unlike itself, and the unlike, like itself. ""' 
131 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 96. 
132 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 96. 
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The result of this for Hegel is that "the inverted world" of the universal law is now the direct 
opposite and corollary of the phenomenal world through the raising of cognition to the level 
of the "second supersensible world. " As the first "supersensible world" was only the 
"immediate raising of the perceived world into the universal element" or law, the problem 
was that the perceived world "retained for itseýf the principle of change and alteration. " 
This principle of change and alteration is now reflected in the law itself, in the movement of 
the universal whose active dialectical process consists of the subject, in its phenomenal 
expression of a twofold force, being characterised in its activity as "self-sundering and 
becoming self-identical. " The polar opposition is now characterised as an "inner difference" 
of the universal, as a universal difference that contains a twofold external expression whose 
polar independence is cancelled in the relation and higher common unity. 
The principle of change and alteration, inherent in the process of phenomenal change, is the 
contradiction that is posited and resolved in the contrary movements of force as the active 
polar expression of the substantial form activity. An activity that both posit the opposite 
poles of the relation as independent moments, and resolves that external contradiction 
through the mutual interpenetration and transformation of those opposites. 
By doing so the subject manifests itself in the higher unity of that common content that 
mediates the inner difference of the polar extremes that are the parameters of the substantial 
form activity of the subject. This it does through the positing and superseding of the specific 
difference and division of the substantial form activity in relation to its own privation and 
negation, as the expression of a "specialised contrariety. " 
This account of nomological activity directly ties in with the essentialist analysis of 
substance and contradiction in Hegel that was analysed earlier; as a specific difference that 
is expressed in the dialectic of its internal and external forms of polar opposition. The two 
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combined elements, of a substantial force in its twofold dialectical forms of expression, now 
give us a nomological foundation for the rational account of substantial activity. 
This dialectical process of the nomological activity is established as the stable ground and 
existence for the opposition contained within the substantial subject to posit and resolve its 
contradiction. This is essentially why, for a scientific account of law, we have to, according 
to Hegel, "think antithesis within the antithesis itseýf, or contradiction. " 
At the end of the Hegelian analysis of this process, the result of the interpenetration of these 
opposite laws of motion that are contained as an inner difference in a dialectical account of a 
systematic subject, is that the fusion of the contrary movement between the poles is resolved 
in the affirmation of the identity of the subject. 
"The different moments of sey-sundering and becoming sey-identical are therefore 
likewise only this movement of setf-supersession. " 133 
This movement of self-supersession is achieved through the dialectic of negativity as the 
moving and generating principle; this dynamic is expressed in the process as i determinate 
negation, and resolved as the self-affirmation through the negation of that determinate 
negation. It is precisely by analysing the nature of the determinate negation or the "inner 
difference" involved in the form activity that allows the cognition of the substantial nature 
of the specific difference in its polar division and dynamic expression to be cognised and 
outlined. 
This contrariety in its essential character, as the parameters of the external process of 
change, is the source for the laws of motion of the subject. This is the dialectical principle of 
change and alteration that Marx applies to the dialectic of labour and its subsumption under 
the forms and mediations of value. Alternatively, it is how value arises and becomes the 
133 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 100-101. 
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subject of the movement and process through the self-mediating dialectic of abstract and 
concrete labour as the source of its principle of change and alteration. 
Hegel's criticism of abstract understanding, and its account of law, centred then on its 
inability to capture that a concrete analysis of a universal kind and nature required 
understanding that its particular and specific forms are expressed in the contrary parameters 
and motions inherent in their process of change. 
Hegel's trenchant criticisms of an abstract understanding of force and law finds, in my 
analysis, its materialist resonance in Marx's critical conception of the limitations of classical 
political economy. Value, as abstract human labour power, the social form of the product of 
commodified labour power, actualises itself by duplicating itself; by self-sundering and 
becoming self-identical. 
This general dialectical account of law developed by Hegel and applied to the specific forms 
of labour contained in the value relation by Marx, is now the subject matter of the argument. 
A further analysis of this twofold character of labour power as a force, in this case a force 
that is both natural and social in its expression and its relation, to the substance and form of 
the law of value is therefore necessary in order to tease out and further develop the present 
line of investigation. 
What is of importance to bring out is the connection that I am trying to make between 
Marx's analysis and usage of the concept of labour power, and Hegel's view of the relation 
between force and law. 
3. Force and Labour Power. 
What separates Marx from his predecessors in classical political economy is the twofold 
character of labour, or to be more precise in my analysis, the twofold character of the labour 
power that is embodied in the commodity. The specific expression of labour power in the 
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form of abstract human labour, as the force and substance of value, is the key to Marx's 
scientific understanding of the law of value. 
This dialectical conception of the diremption and specific difference contained in the 
twofold character of the labour embodied in the commodity is the source of the expression 
of a force and law. The law that is in operation is the law of value, and the force 
underpinning this is the twofold character of the labour power embodied within the 
commodity form. 
The connection between labour power and the law of value is thus imperative for a clearer 
comprehension of value, as it is the foundation and the social force behind the expression of 
the law of value. It thus has to be, in my view, necessarily reflected and located in the 
analysis of the very nomological nature and substance of value itself. As we shall see, this 
strategy is at the core of Marx's dialectical analysis of value. 
Classical political economy, by not having a clearly defined dialectical distinction and 
difference between concrete and abstract labour, could not fully ascertain both the nature of 
value, and consequently coherently explain the contrary motions of use and exchange value, 
of concrete and abstract labour, contained in the expression of the law of value. 
The exercise and expenditure of labour power under the specificities of the value form 
produces a twofold result. It also produces a twofold content and form. The commodity 
form expresses this in its dual nature, being both a use value and a value. The concrete 
labour producing a use value form, and the abstract universal labour producing a value form, 
the twofold natural and social expressions of the commodity form itself. A twofold result, 
like a twofold effect, requires a twofold cause, given that, as Aristotle expresses it, contrary 
effects need and require contrary causes. 
Concrete labour power, expressed as a force, is relatively unproblematic; it forms the use 
value from the materials and instruments of labour employed in the productive activity. 
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What the exact nature of the type of labour that produces value, and how it comes to 
subsume its dialectically opposite form, concrete labour, as a moment and determination of 
itself, is however a little more problematic to ascertain. 
Labour itself is a power and the specific social and value form of labour power, abstract 
human labour power, according to Marx, is the force and substance behind the phenomenal 
expression of the law of value. The analysis of the specific nature of this substance and force 
that is the source of the value form, itself congealed and objectified in the product of 
materialised concrete labour, is the key to unlocking the nature and operation of value and 
the laws of motion of value. "' 
It is, as Marx notes, a fundamental peculiarity of Iabour under the value form that the 
amount of labour power expended and embodied in the commodity and measured in time 
becomes an objective social quality of the product of labour. This "differentia specifica of 
the value form" marks it out from all other forms of human social labour. 
Now abstract labour, or abstract human labour power, is, for Marx, the source of the social 
substance of value. As such, it has a substantial form activity, but this still begs the question 
as to what the exact nature of this peculiar and specific social substance actually is, and how 
it realises this active and peculiar social nature? 
The labour power that forms the substance of value is social rather than physiological in its 
nature, it is the totality of the expenditure of the labour power of society reduced to its 
average form, its general and universal form of simple human labour power. It is simple 
131 Marx, in a letter to Engels (8h January 1868. ), states that there are three fundamentally new 
elements in his analysis of capital. These new elements, in contrast to classical political economy, show that 
firstly Marx begins, unlike his predecessors, by dealing with the generalforin of surplus value. 
Secondly, the double character of labour, which Marx informs us, is "in fact the whole secret of the 
critical conception. " 
Thirdly, that he reveals how wages are the irrational outward form of a hidden relationship. Marx 
Engels. Collected Works. Letters. Volume 42. Lawrence and Wishart. (1987. ) P. 514. It is this second element 
that is of special interest at the moment, though, it should be noted, that the general form of surplus value will 
176 
unskilled human labour power that is the source of all the values of both the products of 
labour and the cost of labour power itself. 
The emphasis that I place on the importance of labour power is a surprisingly novel 
interpretation of Marx's account of abstract labour and the role of labour power in the 
process of value creation and realisation. However, there are two possible objections to this 
analysis and stress on labour power as the key to unlocking the nature of Marx's account of 
the law of value and abstract labour. 
These are based firstly on the idea that labour power is not in itself value, a point that I agree 
with, and which is itself clearly expressed by Marx. However, though labour power is not in 
itself value, it is, in its objective expression and embodiment in the commodity form, its 
"jelly" or "congealed state", the creator of value. 
Secondly, and related to the former, is that Marx does not have a physiological or materio- 
technical conception of value. This view has been most forcefully expressed in the work of 
I. I. Rubin. Again I agree that this is the case; my view of abstract labour as simple human 
labour power is not fundamentally natural and anthropological but social in its nature and 
expression. 135 
Rubin assumes that labour power has to be viewed either solely physiologically, as an 
ahistorical and natural characteristic, or in a material-technical sense when, in fact, Marx 
be generated and derived from the application of the general form of working of dialectic to the twofold 
character of the labour power that is embodied in the commodity. 
"I I. I. Rubin. Essays on Marx's Theory of Value. Black and Red. (1972. ) See the chapter on Abstract 
Labour for his argument against a physiological conception of value as abstract labour. Pages 131-158. The 
position I am attempting to put forward is based on a critical account of the following view. Labour power is 
not itself value however it is the source that creates value. At the same time, value is a social entity or form, 
and independent and atomised concrete labour only produces a use value. It would seem then that value, 
though it presupposes physical and concrete labour, couldn't be based on that independent concrete labour 
employed in the productive process, for value is a social and not a physiological product, and labours; are 
socially equated as values only through exchange. This view of Rubin's, expressed in his book, contains a 
problem however, that value only then seems really to exist and manifest itself in exchange. 
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also has a social characterisation of labour power in the process of both value creation and 
realisation. 
This, social nature and reified expression of labour power however, is specific and peculiar 
to the commodity form of the product of labour and no other social form of labour. 
Otherwise, value would exist in all forms of human society, as labour power is expressed in 
all modes of social labour, as the active nature of the human subject. 
What abstract labour betokens is the fact that all the determinate products of private or 
individual labour manifested in the world of commodities have a value. This social value 
form of the expression of human labour power is only manifested and realised in the 
circulation and exchange of connnodities. The further question generated by this though, is 
where is the value substance of the commodity created? 
In particular, this has expressed itself in the following question; that of the relation between 
the process of value creation and value realisation in Marx's analysis of the operation of 
capital as a mode of production and circulation of value and surplus value. This social 
characterisation of the category of labour power in Marx is missing from Rubin's account, 
and is, in my view, the hidden source and solution to the debate over this vexed question 
that has been generated by his work. 136 
Marx himself, in my view, gives the answer to this question in volume one of Capital, and I 
will address this answer of Marx to the dilemma derived from Rubin's work later in the 
thesis. To summarise the investigation so far, the advantages, in my view, of laying stress on 
136 1.1. Rubin. Abstract Labour and Value in Marx's System. Capital and Class. Number 5. (Summer 
1978. ) P. 107-139. In this later article, he does attempt to rectify this problematic area and argue for the view, 
contained in Marx, that value is created in production and realised in exchange. The problem is that he offers 
no adequate account of how this process is realised that would avoid us from the tendency of lapsing into a 
physiological or material-technical argument for the creative source of value and not, as he correctly points 
out, a social origin. This lacuna in his argument notwithstanding, much of Rubin's analysis has been both an 
important and rightly influential contribution in developing a more rigorous understanding of Marx's 
fundamental concept of abstract labour. 
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the importance of labour power for a more comprehensive understanding of Marx's analysis 
consists largely, but not exhaustively, in the following points. 
Firstly, it allows the intrinsic relation between a force manifesting itself and the laws of 
motion of the substantial subject in its characteristic activity, to be more fully brought out 
into the open in the analysis. Laws of motion require forces, and these forces have both a 
substantial form activity and a materialised content. The analysis of the twofold form and 
content of the force allows its nomological activity to be better comprehended. This general 
nature is central to the strategy that Marx employs in his critical conception of all the 
relations that are subsumed under the value form. 
Secondly, the dialectical basis for this movement of an interpenetrating contradiction, where 
the force receives its due expression in the account of law, provides the basis for a deeper 
understanding of that substantial form activity of value. The integration of force with law 
allows for a more penetrating connection to be made in the dialectical understanding of the 
law of value. 
Thirdly, the pivot for a scientific comprehension of value, as Marx stresses, lies in the 
analysis of the twofold character of the labour power that is embodied within the commodity 
form. This distinction within labour finds its origins in the bifurcation of the labour power 
that is expressed in the natural and social forms of the commodity. 
Fourthly, by introducing the importance of the category of alienated labour power early on 
in the analysis, it highlights its importance for not only a fuller understanding of the social 
substance of abstract labour and value; it also lays the basis for a better comprehension of 
Marx's later usage of it in the labour process itself. That way the category of alienated 
labour power has not fallen from the sky to enter the production process of capital, but has 
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already been logically introduced from the outset as a central core element; as the essence of 
the analysis of the substance of value itself. 137 
Last, and by no means least for the comprehension of a rational form of dialectic, it allows 
for a deeper understanding of the importance of Hegel for Marx's thought to be further 
developed. 
With the above points in mind, what is now necessary is to further elaborate this 
relationship between Hegel's account of force and law, and Marx's employment of it in the 
analysis of abstract labour, the value form, and the law of value in chapter one of volume 
one of Capital. It is now time to further analyse how Marx develops his unique concept of 
abstract labour as the social substance of value, and the role of labour power in the 
explication of a scientific account of the law of value itself. 
"I Marx also seems to indicate the importance of establishing this relation in the following passage 
from the Marginal Notes on Wagner. Here he is explaining the importance of the twofold character of labour 
embodied in the commodity. "the concrete modes of labours which create use-values, and of abstract labour, 
of labour as expenditure of human labour power, irrespective of what 'useful' manner it is expended in 
(which is the basis for the presentation of the process of production, later on); ... the fact that surplus-value 
itself is derived from a use-value of labourpower which is 'specific' and applies exclusively to it, etc., etc. " K. 
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CHAPTER NINE. 
FORCE, LAW, AND VALUE. 
1. Abstract Labour. 
"Where science comes in is to show how the law of value asserts itself. " 138 
Value, for Marx, does not stalk about with a label telling us what it is. Moreover, as it is a 
reified social form of labour, value thus seems to be an inherent property of all labour, as 
natural and material as the use value of the commodity itself. Value, though, is exclusively 
social in its nature and origins, and its social foundations are revealed in Marx's concept of 
abstract labour. What is though, the mysterious nature of this peculiar social substance? 
Value, as abstract human labour power, is a historically specific social form and result. It 
then has, however, a historically specific and determinate social nature, and that peculiar 
nature is fundamentally related to the social form of expressing the objectification of the 
labour power embodied within the commodity. 
What determines its specific social nature and content is, at the same time, the common 
source that universalises and generalises the myriad and specific forms of concrete labour 
itself through the act of exchange. Part of the peculiarity of grasping the mystifying nature 
of value as abstract labour lies in the concept, developed by Marx, of homogeneous and 
simple human labour power; the socialising source and substantial force behind the 
expression of the category of value. 
Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park Publications. (1976. ) P. 216. The development of this relation 
provides the solution to the dilemma in Rubin's account. 
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A social category, which posits that human labour power has been embodied within the 
commodity in the production process, and can thus be equated and exchanged for all the 
other myriad forms of concrete and privately produced labour. The essence of the value 
relation of the commodity form is that it expresses, in an abstract and homogeneous social 
form, that human labour power has been expended in their production. 
"The commodities social form is their relationship to one another as equal labour; 
hence - since the equality toto coelo (utterly) different labour can only consist in an 
abstraction from their inequality - their relationship to one another as human labour 
in general: expenditures of human labour power, which is what all human labours - 
whatever their content and mode of operation - actually are. " 139 
In the value form, all labour is equateable with all other forms of labour. This historical 
evolution and development of all labour as having the character of being abstract human 
labour, only fully establishes itself in a system based on capital accumulation; as the mode 
of commodity production and exchange that expresses its more completely formed nature. 
The social totality of labour thus manifests itself as a world of commodities. 
Abstract human labour power is labour power that is, by its very nature, indifferent to its 
particular concrete manifestation. What abstract labour is saying in its social relation, in the 
value language of commodities, is that all the myriad of particular concrete forms of labour 
can be socially equated by dint of the fact that they are all particular embodiments and 
expressions of human labour power. This social equalisation of all concrete labours can only 
be socially expressed by homogenising and reducing them to their common denominator, as 
expressions of simple human labour power. 
How though does Marx's analysis of the labour power embodied in the commodity manifest 
itself as a dialectical process? The twofold nature of a commodity, as having both a use and 
138 K. Marx. Collected Works Volume 43. Lawrence and Wishart (1987) P. 68. 
182 
a value form can logically only be a result of a dialectic expressed within the labouring; 
activity itself, where the one labouring activity specifies itself in a twofold form of the 
product of labour. 
Labour as genus, as a universal activity, specifies itself as a social value form in and through 
this twofold character, its diremption into its concrete and abstract forms of natural and 
social labour. A polar opposition that is the expression of the determinate and essential form 
activity for realising its universal nature as a thing with a social value; this being the case 
only by dint of the presupposition that it is a thing with a social use. 
"It follows from the preceding not that there are two differing kinds of labour lurking 
in the commodity, but rather that the same labour is specified in differing and even 
contradictory manner - in accordance with whether it is related to the use value of 
the commodity as labour's product or related to the commodity value as its merely 
objective expression. Just as the commodity must be above all else an object of use 
in order to be a value, just so does labour have to be before all else useful labour - 
purposeful, productive activity - in order to count as expenditure of human labour 
power and hence as simple human labour. " 
Labour as genus takes on a twofold specific difference, as a reciprocal and reflexive 
movement of a contradiction contained within the product of labour itself in its natural and 
social forms of expression. This twofold contrary expression of labour requires a twofold 
contrary force in the characterisation of the labour power embodied in the commodity. Marx 
expresses the specific difference of the twofold character of the labour power contained in 
the value relation of the commodity, in the following comments that differentiate labour 
power in its abstract social and concrete natural forms of expression. 
131 K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. Capital Volume I- (First Edition) Chapter 1. New Park 
Publications. (1976) P-32. 
"0 K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park. Publications. (1976. ) P. 16. 
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"On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human 
labour power, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and 
forms the value of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of 
human labour power in a special form and with a definite aim and in this, its 
character of concrete useful labour, it produces use values. ""' 
At the same time then, the concrete labour power embodied in the commodity, becomes the 
congealed material expression of abstract human labour power, as the peculiar source of the 
social manifestation of the product of labour as having a social value. The social relation 
between the producers becomes expressed through the relation of their products of labour, 
with value as their alienated and reified social expression. 
"The labour however, that forms the substance of value, is homogeneous human 
labour, expenditure of one uniform labour power. The total labour power of society, 
which is embedded in the sum total of the value of all commodities produced by that 
society, counts here as one homogeneous mass of human labour power, composed 
though it be of innumerable individual units. Each of these units is the same as any 
other, so far as it has the character of the average labour power of society, and takes 
effect as such; that is, so far as it requires for producing a commodity, no more time 
than is needed on average, no more than is socially necessary. " 142 
The intimate connection between socially homogenised labour power in general or simple 
labour power and abstract labour as the substance of value has to be recognised for what it 
is. It is the reified social expression of the entire myriad and disparate forms of concrete 
labour, the totality of the labour power of society that socially expresses itself as the 
expenditure of one uniform labour power, "that forms the substance of value". 
K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 53. 
K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart., (1974. ) P. 46. 
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The value form of the commodity is the manifestation of a specific social form of alienated 
labouring activity, where the exchange value of the commodity becomes the social form for 
the "expression of the human labour power expended in its production. " This reified form of 
labour power is fundamentally social in both its nature and form activity; the analysis of the 
specific manner and form of the particularising of this genus of social labour becomes the 
central scientific problem that requires a resolution for Marx. 
"A coat is only value insofar as it is a reifled expression of the human labour power 
expended in its production, and is thus a coagulation of abstract human labour - 
abstract labour, because abstraction is made from the determinate, useful, concrete 
character of the labour contained in it - human labour, because in this case labour 
counts only as expenditure of labour power in general. " I' 
Value does not then contain an atom of use value, it is a social, or to use Marx's 
employment of a Hegelian term, a "supersensible" substance. What is enigmatic is the 
specific social nature of the "supersensible" quality of value that is "congealed" and 
expressed in the commodity. As value is a purely social relation, value can only then acquire 
this equateable form by being the expression or embodiment of "one identical social 
substance, viz., human labour". 
It then has to, and can only, express itself in the active social relation of commodities, in the 
mutual and reciprocal alienation that is the essence of the exchange process. Value, as 
abstract human labour power, is then the social expression and product of the human labour 
power that is congealed and manifested within the commodity form. '" 
Socially related, equated, and measured in the form of value, it is the social expression of 
the manifestation of the magnitude of the duration of the human labour power that is 
"" K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. Capital Volume 1. (Appendix to First Edition) New Park. 
(1976. ) P. 52. 
'"'The value of the commodities, however, represents human labour in the simplest form, the 
expenditure of human labour power in general. " K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park. (1976. ) P. 14. 
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embodied in the production of the commodity. The substance of value, abstract labour, only 
fully manifests itself then in the totality of the relations that are expressed in the "world of 
commodities"; where the substance of value subsumes all the myriad forms and expressions 
of concrete labour and gives them a social value form. 
How does Marx develop the dialectical relation that is inherent in the social expression of 
this substance of value? Moreover, how does his exposition of the value substance, form, 
and relation connect to Hegel's account of force and its twofold expression, as the core of 
Hegel's dialectical account of law? 
Hegel presents the process of a substantial force, taking on a material form, as a substantial 
relation whose nomological content is expressed in its twofold determinate moments or 
polar forms of its manifestation. The mystical appearance of the Hegelian mode of 
expression here will have to be unpacked and divested of this form, in order for this relation 
of Hegel and Marx to begin to more clearly emerge. If this can be achieved then it should 
further expose and reveal his account as an important element of the rational kernel that is 
contained in the mystical shell of Hegel's thought. 
"In order, then, that Force may in truth be, it must be completely set free from 
thought, it must be posited as the substance of these differences, i. e. first the 
substance as this whole Force, remaining essentially in andfor itsey, and then its 
differences as possessing substantial being, or as moments existing in their own 
account. Force as such, or as driven back into itself, thus exists on its own account as 
an exclusive One, for which the unfolding of the [different] 'matters' is another 
subsisting essence; and thus two distinct independent aspects are set up. "' 
The substantial force, in this case abstract human labour power, expresses itself by 
objectifying the contradiction contained within its nature. This is manifested in the exchange 
relation embodied in the commodity form. The force, as this whole substance, the "one 
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homogeneous mass of human labour power", both dirempts itself and gives each of the 
twofold forms of its expression an independent existence, as the social expression of the 
value relation of the commodities manifested in the exchange process. 
This it does by both positing and resolving its specific contradiction or twofold nature, 
through the determinate relations that it enters into with others of its own substantial kind; 
by equating the concrete commodities as social values, it thus realises the potentiality of the 
substantial form activity expressed in the twofold force. The elementary form of value is 
thus Marx's application of the embryonic expression of this Hegelian dialectic contained in 
force. 
The dialectical account of force in Hegel is conceived as a process where the force 
actualises itself by duplicating itself into two forces. If the concept of force become actual 
by its duplication into two forces, then entailed in this is that both sides of the relation are 
the result of this double and opposite form of the manifestation of force. This dialectical 
diremption and duplication contained within the expression of force requires yet further 
elucidation and analysis to draw out its connection with Marx's expression of the law of 
value. 
2. Force and the Elementary Form of Value. 
"The whole mystery of the form of value lies hidden in this elementary form. Its 
analysis, therefore, is our real difficulty. " 146 
"In general, to be for itself and to be in relation to another constitutes the nature and 
the essence of the content, whose truth consists in its being unconditionally 
universal; and the result is simply and solely universal. ""' 
115 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 82. 
I'll K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 55. 
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What was shown to be fundamental to Hegel's approach, to the resolution of what he 
regarded as the inherent problem with the abstract understanding's account of law, was the 
notion that a substantial systematic subject contains an "inner difference. " This inner 
difference, as the manifestation of a force, is objectively expressed in a twofold relational 
form; this twofold form has then to be exhibited and contained in the account of the 
operation of the law explaining the phenomena, as it is the dynamic source of the content of 
the objective expression of the law. 
The idea that there is a doubling of form that produces an identity, one containing a specific 
difference, is a characteristic principle of a dialectical analysis of law and, consequently, of 
the general form of working of dialectic itself. The inner difference of the force is expressed 
in the substantial form activity; in the essential forms of determination that objectively 
makes the entity that specific form of subject. The contrariety or inner difference contained 
within the substantial form is reflected, in Hegel's analysis, in the contrariety contained in 
the objective expression of the force. 
The contradictions contained within realising value in its commodity form, simply as it is a 
unity of use and exchange value, are resolved by externalising them, by duplicating them in 
a relation to another commodity. Moreover, this relation is itself an expression of the 
movement of a polar contradiction, as a dialectic whose inner difference is only expressed 
and manifested in an external relation. 
"The commodity is right from the start a dual thing, use value and value, product of 
useful labour and abstract coagulate of labour. In order to manifest itself as what it 
is, it must therefore double its form. It possesses right from nature the form of a use 
value. That is its natural form. It only earns a value form for itself for the first time in 
circulation with other commodities. But its value form has then to be itself an 
G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 80. 
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objective form. The only objective forms of commodities are their use forms, their 
natural forms. ""' 
This dialectic of self and other first exposes the polarity of the forms of the twofold 
expression of the labour power necessary for the comprehension of the value relation. The 
inner difference of the twofold character of the labour embodied in the commodity is 
contained in both of the commodities. The value relation is therefore first objectively 
expressed through the two bodily forms of the commodities brought together in the 
exchange relation. Each of the poles of the relation expressing a contradiction within itself 
that first manifests that twofold contrariety in its self, only in its relation to its other. 
"The opposition or contrast existing internally in each commodity between use-value 
and value, is, therefore, made evident externally by two commodities being placed in 
such relation to each other, that the commodity whose value it is sought to express, 
figures directly as a mere use-value, while the commodity in which that value is to 
be expressed, figures directly as mere exchange-value. Hence the elementary form of 
value of a commodity is the elementary form in which the contrast contained in that 
commodity, between use-value and value, becomes apparent. """ 
The simple polar relation of value illustrates this negative unity of the twofold forms of the 
expression of the labour power embodied within the commodity. The dialectic of concrete 
and abstract labour is first brought out in the simple value form and relation. The human 
labour power embodied within the commodity thus embryonically expresses itself in the 
specific social form of value, as the relational expression of a social quality or substance, 
and the social manifestation of a force. 
"Human labour power in motion, or human labour, creates value, but is not itself 
value. It becomes value only in its congealed state, when embodied in the form of 
148 K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park. (1976. ) P. 21-22. 
141 K. Marx. Capital Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 67. 
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some object. In order to express the value of the linen as a congelation of human 
labour, that value must be expressed as having objective existence, as being 
something materially different from the linen itself, and yet something common to 
the linen and all other commodities. ""0 
In the value relation of one commodity to another, the "one stands forth in its character of 
value by reason of its relation to the other. " The simple form of value is a specific and 
determinate manifestation and application of this generalised content of the Hegelian 
dialectic of self and other, as the initial and elementary expression of a substantial form. 
This embryonic form contains the key to its rational comprehension. 
This process is expressed through the contrary motions and specific determinations of a 
common identity and substantial form activity; an activity that is contained in the 
manifestation of its necessary and reciprocal relation to others of its common kind. Here is 
how Hegel expresses that "inner difference" of a common unity inherent to the polarity that 
is expressed in the substantial force. 
"Through the notion of inner difference, these unlike and indifferent moments are a 
difference, or only a difference of what is self-same, and its essence is unity. As 
positive and negative they stimulate each other into activity, and their being is rather 
to posit themselves as not-being and to suspend themselves in the unity. The two 
distinguished moments both subsist; they are implicit and opposites in themselves, 
i. e. each is the opposite of itself, each has its 'other' within it and they are only one 
unity. " 15' 
The point that Hegel is driving towards is that a universal force and law, as the expression of 
a specific form activity, is manifested in the process of the particularisation and 
individuation of that form activity. As a substantial form that exercises a force in its 
110 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 58. 
Is' G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 99-100. 
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characteristic activity, and this force, manifested in a determinate and necessary substantial 
form activity, operates in a nomological fashion, as the common content of the twofold 
relational expression. 
This general content of the dialectic of self and other defines the universal conditions and 
parameters within which the substantial process operates in this its elementary fashion. With 
the force expressing itself as an identity that includes a specific difference, and, according to 
Hegel, "difference is nothing else than being-for-another. " This inner difference or 
contradiction does not remain inner, but objectively expresses itself in a necessary external 
relation by doubling its form. 
The inner difference and opposition of the contrary poles of the value relation, expressed in 
the social nature of the commodity, not only obtain their specific determination objectively 
in relation to its own form of internal opposition, but the opposition itself only obtains its 
specific nature in the ontological unity of the common genus of abstract human labour that 
sublates and contains the parameters of the specific difference of the twofold labour 
embodied in the commodity. 
"By equating the other commodity to itseY as value, it relates itseýr to itsetf as value. 
By relating itself to itself as value, it distinguishes itself from itsetf as use value, at 
the same time. By expressing its magnitude of value in the coat (and magnitude of 
value is both things: value in general, and quantitatively measured value), it endows 
its reality of value with aform of value which differs from its immediate existence. 
By revealing itself in this manner as a thing which is differentiated within itself, it 
reveals itself for the first time really as a commodity -a useful thing which is at the 
same time value. " 152 
This it does through the principle of change and alteration that is inherent within the 
dialectic of concrete and abstract labour whose contrariety manifests itself in the expression 
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of value. The twofold expression of labour power as a force takes a twofold form in the 
commodity, as a use value and a value, which itself doubles its form in the value relation, in 
its relative and equivalent forms of expression. 
If the nature and the essence of the content for Hegel is a dialectic of being for self and 
being in relation to another, how then does the twofold content of this dialectic of self and 
other unfold and manifest itself as the expression of force and law? 
"Here, these two sides are moments of Force; they are just as much in a unity, as this 
unity, which appears as the middle term over against the independent extremes, is a 
perpetual diremption of itself into just these extremes which exist only through this 
process. ""' 
As Hegel further expresses this process, "what they are, they are, only in this middle term 
and in this contact. " This expression of force is the source of the twofold parameters of the 
qualitative nature of its active substantial activity. The question is though; does this 
Hegelian analysis help to reveal the manner in which Marx investigates how the law of 
value asserts itself? To answer this is to further elucidate the connection between Hegel's 
account of force and law, and how Marx's analysis of the simple value form, are further 
related. 
The common feature of value inherent in both commodities is brought out in that x of 
commodity A is exchanged for y of commodity B. This manifests the value of commodity A 
in its relative opposite commodity B. The relative and equivalent forms are, in Marx's 
account, both mutually related and mutually exclusive; in other words, they are the polar 
opposites of a contradiction that has a twofold form of expression; to borrow Marx's phrase, 
they are as "necessarily opposite as they are connected. " 
152 K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park. (1976. ) P. 19. 
153 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 82. 
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That "unity" of the "middle term" that mediates the "independent extremes", the common 
content or 'third' that is value in Marx's terms, is first expressed in the simple value relation 
between two commodities, as the poles of the "self-diremption" that is inherent to the social 
expression of the value relation. "' 
In what sense, though, is the dynamic of Hegel's view of a force that self-sunders and 
becomes self-identical further related to Marx's analysis of the simple value form? In 
Hegel's terms, the process of the manifestation of force and law is inherent with a principle 
of change and alteration that is expressed in the dialectical relation between its polar forms. 
How does this principle of change and alteration manifest itself? 
The self-diremption of force, in Hegel's account, splits into an antithesis of an active and a 
passive force; as a force that solicits and a force that is solicited, a force that repels and a 
force that attracts. The relationship is expressed in the repulsion and attraction contained 
within the force, and revealed in this opposition of the active soliciting and passive solicited 
sides; as the dual content of the dialectic of self and other. 
Force, in this its expression, is a "perpetual diremption" of itself into these "independent 
extremes. " As the polar contrariety or specific difference of a shared common content; 
where the two poles of the force only exist within this determinate process; as the specific 
parameters that contain the contrary motions inherent to the principle of change and 
alteration that are initially expressed in this simple dialectic of self and other. Here is how 
Hegel expresses this dialectic "interplay" of self and other in the twofold manifestation of a 
universal force that both solicits and is solicited. 
"The interplay of the two forces thus consists in their being determined as mutually 
opposed, in their being for one another in this determination, and in the absolute, 
immediate alternation of the determinations - consists i. e. in a transition through 
154 "What is present in this interplay is likewise merely the immediate alternation, or the absolute 
interchange, of the detenninateness which constitutes the sole content of what appears: to be either a universal 
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which alone these determinations are in which the forces seem to make an 
independent appearance ... The external soliciting Force appears as a universal 
medium, but only through its having been solicited by the other Force to do so; but 
this means that the latter gives it that character and is really itself essentially a 
universal medium; it gives the soliciting Force this character just because this 
determination is essential to it, i. e., because this is really its own self. " 155 
This Hegelian expression of the specific nature and difference of the twofold forces in 
operation is encapsulated in the elementary or simple dialectical form of the value 
expression, where the polar relation is shared between the active relative and passive 
equivalent forms of value. By actively soliciting its value expression in the passive bodily 
form of another commodity, it repels its own value form, and by repelling its value 
expression it realises it only through the attraction of the bodily form of the other. Value 
thus manifests itself in the use value of an other commodity, and use value becomes the 
form of expression of value. 
The actualisation of its movement being the substantial form activity positively resolving 
the contrary states of its being in its affirmative form. A form that is expressed through the 
polar parameters acting in a reciprocal and reflexive relation. Each of the poles of the 
contrary determination then gains its specific form of the relational identity through the 
opposite, and at the same time affirms itself as being of a like nature. Marx reflects this very 
process in the simple value relation. 
"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually 
dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but at the same time 
they are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes - i. e. poles of the same 
expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought 
into relation by that expression ... A single commodity cannot, therefore, 
medium or a negative unity. " G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 89-90. 
155 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 84-85. 
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simultaneously assume in the same expression of value, both forms. The very 
polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive. " 116 
This interpenetration is captured by Hegel's formulation of the dialectic inherent in this 
process of force expressing itself in a nomological manner. That dual content of an active, 
soliciting, "negative unity" or one, a being-for-self on the one hand, and on the other hand, a 
passive, solicited, "universal medium of many subsistent matters", a being-for-other on the 
other hand. Their universal difference and unity being expressed in the polar reciprocity of 
the relation and expression of the substantial force. 
"They do not exist as extremes which retain for themselves something fixed and 
substantial, transmitting to one another in their middle term and in their contact a 
merely external property; on the contrary, what they are, they are, only in this middle 
term and in this contact .... Force that solicits and force that is solicited. 
Consequently, these moments are not divided into two independent extremes 
offering each other only an opposite extreme: their essence consists simply and 
solely in this, that each is solely through the other, and what each is it immediately 
no longer is, since it is the other. ""' 
The relation of simple exchange is itself the expression of a polar contradiction of identity 
and difference based on the reciprocity inherent in a contrariety that shares a common 
content, in this specific case the reciprocal polarity inherent within the expression of value. 
Their common content of self and other, itself based on the social substance of abstract 
human labour power, entails that, as the expression of a polar contradiction, they are both, to 
put it in Hegel's terms, "negatively related to each other in the same respect. " 
The simple value form and relation exemplifies this contrary form and content of a 
substantial universal force. The active relative form of value expresses its value form in its 
156 K. Marx. Capital Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 55 and P. 57 respectively. 
"I G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 85-86. 
195 
other; it solicits its own value expression through its opposite, the equivalent form of value. 
The passive equivalent form, as a being for other, becomes the mode of being for the 
expression of the relative value of the other. Its status as an equivalent is, as Marx expresses 
it, "only a reflection-determination of linen. " 
In this sense, each of the twofold forms of the labour power embodied in the commodities 
"passes over into" its own other. Alternatively posed, a la Hegel, it is the process where like 
becomes unlike and unlike becomes like. Abstract labour manifests itself in a different form 
of concrete labour, and concrete labour becomes the form of manifestation of its dialectical 
opposite, abstract labour. 
"By means, therefore, of the value relation expressed in our equation, the bodily 
form of commodity B becomes the value form of commodity A, or the body of 
commodity B acts as a mirror to the value of commodity A. By putting itself in 
relation with commodity B, as value in propria persona, as the matter of which 
human labour is made up, the commodity A converts the value in use B, into the 
substance in which to express its, A's own value. The value of A, thus expressed in 
the use value of B, has taken the form of relative value. ""' 
The specific contraries contained in the universal form and its substantial expression as an 
active force are the parameters and poles of the process of movement and change. The self 
objectively requires an other, in a double form that reflexively and reciprocally reflects its 
own specific difference or polar contradiction, for the relation to manifest itself in its simple 
and germ form. 
The value of commodities has a "purely social reality" that is only acquired in so far as they 
are expressions and embodiments of one identical social substance, namely abstract human 
labour power. This it does by showing the forms of development of the laws of motion and 
principle of change and alteration inherent to their specific form activity. An activity that 
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both abolishes their apparent unconnected immediacy of being and their fted state and 
condition. 
The substantial and essential activity itself is twofold; it both posits the determinate quality 
of a kind, and posits the identity of the two particulars as a single kind. That is, it is the 
expression of the particularity of the determinate difference contained in the substantial 
form activity that manifests itself in the relation between two members of the same 
substantial kind that exhibits them as having a common essence. 
"But for us, as remarked above, something more was apparent, viz, that the 
differences, qua differences of content andform, vanished in themselves; and on the 
side of form, the essence of the active, soliciting, or independent side, was the same 
as that which, on the side of content, presented itself as Force driven back into itself, 
the side which was passive, which was solicited or for an other, was, from the side 
of form, the same as that which, from the side of content, presented itself as the 
universal medium of the many 'matters'. ""9 
In the simple form of value, the relative and equivalent form could be played by either of the 
two commodities that express the value relation. It is not yet developed into either a fixed 
opposition or a totality of relations. Each of the sides contains both antithetical poles, but a 
commodity cannot express both forms at the same time; the twofold forms are themselves 
contrary and mutually exclusive. This inverse reciprocity is solely due to the fact that the 
value substance and relation is here expressed in its elementary form. 
"In the simple form of relative value or the expression of the equivalence of two 
commodities, the development of the form of value is correspondent for both 
commodities, although in each case in the opposite direction. The relative value 
expression is in addition identical with reference to each of both commodities, for 
"I K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 59. 
119 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 85. 
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the linen manifests its value in only one commodity (the coat) and vice versa, but 
this value expression is double for both commodities, different for each of the same. 
Finally, each of both commodities is only an Equivalent for the single other species 
of commodity, and thus only a single Equivalent. "" 
According to Hegel, the "essence of the active and passive forms is the same. " That is, they 
share a common content and quality, in the specific case of Marx's analysis of value, 
abstract human labour power. Homogeneous human labour power takes the role of the 
mediating unity of the active universal form that is expressed in its relative and equivalent 
polarities via the dialectic of abstract and concrete labour; with value as the common 
essence behind the active and passive forms of commodity exchange. 
Value, as the substantial force of abstract labour subsumes the concrete labour and makes it 
a moment or determination of its own substantial form activity. Private labour and its 
product, the commodity, becomes social through the mediation of the substance of abstract 
labour, by the social measurement of the quantitative determination of the labour power that 
is embodied in the commodity. As the process by which the labour time spent on creating it 
"becomes expressed as one of the objective qualities of that article. " 
That all the products of labour have a value, as the social form of expressing that human 
labour power is embodied in them, is first manifested through the alienated and reciprocal 
act of exchange. This distinction within the twofold character of the labour power that is 
embodied within the commodity form is thus basis for Marx's uniquely scientific account of 
value. 
This notion, peculiar to dialectic, of contradiction as the expression of the specific difference 
within a common genus or kind; a difference that doubles its form in order to both posit and 
resolve its contradiction, is essential for grasping the dynamics behind the general form of 
working of dialectic, and consequently, Marx's analysis of the value form and relation. 
160 K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park. (1976. ) P. 24. 
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This conceptual evolution of a substantial force, from this its elementary dialectical form, is 
the source for how it later becomes a more fully "developed actuality" and totality that is 
itself initially brought out and expressed as an alternation of the two moments or 
determinations of this its double form of expression. 
This development of the subject in its essential determinations and relations universally 
connects them as an evolving totality of relations and determinations; each of those evolving 
and more developed determinations and forms are themselves based on the common driving 
contradiction inherent to its specific nature and difference, and expressed in the substantial 
twofold force contained in their form activity. 
Value, expressed in this its simplest form and content as a dialectic of self and other, is the 
initial process of this universal and substantial form and content particularising and 
individuating itself in its universal and specific form of activity. By doing so it will further 
develop and evolve to subsume the totality of both concrete labouring activity itself, and its 
product. 
The further development of the analysis, from this initial and elementary expression of a 
dialectic of self and other to a dialectic of one and many, will, as we shall see, both bring out 
that universality of value in the world of commodities, and at the same time, more fully 
develop abstract labour as a totality of homogeneous human labour power. 
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CHAPTER TEN. 
THE VALUE FORM. 
1. Abstract Labour and Pure Quantity. 
"Pure Quantity must here be distinguished from determinate quantity, or Quantum. 
As the former, Quantity is, first, real Being for Self, which has returned upon itself 
and as yet has no determinateness; as infinite, homogenous unity which continues 
into itself. " 161 
"Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the same 
unsubstantial reality in each, a mere congelation of homogeneous human labour, of 
labour-power expended without regard to the mode of its expenditure. All that these 
things now tell us is, that human labour-power has been expended in their 
production, that human labour is embodied in them. When looked at as crystals of 
this social substance, common to them all, they are - Values. ""' 
Commodities, as Marx tells us, come in a myriad of different concrete forms and qualities, 
but in their exchange value form they are merely different quantities and "consequently do 
not contain an atom of use value. " The use value or material form of the commodity being 
merely the material depository of the exchange value. Yet, this quantitative expression of 
value manifests itself in the world of commodities as being their common and universal 
property. 
161 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Volume One. (Johnston and Struthers translation. ) Allen and 
Unwin (196 1. ) P. 198. 
11 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 46. 
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Just as exchange value appears, at first glance, as an accidental and purely relative thing, 
something that is not intrinsic to the nature of the commodity form itself, then this intrinsic 
nature of value, as Marx puts it, "seems a contradiction in terms. " How then can this purely 
quantitative expression of commodities assume a common qualitative nature? 
We have already gone some way down the road to answering this question in the analysis of 
the substance of value and its elementary expression in the relation of two commodities. 
This elementary expression of value, however, does not fully bring into relief, both the 
substance of value, and the value relation in its entirety. Abstract labour and value have yet 
to prove themselves as a social totality. 
In order for a fuller expression of how the substance and the form of value coheres itself into 
a world of commodity relations and exchange, based on the value form itself, the substance 
of value and its universal social form have to be shown how they manifestly emerge and 
assert themselves as the reified social expression of this totality of the product of labour, the 
commodity. 
What the logical and conceptual relations that underpinned the analysis of value in Marx, 
have been shown to express and exemplify, are some core elements contained in the 
Hegelian account of the relation of force and law. This dialectical account of force and its 
twofold form of expression, both allowed greater elucidation and underpinned, in my view, 
the laws of motion of the twofold character of the labour power, both concrete and abstract, 
that are contained in the contrary relations of the expression of value. 
By abolishing the immediacy of the use value form of the commodity, through the principle 
of change and alteration inherent in the dialectic of the active relative and passive equivalent 
forms of the expression of value, abstract labour both subsumes concrete labour, and makes 
it a subordinate moment or determination of its own activity. 
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Value overcomes its privative condition or state, its use value form, and realises its value 
form by transforming the bodily form of another commodity to act as its own value 
expression; through doing so, the potentiality of the substance of value actualises its 
peculiar and specific social nature. 
These active-soliciting and passive-solicited poles of the twofold form of expression 
contained in Hegel's account of force and law, in my view, provide for a fuller 
understanding of Marx's dialectical analysis of how the value of a commodity is 
determinately expressed. In the analysis of value, the use value becomes a moment of value 
in process. This is the sole aim of the substantial form activity and process of the value 
inherent within the commodity form, to abolish its use value form and realise its value form. 
We have also seen, at least in its initial expression, the importance of this Hegelian account 
of force and law for Marx's analysis of the substance of value, abstract human labour power, 
as the determinate content of the social nature of value. What other elements of Hegel's 
logical thought will prove useftil for Marx's analysis of the fuller expression of both abstract 
labour, and its individuation into the single universal equivalent of the money form? For 
example, does the dialectic of quality and quantity, that are contained and employed in 
Marx's analysis of the expression of value, have its source in Hegel's account of quality and 
quantity? 
There are two main areas of Hegel's analysis that I think are fundamental for a, fuller 
understanding of Marx's account of the substance and form of value. These are, firstly, the 
dialectic of repulsion and attraction that coheres the different entities into a common but 
indifferent form that manifests the atomised elements into a unified totality; this specific 
contrariety of the expression of force provides the dialectical dynamic for Hegel's account 
of the transition from quality to quantity. 
Secondly, Hegel's account of the category of measure as involving a series of measure 
relations. This dialectic is the inverse expression of the transition of quality into quantity, as 
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it provides the dynamic for the transition of quantity into quality. These twofold dialectical 
transitions of quality and quantity find their unity in measure, itself a "qualitative quantity" 
for Hegel; this provides the resolution of the dialectic in his exposition. 
Both the above areas of Hegel's thought will allow, in my view, greater insight into Marx's 
account of the dynamic of abstract labour as the social substance of value, and its further 
development and embodiment into a single universal form of value, the money form. 
The fundamental distinction and difference between the categories of quality and quantity 
for Hegel is that quality is primary and immediate determinateness and quantity is this 
determinateness that has become indifferent to this immediate being of quality. What is of 
central importance here, for the present study, is that in the Hegelian account of the 
transition from quality into quantity, quantity takes on an indifference to the determinate 
qualitative nature of the one or unit. 
This is reflected in Marx's distinction of the use and exchange value aspects inherent in the 
commodity form, where the commodity value is indifferent to its mode of expressing itself. 
In Marx's terms, the particular qualities of the use value of the commodity are treated 
indifferently by the quantitative value relation; it makes no difference to the commodity 
which particular use value expresses the equivalent form, any bodily form of commodity 
would suffice for this. 
It is through the logical unfolding of these ontological categories and relations, uniquely 
developed dialectically by Hegel, and applied by Marx to political economy, that will, to 
paraphrase Hegel (by replacing the category of being here with the category of value), both 
bring out the totality of value and abolish the immediacy of the form of value. 
That is, in Marx's terms, how the useful products of labour become a totality of commodity 
values and generate a universal form of value itself. Let us explore the first of these areas, 
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the dialectic of repulsion and attraction, before later considering the second, the analysis of 
measure. 
Value, in its soliciting and solicited, its active-relative and passive-equivalent forms are, in 
my account, Marx's expression of the Hegelian modal forms of the forces of repulsion and 
attraction applied to the specificities of value. We have already seen their expression in the 
simple form of value relation. What are then, the determinate operational forms and 
relations, contained in the forces of repulsion and attraction in Hegel's analysis, that are 
useful for Marx's critical exposition of value in its more developed expressions of the 
expanded and general form of value? 
Attraction, for Hegel, is the moment of continuity of quantity, and repulsion is the moment 
of discreteness contained in quantity. How does this unfolding dialectic of continuous and 
discrete magnitude, inherent within the category of quantity in Hegel, allow a fuller 
understanding of Mark's account of abstract human labour and the value expression? Let us 
investigate this relation a little further to see what it can reveal. 
Hegel expresses a difference in the category of magnitude between what he calls "Pure 
Quantity" and "Quantum"; the differentiation is ftirther posed in the following terms that 
correlate to the quantitative expressions of the forces of attraction and repulsion. Pure 
quantity is magnitude that is continuous, and quantum is magnitude that is discrete. 
Quantity, as the generalised category of magnitude embodies both forms, it has then two 
moments or determinations; it is the expression of the dialectic of continuous and discrete 
magnitude. Quantum, as the discrete form of magnitude is, for Hegel, the determinate being 
of quantity, as a unit of quantity; it is then the determinate form of being that quantity takes, 
for example, as a single commodity with a determinate exchange value. 
"Pure Quantity", as the continuous form of magnitude is, in my analysis, both akin to, and 
the source for, Marx's analysis of abstract labour as the social substance of value. 
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"Quantum", as the discrete form of the magnitude of quantity, is then the source for Marx's 
analysis of the determinate magnitude of the exchange value of the commodity. The 
continuous form of magnitude as the moment of attraction or "ideality" in Hegel, is the 
expression of the universal form that unites the many, the totality of the discrete forms of 
magnitude. 
In terms of Marx's value theory, abstract labour as one homogeneous mass of human labour 
power, is manifested in the totality of the discrete forms of the magnitudes of labour power 
embodied in the world of commodities. Let us see how Hegel further develops the relational 
forms of dialectic that are contained in the expression of the category of quantity; by doing 
so this will, at the same time, further reveal the basis for the elementary expression of value 
in Marx. 
Quantity, in Hegel's account, has "two sources", these being "the exclusive unit and the 
identification and the equalisation of these units. " Hegel does not see these twofold 
relational determinations of the continuous and discrete forms as two species of magnitude 
that are unrelated, "as if the characteristic of one did not attach to the other. " They are 
understood, in my interpretation, as the specific difference and contrariety that is contained 
in the very modal expression of quantitative magnitude itself. "' 
Furthermore, quantity, as this dialectical combination of discrete and continuous magnitude 
entails that the expression of the discrete unit progresses into its relation with continuous 
magnitude. That relation is first expressed in two discrete units. Quantum, in this its 
independent character for Hegel, "is external to itself", this is expressed in its relation to an 
other; it is this relation that initially constitutes its quantitative quality. This external 
"I "Continuous and discrete magnitude can be regarded as species of quantity, provided that 
magnitude is posited, not under external determinateness, but under the determinatenesses of its own 
moments; the ordinary transition from genus to species allows atenwl characteristics to be attributed to the 
former according to some extemal basis of classification. " G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. 
(1993. ) P. 200-201. They are then, the twofold contrary and specific dialectical forms of the expression of 
magnitude itself, as its essential and necessary forms of determination intrinsic to its nature. That is, to pose it 
in Aristotelian terms, they are the contrary species of the common genus of magnitude. 
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"otherness" for Hegel is not "something indifferent and outside it but a function proper to 
it. " 
The motor forces of repulsion and attraction, contained within quantity, with their discrete- 
continuous expressions of magnitude, are then manifested in their simplest form as a 
quantitative ratio. This mutual reciprocity of repulsion and attraction in its discrete and 
continuous forms first manifests itself in the relation between two quanta; expressed in the 
dialectic of self and other as the two sides of the quantitative ratio. 
"Quantum is thus posited as repelled from itself, with the result that there are two 
quanta which, however, are sublated, are only as moments of one unity, and this 
unity is the determinateness of quantum. Quantum as thus seV-related as an 
indifferent limit in its externality and therefore posited as qualitative, is quantitative 
ratio .... It has in this unity not an 
indifferent, but a qualitative, determination; in 
this its externality it has returned into itself, and in it quantum is that whichit is. " 164 
The quantitative ratio, which is a mode of being that, in its exponent for Hegel, is an 
immediate quantum, is also the expression of the qualitative nature of the mediation. It is the 
relation and reference of one quantum to another that form the two sides of the ratio. These 
two sides are, like the relative and equivalent forms of value, both mutually exclusive and 
mutually connected. 
2. The Quantitative expression of the Simple Value Form. 
Quantity, for Hegel, is not only magnitude that is continuous and discrete, each individual 
unit that repulses itself is also an expression of both an intensive and extensive magnitude. 
This entails that in the mutual relational repulsion and attraction of two discrete forms of 
magnitude, this further dialectic of quantity is relationally reflected in the internal and 
external determinations of magnitude contained within each unit. This dialectic is the source 
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for their determinate quantum and the external expression of relationship of similar 
magnitudes of quanta. 
"Extensive and intensive magnitude are thus one and the same determinateness of 
quantum; they are only distinguished by one having the amount within itself and the 
other having amount outside itselL""' 
The two sides not only reflect the discrete and the continuous elements of magnitude that 
share a homogeneous unity of a pure quantity; they also represent the intensive and 
extensive determinations inherent to quantum. The dialectic of quantity here involves a 
quantitative ratio, this marks the "intensive" and "extensive" aspects of determinate quantity 
or quantum, as opposed to the discrete and continuous elements of magnitude at the start of 
Hegel's quantitative analysis. 
The difference is that the latter apply to the category of quantity in general, and the former 
applies to the limit or determinateness of it; hence its expression as both a quantum and a 
direct ratio. The quantitative expression is now further specified and manifested as a 
determinate relation of two quantum, in the unity of the intensive and extensive aspects of 
quantum in its determinate relation. 
This relation of intensive and extensive magnitude, contained within each commodity, is 
first expressed in the relation between two commodities, as a quantitative dialectic of self 
and other. This provides the basis for the equal quantitative determinations of the magnitude 
of the exchange value relations between two qualitatively different forms of commodities. 
Hegel expresses this relation in a manner that clearly foreshadows Marx's account of the 
value relation. 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 240. 
G. W. F Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 220. "A quantum, therefore, in 
accordance with its quality, is posited in absolute continuity with its externality, with its otherness. " Ibid. 
P. 225. 
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"In Ratio, Quantum is external to and different from itself: this its externality is the 
relation of one Quantum to another, each of which has value only in this its relation 
to its Other; and this relation constitutes the determinateness of Quantum, which 
exists as such a unity. Here its determination is not indifferent, but qualitative: in this 
its externality it has returned upon itself, and in it is that which it is. "166 
What determines their similarity of quantitative expression is the magnitude of the human 
labour power that is embodied within their production. This abstract social form and relation 
provides the source for the common quality that unites them both. This embryonic 
expression of a quantitative quality is the result of the relation between the two quanta, in 
Marx's terms this is first manifested in the simple value relation between two commodities. 
The properties that a thing exhibits are, as Marx expresses it, not the result of an external 
relation but only manifest themselves in that relation. This distinction of discrete and 
continuous magnitude is further expressed and reflected in the intensive and extensive 
determination of the two sides of the relation that expresses the determinate exchange value 
of the commodity. With repulsion, as the active expression of the relative form of value, and 
attraction, as the passive equivalent form of value. 
Again the intensive and extensive magnitudes for Hegel are not two separate species of 
which one involves a character not possessed by the other; they share a common nature. 
Hegel expresses this very process, that of the qualitative form of a quantitative relation, in 
his description of the determinate expression of one quantum to another quantum. 
"Quantum in qualitative form is quantitative relation. Quantum merely passes 
beyond itself-, in relation it passes over into its otherness in such a way that the latter, 
which forms its determination, is posited simultaneouslY, and is another Quantum; 
166 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Volume one. (Johnston and Struthers translation. ) Allen and 
Unwin (1961. ) P. 256. Hegel also expresses this relation as a qualitative one that brings out the value in the 
relation in the Logic. "But the two quanta are not reckoned at their immediate value: their value is only in this 
relation. " Paragraph 105. O. U. P. (1975. ) P. 156. 
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we then find that it has returned to itself and that it is related to itself (namely in 
Otherness). "" 
In its externality, and through its quantitative relation to an other, it expresses its own 
quality; as a quality, which, as it is quantitatively expressed in and through the other, it has 
in common with the other. Marx also expresses this same qualitative nature that underpins 
the quantitative equality of the determinate magnitudes of two commodities in their 
common value expression. 
"What does this equation tell us? It tells us that in two different things - in lquarter 
of corn and x cwt. of iron, there exists in equal quantities something common to 
both. The two things must therefore be equal to a third, which in itself is neither the 
one nor the other. Each of them, so far as it is exchange value, must therefore be 
reducible to Us third. " 168 
Value, as abstract labour is this 'third' that initially brings out the common content of the 
social form of labour embodied within the two related commodities. This value relation 
finds its determinate expression in the exchange value of the commodity only when it is 
expressed through another commodity body. 
As we have seen, according to Hegel, the qualitative nature of quantity is that quantity is 
external to itseýf. The analysis of the simple value form and relation of Marx is derived from 
this Hegelian form of dialectical analysis. The essence of value, as abstract human labour 
power, is the source for the expression of the common content of both. 
"One forgets that magnitudes of different things are only quantitatively comparable 
after their reduction to the same unit. Only as expressions of the same unit do they 
have the same denominator, and are hence commensurable quantities. In the above 
167 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Volume one. (Johnston and Struthers translation. ) Allen and 
Unwin. (1961. ) P-199. 
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expression, the linen relates itself thus to the coat as to something like itself, or the 
coat is related to the linen as a thing of the same substance, having a like essence. It 
is set qualitatively equal to the linen. ""' 
Two forms of the expression of the same quality, both in equal but discrete quantities, are in 
a measured relation. What it is continuous with, and what it passes over into, is itself. The 
value quality is, and can in fact only be expressed, in and through that dialectical relation of 
self and other. The substantial social force of commodified human labour power and its 
alienated product can only be expressed in the reified form of abstract labour or value 
through the relation of one commodity to an other. 
The relation between two quanta, each of which expresses the same qualitative 
determination of quantum, is the result of Hegel's analysis of direct ratio. In this form of 
direct ratio, which could be the product of an accidental relation, the qualitative nature of the 
expression of quantity is not obviously revealed in this simple quantitative relation of two 
discrete quanta. Here is how Hegel expresses this embryonic qualitative relation of direct 
ratio. 
"In this, the qualitative moment does not yet emerge explicitly as such; its mode is 
still only that of quantum, namely, to be posited as having its determinateness in its 
very externality. "' 
Like Marx's account of the simple or accidental form of value, it appears to be the result of 
a merely contingent relation, as the expression of an indifferent and external quantitative 
relation. It is though, the initial but yet to become more fully emergent expression of, a 
qualitative and common form and unity. 
K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 45. 
169K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park. (1976. ) P. 52. 
170 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 315. 
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Let us see how Hegel further develops the dialectical dynamics and motor forces necessary 
for comprehending this evolution, from its simplest expression of a dialectic of self and 
other into an emergent quantitative and qualitative totality. At the same time, this will reveal 
its important influence in Marx's exposition of the process of the subsumption of labour and 
its product by the social substance of abstract labour and value, their common essence. 
3. The Dialectic of One to Many or the Expanded form of Value. 
The simple form of value, as it appears as an accidental and quantitative relation, does not 
fully manifest the value creating substance that underpins the exchange relation. It is, as 
Marx puts it, through the expression of equivalence between different sorts of conunodities, 
that "alone brings into relief the specific character of value creating labour. 
This it does by reducing the different varieties of concrete labour to their common social 
quality, namely abstract human labour power. This value creating substance of abstract 
labour is more fully manifested with its further development into the expanded form of 
value. 
As a commodity finds its relative value expression in a particular quantity of another 
commodity, it can then potentially express its relative value in a myriad of quantitatively 
determinate relations with other commodity forms. This quantitative aspect of value can 
thus be expressed not only in one other commodity, but also in a whole series of other 
commodities. 
The dialectic of self and other, expressed in the relative and equivalent poles of the simple 
form of value, now makes the transition and becomes a more evolved dialectic of one to 
many; as a series of expressions of the relative value form of a particular commodity. The 
equivalent form of the relative expression of value can now be expressed in potentially 
limitless acts of exchange relations, with the same relative form of value expressing itself in 
a series of equivalent forms. 
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Hegel also expresses this dialectical dynamic of the development of a single to a series of 
measure relations, inherent in Marx's account. It is this development into an expanded series 
of quantitative relations that more fully brings out the "distinctive character" of its 
qualitative nature for Hegel. 
"The qualitative exponent, as one immediate quantum, expresses only one relation. 
The distinctive character of the self-subsistent measure finds its true expression in 
the characteristic series of exponents which it, taken as unit, forms with other self- 
subsistent measures; for one of these measures when brought into relation with the 
rest of them and taken as unit forms another series. Now it is the interrelationship of 
the members of such a series that constitutes the qualitative aspect of the self- 
subsistent measure. " 
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The motor force for this evolution into a more expanded form of quantitative relation lies in 
the further development of the dialectic of the forces of repulsion and attraction. The 
relation of the one and the many that Hegel develops here, is a dialectic of mutual exclusion 
and mutual connection, with repulsion as the positing of each single unit, and attraction as 
the positing of their relation as a many. This process is exhibited through the further 
development of the dialectic of the discrete/intensive and continuous/extensive forms of 
magnitude. 
"Continuity is only coherent, compact unity as unity of the discrete; posited as such 
it is no longer only a moment but the whole of quantity, continuous magnitude .... 
This continuity in the discrete consists in the ones being the same as one another, or 
in having the same unity. Discrete magnitude is, therefore, the asunderness of the 
manifold one as self-same, not the manifold one in general but posited as the many 
of a unity. " 172 
171 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 352. 
172G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 199 and 200 respectively. 
212 
The discrete unit finds that the quantitative expression of its own quantitative nature is 
manifested externally through relating to an other discrete unit. The further quantitative 
relations, that the discrete unit enters into with a series of other discrete units, brings out the 
continuous unity of magnitude, and posits that continuity as the expression of a common 
unity or equality. 
This quantitative relation of equality belies a common qualitative expression that links the 
one to the many. This undifferentiated many is the homogeneous totality that is now 
determinately expressed as continuous magnitude, a continuous magnitude that is the 
totality of all the discrete magnitudes or single units. 
"In continuity, plurality is posited as it is in itself, each of the many is what the 
others are, each is equal to the other, and hence plurality is simple and 
undifferentiated equafity. 
" 173 
For Hegel, the negative relation of one to itself is the manifestation of the force of repulsion; 
it posits itself as itself, this it does, and can only do, in its relation to others. Each of the 
individual units repel themselves from themselves, repulsion is their common relation. This 
positing of the individual unit by repulsion, is then, also the positing of many individual 
units; the "mutual repulsion is the posited determinate being of the many ones. " 
To put it in Marx's terms, each single commodity seeks to express its relative exchange 
value. The relative expression of value presupposes another commodity that it can express 
its inherent value form in; the development into the expanded form of relative value 
presupposes many commodities that it can express its inherent value. in. This develops a 
whole series of measure relations contained in the developed expression of the relative 
exchange value for each commodity. 
113 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Volume one. (Johnston and Struthers translation. ) Allen and 
Unwin. (1961. ) P. 201. 
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The self-existing unit both excludes the others and at the same time relates itself to the many 
which it excludes; this they all do. Repulsion thus posits both the individual unit and also a 
multitude of individual units, each of which relates itself in the same fashion. By doing so, 
quantity shows itself to be both discrete, as a one, and continuous, as a many, at the same 
time they express their qualitatively common nature and sameness. This manifested in their 
commonality or "ideality" of attraction. 
"Both repulsion and attraction are in the first place distinct from one another, the 
former as the reality of the ones, the latter as their posited ideality. The relation of 
attraction to repulsion is such that the former has the latter for presupposition. 
Repulsion provides the material for attraction. If there were no ones there would be 
nothing to attract; the conception of a perpetual attraction, of an absorption of the 
ones, presupposes an equally perpetual production of them. ""' 
All commodities actively express themselves in the evolution of the simple to the expanded 
form of value relation, as it is their common social substance and driving force. The active 
nature of the commodity form is to divest itself of its privative state, its use value form, and 
realises its true social form of activity as exchange value; value is thus the "ideal" form of 
the concrete commodity. 
The evolution of abstract labour into the value form for Marx is thus driven by the ftirther 
development of the relative form of value where each commodity seeks to express its value 
in relation to all other commodities. The development of the value form for Marx takes then, 
its starting point from the active relative expression of the value form of the commodity. 
Attraction is, however, also inseparable from repulsion; in the same way that the value 
expression of a single commodity could take either the relative or the equivalent form, but 
not both at the same time, this being dependent on which side it takes in the value 
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expression. The commodity form presupposes other cornmodities that it can reciprocally 
alienate itself in and expresses its own value nature. This mutual repulsion or exclusion 
dialectically inverts and turns into its opposite, mutual attraction or relation. 
"In starting, however, with the repulsion of the determinately present ones and so, 
too, with attraction posited as externally connected with it, the two determinations, 
although inseparable are held apart as distinct; but it has been found that not merely 
is repulsion presupposed by attraction, but equally, too, there is a reverse relation of 
repulsion to attraction, and the former equally has its presupposition in the latter. ""' 
This self-presupposition of the relative and equivalent forms of value entails, as in the 
Hegelian account of the relation of repulsion and attraction, that the "two determinations 
each for itself, means that each contains the other as a moment within it. " The binding 
together of the two sides lies in their common nature, both being values. 
The relation for Hegel is such that in repulsion, "the self-negating of each in itself" turns 
into its opposite, attraction, as "the self-positing of each as its own other. " This dialectic of 
repulsion and attraction is therefore expressed, or shared between, the two polar forms of 
the value relation. 
Repulsion and attraction turns out to be a relation whereby each presupposes the other as its 
own negative determination and mediation; this negative self-relation is expressed in the 
mutual independence and mutual relation of the one with the many; in the relation of the 
individual to the common kind. One determines itself as a many and the many determine 
themselves as a one. 
"Their independence consists in this, that in this mediation they are posited as 
another determining for each other (Repulsion is the positing of the Many, 
174G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 173. 
171 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 175. 
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Attraction of the One; the latter is also the negation of the Many, the former, the 
negation of their ideality in the One), and in that Attraction is Attraction only by the 
mediation of Repulsion, and Repulsion Repulsion only by the mediation of 
Attraction. " "' 
This development of the dialectic of quantity and quality is driven by the universality of the 
forces of repulsion and attraction, manifested in both the discrete and continuous, and 
intensive and extensive expressions of the forms of magnitude, and more fully revealed in 
the expanded dialectical relation of the one and the many. What constitutes the "moment of 
continuity" in quantity in Hegel's analysis is the force of attraction. 
This homogeneous nature, of an indifferent plurality externally related to each other, is the 
qualitative element contained in the relative expression of quantity. What that continuity 
depends upon for Hegel "is the common element. " Attraction, for Hegel, is then the moment 
of not only continuity, but also ideality, as the positing of the many in an undifferentiated 
homogeneous unity, as an expression of one common substance. 
Hegel has the view that it is this externality of many ones, as discrete self-repulsing units, in 
which atomism "remains entangled. " They are then viewed as being merely externally and 
contingently related as self-acting individual units. For Hegel the opposite is the case, and 
this is shown in the qualitative relation that is inherent in the continuity of the one. 
"We saw, when examining the One that, in its own true nature, it passes over into its 
ideality, which is Attraction, and that thus continuity is not external but peculiar to 
it, and founded in its essence. ""' 
I'll, G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Volume one. (Johnston and Struthers translation. ) Allen and 
Unwin. (1961. ) P. 189. 
177 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Volume one. (Johnston and Struthers translation. ) Allen and 
Unwin. (1961. ) P. 202. See also Hegel's Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 100z. P. 148-149. 
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This is the motor force and expression of the dynamic movement of the contradiction 
contained in the specific determination of an individuated substance to the rest of its kind. 
This qualitative relation of the many to each other is the source for both its "forth-putting" 
and its "passing over into the other"; this is the determinate characteristic that, for Hegel, 
"brings out the totality" in the sphere of being. It is the dialectical activity of the forces of 
repulsion and attraction that both ties them together and brings out their common unity, 
quality, and nature. 
This dialectic of one and many that produces a common homogeneous unity is also the 
motor force behind the expression, in Marx's value theory, of the fuller development into 
the expanded form of the value relation that is manifested in the more evolved exchange 
relations between commodities. This further brings out the social nature of the force 
underlying the value creating substance, abstract human labour power. This reified form of 
labour power, measured in time, is the source for the determinate exchange value inherent 
within the commodity. 
"Our analysis has shown, that the form or expression of the value of a commodity 
originates in the nature of value, and not that value and its magnitude originate in the 
mode of their expression as exchange-value. ""I 
That common pole of attraction in Hegel's analysis of quantity is expressed as the social 
form of value in Marx. It is also the development of the dialectic from its initially apparent 
quantitative to expanded qualitative expression of the common element necessary for an 
understanding of the development of Marx's concept of abstract labour; as the one 
homogeneous mass of human labour-power in the reified form that the social substance of 
value takes. 
This development of the dialectic from the simple or accidental form of self and other, to the 
expanded form of self and many others, more fully brings out that abstract labour is the 
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social substance that is the essence of the value form and expression. This it does as it is 
now cohered in a more expanded social relation and form that unites the one with the many, 
"with the whole world of commodities. " 
"It is thus, that for the first thne, this value shows itself in its true light as a 
congelation of undifferentiated human labour. For the labour that creates it, now 
stands expressly revealed, as labour that ranks equally with every other sort of 
human labour, no matter what its form. ""' 
This expanded form shows that the relative form of the expression of value remains 
unaltered in magnitude, regardless of which other commodity form its value is expressed in. 
Furthermore, it also confirms that value is no accidental expression manifested in the 
exchange relations of commodities, but it is, on the contrary, value that manifests itself in 
the exchange relation between different and contingently related commodities. The inverse 
of the phenomenal appearance is revealed in the essence that underlies it. 
"The accidental relation between two individual commodity-owners disappears. It 
becomes plain, that it is not the exchange of commodities which regulates the 
magnitude of their value; but, on the contrary, that it is the magnitude of their value 
which controls their exchange proportions. "" 
The products of human labour have always had the potentiality of being reciprocally 
alienated, of being mutually exchanged. This potentiality only and necessarily actualises 
itself through the homogeneous quality and substance of abstract human labour; this social 
form of the universalisation and equalisation of all concrete forms of labour and its product 
is expressed in all the evolving determinate forms that abstract labour as value takes. 
178 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 66. 
179 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 68. 
"I K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 69. 
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4. Bad Inrinite. 
How does this analysis of the expanded form of value in Marx tie in with Hegel's concept of 
a "bad infinite"? The core of the problem here for Marx is that the substance of value is not 
yet a totality, it is "deficient in unity. " What prevents the full development to the money 
form in this expanded series of measure relations is that abstract labour, as the universal 
substance, has yet to individuate itself in a single form. This single universal form has not 
yet congealed itself through these dialectical relations; this now results in a myriad of 
particular relative and equivalent forms of value. 
"In the first place, the relative expression of value is incomplete because the series 
representing it is interminable. The chain of which each equation of value is a link, is 
liable at any moment to be lengthened by each new kind of commodity that comes 
into existence and furnishes the material for a fresh expression of value. In the 
second place, it is a many-coloured mosaic of disparate and independent expressions 
of value. And lastly, if, as must be the case, the relative value of each commodity in 
turn, becomes expressed in this expanded form, we get for each of them a relative 
value-form, different in every case, and consisting of an interminable series of 
expressions of value. ""' 
It is a "bad infinite" for Marx because every commodity can not only express its value in an 
ever-expanding series of measure relations, but, every other relative form of value can, at 
the same time, play this role of universal equivalent for all other commodities in their 
developed expression of value. The other related problem with this is that every new form of 
commodity also has the potential to do so. This defect of the simple and expanded forms is 
also encapsulated in Hegel's analysis of measure as a series of measure relations. 
"But further, those measures which together with the two, or rather indefinitely 
many self-subsistent measures of the first series - measures which are compared 
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only with each other - yield a series of exponents of the ratios between the members 
of that series, are similarly in themselves self-subsistent measures, each being a 
specific something with its own intrinsic measure ratio. " 182 
The simple and expanded forms of the value expression cannot, in themselves, cohere this 
expanding totality of the products of labour, into a fully developed universality of a value 
form. Marx expresses the "bad infinite" of the expanded form of value and its impact on the 
equivalent form in the following fashion: 
"The defects of the expanded relative value-form are reflected in the corresponding 
equivalent form. Since the bodily form of each single commodity is one particular 
equivalent form amongst numberless others, we have, on the whole, nothing but 
fragmentary equivalent forms, each excluding the others. In the same way, also, the 
special, concrete, useful kind of labour embodied in each particular equivalent, is 
presented only as a particular kind of labour, and therefore not as an exhaustive 
representative of human labour generally. The latter, indeed, gains adequate 
manifestation in the totality of its manifold, particular, concrete forms. But, in that 
case, its expression in an infinite series is ever incomplete and deficient in unity. " 183 
The list of potential universal equivalents, like the commodity form itself, is therefore 
continually growing and ever-expanding. The continuous and discrete forms of magnitude, 
contained in the expanded form of value, though a more developed totality and generality, a 
totality that is now a more adequate, but not yet a fully formed expression of one 
homogeneous mass of human labour power. This is expressed in Marx as the defects that are 
inherent within the simple and expanded forms of value. 
K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 69. 
G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 353. Hegel further expresses this 
deficiency in unity in the following form. "The exponents of these ratios are not exclusive determinations of 
measure; their progress is continuous but it contains an immanent specifying law which is distinct from the 
formally progressive ratios in which the amounts are combined and makes the former progress 
incommensurable with the latter. " (Ibid. ) P. 366. 
181 K. Marx. Capital Volume one. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 69-70. 
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"The two earlier forms either express the value of each commodity in terms of a 
single commodity of a different kind, or in a series of many such commodities. In 
both cases, it is, so to say, the special business of each single commodity to find an 
expression for its value, and this it does without the help of the others. "'" 
Moreover, as each commodity has to seek out its own expression of value, the totality, and 
hence abstract human labour power in the universal form of value, forever remains, in these 
forms, "incomplete and deficient in unity. " What is needed to fully actualise this potentiality 
is a generalised social form, based on the commodification and universalisation of labour 
power, as the single source of the exchangeability of all concrete products of labour through 
the market. 
It becomes this totality only when abstract labour actively individuates itself, by all other 
commodities excluding a single commodity form of value. How then does this dialectic 
change its qualitative and quantitative nature and become a unifying totality? 
5. The Dialectic of Many to One or the Money Form. 
"The positing of the totality requires the double transition, not only of the one 
determinateness into its other, but equally the transition of this other, its return, into 
the first. The first transition yields the identity of both, but at first only in itseýf or in 
principle; quality is contained in quantity, but this is still a one-sided 
determinateness. That the converse is equally true, namely, that quantity is contained 
in quality and is equally only a sublated determinateness, this results from the 
second transition - the return into the first determinateness. This observation on the 
I" K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 71. 
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necessity of the double transition is of great importance throughout the whole 
compass of scientific method. ""' 
The real infinite, according to Hegel, "consists in being at home with itself in its other, or, if 
enunciated as a process, in coming to itself in its other. " This consists, for Hegel, in a 
passing over into the other, but a passing over that is, in the passage, self-related, or to put it 
negatively "what is altered is the other. " This dialectic is completed through the totality of 
the relations now generated by the forces of repulsion and attraction. 
The repulsion of the many ones now reciprocally transforms itself into its opposite, what 
Hegel calls the one one of attraction. "This positing of themselves by the many ones into a 
single one is attraction. " Attraction is, for Hegel, the force whereby the dialectic is realised 
through the common repulsion that leads to the many ones positing a single one, that single 
one is "ideality realised. " Here, this process of the dialectic of repulsion and attraction is 
realised when the repulsion of the many is, by their own activity, inverted into its opposite; 
here repulsion "passes over into attraction, the many ones into one one. " 
"It is only attraction itself that is a positing of a one distinct from other ones; these 
are only immediate ones which should maintain themselves through repulsion; but 
through their posited negation arises the one one of attraction, which is consequently 
determined as mediated, the one posited as one. The first ones, as immediate, do not 
in their ideality return into themselves but have this ideality in another one. 
The one one, however, is the realised ideality, posited in the one; it is attraction 
through the mediation of repulsion, and it contains this mediation in itself as its 
detemination. ""' 
185 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 323. Hegel then continues in the 
following vein. "Quantum is now no longer an indifferent or external determination but as such is sublated 
and is quality, and is that by virtue of which something is what it is; this is the truth of quantum, to be 
Measure. " (Ibid. P. 323-324. ). 
186 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 174. Hegel also expresses this 
process in the following form. "But in the relative repulsion and attraction, which presupposes immediate, 
determinately existent ones, it is posited that each is in its own self this negation of itself and is thus also the 
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This reciprocal exclusion of repulsion, through its own dialectical negation, is turned into its 
opposite, attraction, where the reciprocal exclusion of the many is shown to be based on a 
necessary connection. That connection, "the nexus binding the many with one another is by 
no means a mere accident: as we have already remarked, the nexus is founded on their very 
nature. "1" 
Hegel expresses the further development of this qualitative aspect, inherent within the 
further development and expansion of quantity, as a form of "elective affinity. " This process 
leads to the development of an "exclusive measure. " This marks a change from the self- 
subsistent series of measure relations that characterises the bad infinite of the expanded form 
of value in Marx. This process, for Hegel, the transition of quantity into quality and vice 
versa, is represented through the development of a nodal line of measure relations. One that 
itself posits a measure relation that is qualitatively distinct from the preceding series of 
measure relations - 
"Here we have a measure relation, a self-subsistent reality which is qualitatively 
distinguished from others. Such a being for self, because it is at the same time 
essentially a relation of quanta, is open to externality and to quantitative alteration; it 
has a range within which it remains indifferent to this alteration and does not change 
its quality. But there enters a point in this quantitative alteration at which the quality 
is changed and the quantum shows itself as specifying, so that the altered 
quantitative relation is converted into measure, and thus into a new quality, a new 
something. The relation which has taken place of the first is determined by this, 
partly according to the qualitative identity of the moments which are in affinity, and 
partly according to the quantitative continuity. ""' 
continuity of itself in its other. The repulsion of the determinately existent ones is the self-preservation of the 
one through the mutual repulsion of the others. " G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) 
P. 177. 
181 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 98z. P. 144. 
"I G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 367. 
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This process exemplifies Hegel's dialectic of quality to quantity and the result of this 
dialectic being that of the transition to the category of measure and essence. Both contrary 
motions, of quality into quantity and quantity into quality, are in operation at the same time. 
The dialectical evolution of this categorial development into a single universal form; a form, 
whose result is itself measure, is itself described by Hegel as a "qualitative quantity. " 
"This transition of the qualitative and the quantitative into each other proceeds on 
the basis of their unity, and the meaning of this process is only to show or to posit 
the determinate being of such a substrate underlying the process, a substrate which is 
their unity .... In this unity of the substrate with 
itself the measure determination is 
sublated and its quality is an external state determined by the quantum. This process 
is equally the progressive determination of measure in its realisation and also the 
reduction of measure to the status of a moment. " 189 
In Marx's value theory that dialectic of one to many, as the expanded value expression of 
each single commodity, becomes an inverted dialectic of many to one, where all other 
commodities now exclude a single commodity as the measure of the totality of the 
quantitative value relations contained in the world of commodities. That commodity is now 
the universal form of the commodity itself, the money form. That exclusive and excluded 
one is the general individuation of abstract labour, as the "substrate underlying the process" 
into the unity and totality of the value form in a single entity. 
This it has achieved through the quantitative and qualitative changes inherent in the nodal 
line of measure relations in their dialectically evolving simple and expanded forms of value. 
What has revealed itself in Marx's application of this dialectic of Ilegel's is the objective 
manifested form of the substance of value, or, alternatively expressed, value as the subject 
of the activity has now assumed an independent and common universal form. 
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"The general form of value C, results from the joint action of the whole world of 
commodities, and from that alone. A commodity can acquire a general expression of 
its value only by all other commodities, simultaneously with it, expressing their 
value in the same equivalent; and every new commodity must follow suit. It thus 
becomes evident that, since the existence of commodities as values is purely social, 
this social existence can be expressed by the totality of their social relations alone, 
and consequently that the form of their value must be a socially recognised form. "" 
The evolution and transition of these two forms, the simple and expanded into the general 
form, marks a dialectical shift and transition from the development of a quantitative 
homogeneous totality into the development of a new quality; or, to be more precise, they 
mark the transition into the qualitative quantity that is the category of measure for Hegel. 
The first function of money, as the universal form of value for Marx, is the role of money as 
measure. Hegel expresses this process in the following form; it "is the very essence of being 
to characterise itself, and its complete characterisation is reached in measure. " Moreover, for 
Hegel, measure "is implicitly essence; and its process consists in realising what it is 
implicitly. " 
This process in Marx has been shown to be the product and result of an underlying and 
substantial essence, abstract human labour power. What has now fully expressed itself is, 
not only the substance of value, but also the specific and determinate form that this 
individuated substance of value takes, the money form. 
This process, as the evolving contradiction that is contained in a potential totality, is itself 
resolved, as a totality, by separating the value quality of the commodity form from itself and 
individuating its universality of exchange in a single and general form, the money form. 
189 G. W. F. Hegel. Science of Logic. Humanities Press. (1993. ) P. 373 and 374 respectively. 
11 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 71. 
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"In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not 
only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete 
form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to 
reveal itself expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual 
labour to their common character of being human labour generally, of being the 
expenditure of human labour power. ""' 
Value, in terms of its evolution from direct barter, has now become the money form. This is 
achieved through objectively separating the use values of the commodities from their 
inherent exchange value, and positing value in an independent form that now dialectically 
interpenetrates with the whole world of commodities. This separating off, of the commodity 
form of value from a single universal equivalent form of value, a process that does not 
manifest itself in substantial nature, has its own particular social expression of reification for 
Marx. 
"It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all other actual animals, 
which form when grouped together the various kinds, species, subspecies, families, 
etc. of the animal kingdom, there existed also in addition the animal, the individual 
incarnation of the entire animal kingdom. Such a particular, which contains within 
itself all really present species of the same entity, is a universal (like animal, god, 
etc. ). 192 
In exchange, the commodity and money forms now become independent moments or 
determinations of the exchange process itself. What we now have is the posited 
contradiction between the commodity and the money form as the twofold phenomenal forms 
191 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 72. 
192 K. Marx. Value Studies by Marx. New Park. (1976. ) P. 27. This hiving off of a particular 
commodity to represent all forms of appearance of value as "the universal materialisation of abstract human 
labour" entails that the "specific labour materialised in it now thereby counts as universal form of realisation 
of human labour, as universal labour. " (Ibid. ). 
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of the expression of value itself. Measure, as Hegel expresses it, "is the reduction of 
measure to the status of a moment. " 
Marx achieves this in the analysis of value by the logical and conceptual explication of the 
process of the separation and doubling of the forms of value from the primary commodity 
form and its evolution into the money form. In terms of Hegel's Logic we have now moved 
on to the sphere of essence where the contradiction, implicit in the sphere of being, is now 
made explicit. This dialectical process is also reflected, in Marx's account, in the evolution 
of value into the generalised contradiction between the commodity and money forms. 
"The antagonism between the relative form of value and the equivalent form, the two 
poles of the value form, is developed concurrently with that form itself. " 193 
Value, as a process, actualises itself by separating itself, by duplicating or doubling its form. 
This as we have seen, it does through the evolution of the dynamic dialectic of the twofold 
character of the labour-power embodied within the twofold form of the commodity. It 
resolves this contradiction by generalising it, by externalising its twofold form in the 
relation of the commodity and its own universal form of expression, the money form. The 
germ of the money form has been shown to be contained in the commodity form in Marx's 
dialectic. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN. 
DIALECTICAL MOTION AND PROCESS. 
Doubling of Form. 
"What constitutes dialectical movement is the co-existence of two contradictory 
sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new category. ""' 
The central source and principle of motion contained in the general form of working of the 
dialectic has proven to be that of polar contradiction. This twofold character of polarity has 
also been manifested in Hegel's analysis of force and law, and reflected in Marx's analysis 
of value. This dialectical doubling of form, manifested in an external relation, is the result of 
the twofold diremption of the force characteristic of the substantial form activity. 
The necessity for grasping the Hegelian principles inherent to this nomological unfolding 
has consequentially proven to be pivotal for the comprehension of the substantial and 
dialectical activity of the subject in process. The principle of change and alteration 
underlying the interpenetration of the polar parameters of the process were analysed as the 
product of not only their specific form of inner difference, but also as the expression of their 
universal nexus - 
This universal nexus is also characteristically expressed as the common unity or genus that 
mediates the specific difference exhibited in the reciprocity of the contrary polar extremes of 
that common identity. This is the core dynamic of Hegel's essentialist account of the laws of 
193 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 73. 
11 K. Marx. Poverty of Philosophy. Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 6. Lawrence and 
Wishart. (1976. ) P. 168. 
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motion, of the principle of change and alteration contained in the universal form activity of a 
substantial subject expressed through its dialectical doubling of form. 
This dialectical kernel of the source of motion and movement expresses itself at the outset 
of the analysis of the process, from the simplest forms of determination to the more complex 
forms of relations that expresses its systematic nature and universal interconnections. This 
conceptual evolution is, as we shall further investigate, also reflected in Marx's application 
of the dialectic to political economy. 
From the dialectical nature of the twofold character of the labour power embodied in the 
commodity all the subsequent contradictions of capital will ensue. Marx's analysis thereby 
starts from this simple and universal difference expressed in the commodity form of use and 
exchange value, of concrete and abstract labour, and proceeds to analyse the substance and 
form of the commodity value in order to develop the movement of this dialectic contained 
within the expression of human labour power. 
This relation between the dialectical law of the interpenetration of opposites, expressed in 
this notion of a doubling of form, is further exemplified and dialectically reflected in Marx's 
view of how value, as subject, develops a modus vivendi for resolving the inner 
contradiction and connection pertaining to its nature. This it does by objectifying the 
contrary opposition inherent within the commodity form in and through an external relation. 
"The exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive 
conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does 
not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in 
which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real 
contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as 
constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away 
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from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to 
go on, at the same time reconciles it. "" 
The conflict and fusion inherent within the polar reciprocity is resolved in the dialectical 
movement of the contradiction, through the unity and difference contained in the 
interpenetration of opposites. This resolution is now expressed in a new and more developed 
category, in this case the evolution of the simple form of circulation that now posits the 
money form of value in its dialectical relation with the commodity. 
The dialectical doubling of form is now on a more evolved and higher level, with the 
internal contradiction in the commodity between use and exchange value now objectively 
expressed in the relation between the commodity form and its universal equivalent, the 
money form. The contradictions within the exchange process, inherent in the barter form, 
are resolved by generalising them. 
"The process then differentiates them into commodities and money, and thus 
produces an external opposition corresponding to the internal opposition inherent in 
them, as being at once use values and values. Commodities as use values now stand 
opposed to money as exchange value. On the other hand, both opposing sides are 
commodities, unities of use value and value. But this unity of difference manifests 
itself at two opposite poles, and at each pole in an opposite way. Being poles they 
are as necessarily opposite as they are connected. "196 
Here Marx is clearly expressing the view that a polar contradiction, a "unity of difference" 
is both necessarily opposite, and at the same time, necessarily connected. Ifere he is also 
expressing the Hegelian position that the antithesis is contained within the antithesis, in this 
specific case the twofold character of the labour, and the twofold character that the form of 
"I K. Marx. Capital. Volume I. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 106. 
'K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974 -) P. 106-107. 
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that labour takes within the commodity, is now dirempted and expressed in an objective and 
generalised relation. 
Value itself, and this is of some importance, mediates between the extremes of the 
commodity and money forms. It sunders itself in two, to paraphrase Hegel, in order to 
express itself as value, in order for value as the substantial subject of the process to become 
self-identical. This process is reflected in the following comments of Marx. 
"A law of capital in general that, in order to realise itself, it must posit itself doubly, 
and must realise itself in this double form, .... While the general is therefore on the 
one hand only a mental [gedachte] mark of distinction [differentia specifica], it is at 
the same time a particular real form alongside the form of the particular and 
individual. ""' 
In Hegel's account of force and law, the nomological expression of the dialectic contained 
within the twofold expression of force, entails that the independence of the two forces is the 
result of the "self-diremption" or "self-sundering" of the force itself. Force splits itself into 
an antithesis in order to express itself as a unity, as being self-identical and self-moving in 
its activity of change and alteration. Force manifests and expresses itself externally in a 
double and opposing form. However, this, as Hegel himself recognises, does seem to pose a 
potential problem and barrier to be overcome. 
"There are at the same time two forces present; the Notion of both is no doubt the 
same, but it has gone forth from a unity to a duality. Instead of the antithesis 
remaining entirely and essentially only a moment, it seems, by its self-diremption 
into two wholly independent forces to have withdrawn from the controlling unity. " 198 
11 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P-449-450. 
198 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 84. 
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This external diremption into two independent forces opens the possibility, for the 
materialist critique, of an absolute or irreconcilable antagonism between the inner difference 
and contradiction rather than its idealist conceptual reconciliation. It is not, for the 
materialist, a matter of idealistically balancing dialectical concepts, but of expressing the 
development and evolution of the real contradictions that are expressed within the real 
relations - 
"' 
The fact that value, in order to resolve the contradictions inherent within barter, has to be 
expressed objectively in the exchange relation in two independent and antithetical forms, the 
commodity and money form, lays open the possibility of crisis. Value, then, manifests itself 
in its own material forms of Hegelian self-sundering. 
This dialectical doubling of form into the commodity and money forms not only resolves 
the contradictions within barter; it raises those contradictions onto a higher objective form, 
in the circulation relations between the twofold forms. The process of circulation itself now 
develops its own modus vivendi, its own forms of dialectical separation and fusion, at the 
same time it also poses their potential non-interpenetration and resultant crisis in its laws of 
motion, as a material expression of the law of the interpenetration of opposites. 
Here, it not only "seems, by its self-diremption into two wholly independent forces to have 
withdrawn from the controlling unity", value both can, and does, lose the struggle for its 
"controlling unity". This dialectical diremption and doubling of value into the commodity 
and money forms manifests itself, in opposition to its ideal conceptual positing and 
resolving of the contradiction, into what Marx expresses as an "absolute contradiction". 2W 
'"The consequences for this twofold objective form of polarity will have significant repercussions for 
not only a materialist critique of absolute idealism, but also the materialist account of an evolutionary form of 
dialectic itself. This requires that both poles are not in a fixed relation where the opposition between them is 
not only reciprocal and self-reflexive, the polarity itself is also subject to a movement and development in the 
relationship between the poles. This, will, in turn, alter the nature of the subject that expresses itself in this 
twofold polar form. 
100 "In a crisis, the antithesis between commodities and their value form, money, becomes heightened 
into an absolute contradiction. " K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. P. 138. Abstract human labour power or value, as 
a manifestation of a social force, not only splits into an antithesis in order to expresses itself; by doing so it 
232 
2. The Twofold Forms of Circulation. 
But that it does exist in these opposite ways simply means that the two moments are 
at the same time themselves independent. It is therefore this movement of the two 
moments in which they perpetually give themselves independence and then 
supersede themselves again which we are now to consider. "20' 
The exchange process of simple circulation between commodity and money posits that 
purchase and sale are the positive and negative poles of the exchange relation. in simple 
commodity circulation there are two antithetical and opposing motions that interpenetrate 
and pass into their opposites. Buyer and seller act out the contrary forms of the exchange 
relation of the two mutually exclusive and mutually connected forms of value. 
The commodity and money forms interpenetrate and pass into their polar opposite forms. 
They each negate themselves in the other, but by doing so they also actively express value 
and the value relation in that process. The conversion of a commodity into money, is the 
simultaneous conversion of money into a commodity. M-C, a purchase, is, at the same time, 
C-M, a sale. From the pole of the commodity owner it is a sale, from the pole of the money 
owner it is a purchase. As Marx expresses it, "the apparently single process is in reality a 
double one. " 
What in an exchange relation is a single act by two poles of the relation, become two 
contrary acts when expressed in the activity of a single subject. The starting point of 
commodity is negated in money, only to return to itself as the commodity form. What we 
have in the motion of simple circulation is the social relation between three "dramatis 
personae", one of whom sells in the first transaction and buys in the second transaction. 
also has to, at least in some form, necessarily maintain itself in a dialectical relation to its opposing pole, 
concrete labour. This substantive relation being due to the presupposition, inherent in the value relation, of 
concrete labour as the predicated and necessary condition of its own social nature and form of existence. 
201 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 82. 
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This gives us a circular movement that contains four extremes. The process of C-M-C can 
then be represented as a circular motion that is completed through two contrary rectilinear 
- motions, C-M and M-C. 
In the process of circulation there are however not just one form of circulation, that of the 
simple commodity form; this form will itself further evolve and give rise to its own opposite 
form of circulation, namely M-C-M. With the separation of value into the commodity and 
money forms, capital can now first manifest itself in the process of circulation. As itself the 
expression of two forms of rectilinear motion, only this time, M-C and C-M. 
What we now have is the doubling of the forms of circulatory motion contained in the 
further development of the value relation. Both forms are themselves the result of two 
contrary motions: C-M and M-C and its direct opposite: M-C and C-M. What the two forms 
of circulation have in common is that both circuits are resolvable into the antithetical poles 
of sale and purchase, and each circuit is the unity of the same two antithetical phases. 
What distinguishes and fundamentally differentiates the circuit C-M-C from M-C-M is the 
inverted order of succession of the two phases of purchase and sale. Simple commodity 
circulation begins with a sale and ends with a purchase; in the circulation of capital we still 
have four extremes and three dramatis personae, but the one subject this time buys in order 
to sell. The circulation of capital therefore begins with a purchase and ends with a sale. 
We have then, two contrary forms of circulation with opposite starting points and results. 
Simple circulation begins and ends with a commodity via the intervention or mediation of 
money, the money changes its place twice. The circulation of money as capital begins and 
ends with money mediated through the double change of place of the commodity form. In 
sum, we have two contrary forms of motion in relation to each form of circulation, and we 
also have two contrary forms of circulation as a whole, expressed in the substantive opposite 
motions and ends that characterise them. 
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Simple commodity circulation, selling in order to buy, has consumption as its aim; the 
commodity falls out of circulation and its use value consumed. The money is continually 
transferred into the hands of another personage. 202 The circulation of money as capital, 
buying in order to realise a profit, has the expansion of itself, more exchange value, as its 
aim and characteristic activity. The money, moreover, returns to its initial subject and agent. 
In simple circulation, money acts as measure and medium of circulation, the aim is 
consumption, in the circulation of money as capital, value, in this its highest form is the 
subject of the process; it is the point of departure and return of the whole activity. 
"The circulation of money as capital is, on the contrary, an end in itself, for the 
expansion of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The 
circulation of capital therefore has no limits. "'O' 
What fundamentally separates the circuit C-M-C from M-C-M is that in the latter, it is a 
complete activity of a single subject. Marx expresses this self-returning activity inherent in 
the law of the negation of the negation, in the form of a reflux back to the point of departure; 
in this case money as capital is the active subject of the process. This it does through the 
self-mediation and subsumption of itself, by assuming a dual mode of expression, as the 
unity of the extremes of its determinate and specific twofold content and form. 
"In simple circulation, C-M-C, the value of the commodities attained at the most a 
form independent of their use values, i. e., the form of money; but that same value 
now in the circulation M-C-M, or the circulation of capital, suddenly presents itself 
as an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own, passing through a 
202 This would be a further example of Hegel's "bad infinite" applied to political economy; as the 
money form continually transforms itself into new hands, it is continually moving away from its starting point, 
as Marx expresses it. Money as capital, however, expresses a unity that money, as medium of circulation does 
not, it refluxes back to its starting point, as the unity of activity of a single subject. 
201 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) PASO. 
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life process of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms which it 
assumes and casts off in turn. Nay, more: instead of simply representing the relations 
of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into private relations with itself. It 
differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus value. ""4 
The circulation process of capital is actively expressed in the movement to the negation of 
its form, M-C, and in turn, the negation of that negation, C-M, where it is the realised 
affirmation of itself expressed in the return to its own point of departure. In this process the 
magnitude of M "expands spontaneously. " The active self-movement of adding surplus 
value from original capital is its own fundamental nature that is manifested as an active and 
"automatic expansion. " 
However, circulation in and of itself has no principle of self-renewal; it has to be constantly 
mediated by the extremes of commodity and money, but it does not posit those extremes. 
What circulation really presupposes, as its mediation, is commodity production that creates 
exchange values to be realised in circulation. As circulation does not have its own principle 
of self-renewal, it has to rely on its dialectical opposite and mediation, namely production, 
to carry this principle within it. 
Circulation not only presupposes production; it necessarily ensues from this that it, as Marx 
notes, "returns into it as into its ground. " The drive is for capital to create its own mode of 
production and thus replicate and self-expand in accordance with its evolved and mature 
form of activity; the activity that can adequately express its own substantial social nature, 
the creation of value and surplus value. 
"This is their point of departure, and through its own motion it goes back into 
exchange-value-creating production as its result. We have therefore reached the 
point of departure again, production which posits, creates exchange values; but this 
time, production which presupposes circulation as a developed moment and which 
204 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 152-153. 
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appears as a constant process, which posits circulation and constantlY returns from it 
into itself in order to posit it anew. "' 
3. Negation of Negation as Being-for-self. 
Capital, as a system of self-expanding value, requires that it becomes a systematic unity of 
both production and circulation, with value accumulation as its own specific form of 
activity. Value, as active capital, is now the substance and ground of the activity that itself 
takes the twofold form of production and circulation. By doing so it resolves the 
contradiction within its nature, by subsuming production as a determinate moment of its 
own form activity and realising itself in its own presupposition, circulation. 
Resolved contradiction, according to Hegel, is ground as essence, as the unity of positive 
and negative. The unity of this polarity for Hegel, as we saw earlier, is based on a universal 
nexus; the "middle term" that stands over and against the "independent extremes", and is a 
"perpetual diremption" of itself into just these extremes. The movement of self-supersession 
contained and expressed in the law of the negation of the negation is encapsulated then for 
Hegel in this process of its systematic self-sundering and becoming self-identical. 
"That the self-identical divides itself into two means, therefore, just as well that it 
supersedes itself as already divided, supersedes itself as an otherness .. The different 
moments of setf-sundering and of becoming setf-identical are therefore likewise only 
this movement of setf-supersession. "' 
The substantial subject in its nomological activity exemplifies this Hegelian view of 
contradictory change as a "permanence of impermanence" as it takes, and in turn casts off, 
its twofold form in order to express its true substantial nature. Substance, as essence is the 
ground of all determinate being; this it is because substance has now shown itself to be both 
205 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 255. 
206 G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 100-101. 
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self-causing and self-acting. This essential activity can alternatively be expressed as the 
process whereby substance becomes subject. 
This process and movement of the dialectical subject "necessarily develops" from its 
mediating position to where the category or subject mediates itself through the polar 
extremes. Marx expresses this very dialectical process of the coming to be of value as 
capital; a process that is expressed here in an unambiguous and largely unrefined Hegelian 
manner. 
"It is important to note that wealth as such, i. e. bourgeois wealth, is always 
expressed to the highest power as exchange value, where it is posited as mediator, as 
the mediator of the extremes of exchange value and use value themselves. This 
intermediary situation [Mitte] always appears as the economic relation in its 
completeness, because it comprises the opposed poles, and ultimately always 
appears as a one-sidedly higher power vis a vis the extremes themselves; because the 
movement, or the relation, which originally appears as mediatory between the 
extremes necessarily develops dialectically to where it appears as mediation with 
itself, as the subject [Subjekt] for whom the extremes are merely its moments, whose 
autonomous presupposition it suspends in order to posit itself, through their 
suspension, as that which alone is autonomous. "207 
Substance, according to Hegel, as the "absolute form-activity and the power of necessity" is 
"the wealth of all content. " In order to be so, it has to have a systematic form of activity that 
returns to itself, to the subject as both the point of departure and result; that is, it has to be 
self-replicating and self-moving in the essential and necessary activity that makes it that 
specific subject. 
' K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 331-332. We saw Hegel's formulation of this same 
process earlier on in the thesis, when we were investigating his account of force and law and its importance 
for the understanding of Marx's concept of value. As Hegel expressed it, the "unity appears as the middle term 
over against the independent extremes, is a perpetual diremption of itself into just those extremes which exist 
only through this process. " G. W. F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit O. U. P. (1977. ) P. 82-83. 
238 
This it becomes when the subject subsumes both the polar forms of the relation and 
manifests its own self-activity through these polar forms. Central to this process of self- 
movement is how the Hegelian law of the interpenetration of opposites leads to the law of 
the negation of the negation. 
"In Reciprocity, although causality is not yet invested with its true characteristic, the 
rectilinear movement out from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, is bent 
d flnitum of causes and effects is, round and back into itself, and thus the progress a in 
as a progress, really and truly suspended. This bend, which transforms the infinite 
progression into a self-contained relationship. "208 
This dialectical interpenetration of opposites, here expressed by Hegel as the reciprocal 
dialectic of two rectilinear movements of cause to effect and effect to cause, are the sources 
of the active twofold form activity and force behind the interpenetration of opposites. That 
reciprocal causation, when the interpenetration of opposites turns into the substantial form 
activity of a self-returning subject, both subsumes and transforms the reciprocal polarity into 
a self-contained activity, into a circular form of motion. 
This "bend" which transforms the infinite progress of the rectilinear movements of cause 
and effect into a self contained relationship is the "bend" of circular motion; but circular 
motion that refluxes back to its point of departure. Here the movement from cause to effect 
and effect to cause is both suspended and united in the reciprocal nature of the "self- 
contained" relation. 
As the self-activity of a substantial subject containing a nornological activity with a 
principle of 
. 
change and alteration, whose laws of motion and determinate forms of 
interaction encapsulate the necessary form activity and nature of the self-replicating and 
self-expanding subject. This was achieved by capital in circulation returning to production 
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and positing the unity of capital as these twofold contrary forms and determinations of 
production and circulation. Here circulation does "bend" back into itself with capital 
becoming the subject of the whole process. 
Capital has now become the result of these dialectical processes of the interpenetration of 
opposites that now, instead of having their own specific forms of rectilinear movement, now 
becomes the circulatory movement of a subject that is the unity of both forins of polar 
interpenetration. The progress ad infinitum of the rectilinear motions is suspended into the 
circular motion of systematic replication and self-movement. Like the activity of capital, it 
returns into it as into its ground. 
Hegel further expresses this dialectic of causality and reciprocity, inherent in the substantial 
dialectical activity of a subject in process, in the following form. As the process of the 
substantial form activity self-sundering and becoming self-identical through a circular 
movement that returns to itself. As the unity of production and circulation in Marx's account 
of capital, or as the unity of causality and reciprocity as Hegel expresses this movement of 
the subject of the process. 
"The circulation of substance through causality and reciprocity therefore only 
expressly makes out or states that self-subsistence is the infinite negative self- 
relation -a relation negative in general, for in it the act of distinguishing and 
intermediating becomes a primariness of actual things independent one against the 
other - and infinite se? f-relation, because their independence only lies in their 
identity .... An 
independence which, though self-repulsive into distinct independent 
elements, yet in that repulsion is self-identical, and in the movement of reciprocity 
still at home and conversant only with itself. "" 
208 G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 154. P. 217. 
2' G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 157 and 158 respectively. P. 219-220. 
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It is through this process that the interpenetration of opposites becomes transformed into the 
law of the negation of the negation, as the nomological activity of the subject of the whole 
process. The twofold forms of motion, from production to circulation and from circulation 
back to production, become a unitary circular motion; a form of motion that unites the same 
subject as point of departure and terminus of the whole activity. 
"In the circulation of capital, the point of departure is posited as the terminal point 
and the terminal point as the point of departure. The capitalist himself is the point of 
departure and of return. He exchanges money for the conditions of production, 
produces, realises the product, i. e. transforms it into money, and then begins the 
process anew. The circulation of money, regarded for itself, necessarily becomes 
extinguished in money as a static thing. The circulation of capital constantly ignites 
itself anew, divides into its different moments, and is a perpeluum mobile. "210 
In this form of circular motion based on two contrary and reciprocal forms of rectilinear 
motion, we have the general form of working of the Aristotelian and Hegelian account of 
nomological activity, as an infinite circular motion that returns upon itself. This process has 
been reflected, albeit with a materialist foundation and application, in Marx's dialectic of 
value and in the form of circulation that expresses its more developed concept as capital, 
expressed in the laws of motion of the twofold determinate forms that underpins its circular 
movement. 
This development of the substantial form activity is the process where the common quality, 
as Marx expressed it, which originally appears as mediatory between the extremes, 
necessarily develops dialectically to become the autonomous subject of the process. This 
process and movement is expressed in the reciprocal action involved in the polar alternation 
of the conditions of its systematic replication and sclf-expansion. 
210 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 516. 
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The result is the circular motion that exemplifies the negation of the negation as the self- 
active process of a substantial subject that systematically reproduces itself, and its 
conditions of existence, through its own substantial form activity. Force self-sunders in 
order to become self-identical as Hegel puts it. Value duplicates itself in order to realise 
itself as capital, in order to act as the self-expanding value subject of the whole process. 
In Hegelian terms, it suspends its presuppositions in order to presuppose itself as the 
autonomous subject, a subject that is now shown to be the common expression of the 
twofold form of the polar relation. The subject, in turn, now presupposes itself as the 
starting point and return of the whole process. The motion inherent in the law of the 
interpenetration of opposites thus intrinsically leads to the law of the negation of the 
negation; expressed as the realised substantial form activity of the subject. 
"The total production process of capital includes both the circulation process proper 
and the actual production process. These form the two great sections of its 
movement, which appears as the totality of these two processes. On one side, labour 
time, on the other, circulation time. And the whole of the movement appears as a 
unity of labour time and circulation time, as unity of production and circulation. This 
unity itself is motion, process. Capital appears as this unity-in-process of production 
and circulation, a unity which can be regarded both as the totality of the process of 
its production, as well as the specific completion of one turnover of the capital, one 
movement returning into itself. ""' 
The systematic result of capital as the unity of its own twofold forms of specific diffcrcncc 
and determination, namely production and circulation, is itself the historical result of an 
evolving process. Here capital, as Marx expresses it, posits itself "as a spccific unity of 
circulation and production. " Value, in the form of capital has now bccome the subjcct of ale 
process, as a relative form of the Hegelian expression of law as a pcrmancnce of 
impermanence. 
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"Capital posits the permanence of value (to a certain degree) by incarnating itself in 
fleeting commodities and taking on their form, but at the same time changing them 
just as constantly; alternates between its eternal form in money and its passing form 
in commodities; permanence is posited as the only thing it can be, a passing passage 
- process - life. But capital obtains this ability only by constantly sucking in living 
labour as its soul, vampire-like. The permanence - the duration of value in its form 
as capital - is posited only through reproduction, which is itself double, reproduction 
as commodity, reproduction as money, and unity of both these reproduction 
processes. In its reproduction as commodity, capital is fixated in a particular form of 
use value, and is thus not general exchange value, even less realised value, as it is 
supposed to be. The fact that it has posited itself as such in the act of reproduction, 
the production phase, is proved only through circulation. ""' 
Capital has to take on a historically evolving and universally interconnected series of 
twofold forms in order for it to be realised value as capital, as the systematic subject of its 
own self-process. Capital not only has to take the forms of commodity and money; it also 
has to take the forms of simple circulation and the circulation of money as capital. 
Furthermore, it has to take the twofold forms that encapsulates this whole process, as a 
specific and determinate mode of production and circulation based on surplus value creation 
and capital realisation and accumulation. 
The systematic outcome is realised in the totality of the expressions of all the specific and 
determinate forms of the dialectic of negativity, of the polar contradictions and reciprocal 
relations of the interpenetration of opposites, that characterise cach successive mode and 
determinate movement of the systematic subject. All these determinate modcs and forms, 
along with the systematic whole itself, are cohered together, and resolved in their ongoing 
contradictions, as the result of the operation of the law of the negation of the negation. 
"' K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 620. 
212 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 646. 
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Here we have another key sense of Hegel's systematic employment of the concept of 
aufheben; where the autonomy of the poles are cancelled in all their dialectical forms and 
relations, and the unity of the polar forms and movements of all its determinate modes and 
forms of being, are retained as the dialectical activity of the systematic subject of the whole 
process. 
This process is the dialectical outcome of the positing and resolving of the contradiction in 
all the determinate and specific forms that characterise the essential nature of the subject; 
characteristically expressed by Marx as a determinate form of modus vivend! that resolves 
the contradiction by both externalising and generalising it. 
"The simultaneity of the process of capital in different phases of the process is 
possible only through its division and break-up into parts, each of which is capital, 
but capital in a different aspect. This change of form and matter is like that in the 
organic body ... The 
important thing here above all is to examine capital as such for 
itself first of all; since the aspects being developed here are those which make value 
in general into capital; which constitute the specific distinguishing characteristics of 
capital as such. "213 
This process of dialectical movement receives its general form of categorial and conceptual 
reflection in Hegel's idealist but systematic logical thought process. it also, as we have 
attempted to show, finds its materialist reflection in Marx's analysis of the general form and 
concept of capital. Capital is now the subject of the dialectical process. As a systematic 
subject, its forms of motion are reflected within its own characteristic activities, forms of 
determination, and universal interconnections. 
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4. Spiral Development 
All these determinate forms and ongoing modes of expressions of the systematic relations 
are all united in the activity of value as capital, as a determinate whole with its own specific 
expression of the dialectical laws of motion. This is exemplified in the twofold nature of the 
circulation of capital as a whole, its two all embracing phases of its fixed and circulating 
forms, that become the determinant moments of the general form of capital itself. 214 
As fixed and circulating forms of capital, each respectively representing the specific 
difference of the process in motion of production and circulation. These two moments or 
determinations are a moving unity of difference that interpenetrates in the circulation of 
capital as a totality. Circulating capital is transformed into fixed capital, and fixed capital 
reproduces itself in circulating capital. "As circulating capital it fixates itself, and as fixated 
capital it circulates. " Both forms can do so only in so far as capital appropriates living 
labour. 215 
But as it is in the process of going from one phase into the other, it is, "at the same time, 
within each phase, posited in a specific aspect, restricted to a particular form, which is the 
negation of itself as the subject of the whole movement. "116 When capital assumes then, any 
one of its phases or determinate and specific modes, it is also the negating of itself as the 
211 
subject of a determinate and circular process. 
211 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 661. 
"I Marx also writes that "besides the distinction between constant capital and variable capital, which 
arises out of the immediate production process of capital, there is the further distinction between fixed and 
circulating capital, which arises out of the circulation process of capital. " K. Marx, letter to Engels (2 nd 
August 1862. ). Marx Engels. Collected Works. Letters. Volume 41. Lawrence and Wishart. (1985. ) P. 397. 
215 "The distinction between circulating capital and fixed capital thus appears initially as a formal 
characteristic of capital, depending on whether it appears as the unity of the process or as one of its specific 
moments. " K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 621. 
216 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 620. 
217 "It is extremely important to grasp these aspects of circulating and fixed capital as specific 
characteristic forms of capital generally, since a great many phenomena of the bourgeois economy - [would 
otherwise be] incomprehensible. " K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 623. "Much confusion in political 
economy has been caused by this, that the aspects of circulating and fixed capital are initially nothing more 
than capital itself posited in the two aspects, first as the unity of the process, then as a particular one of its 
phases, itself in distinction to itself as unity - not as two particular kinds of capital, not capital of two 
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Both forms can only be mediated by capital dividing itself and alternating between its 
production as a commodity and its realisation as surplus value in circulation. These specific 
moments or determinations, as in the externalisation of value into the commodity and 
money form, may fail to reciprocally and reflexively interpenetrate; capital will then have 
failed to actualise itself as the unity of all its determinate moments, as the subject of the 
whole process. 
Capital, however, as the unity of production and circulation, is value in that it not only 
reproduces itself, but also is value that posits greater value. Its movement consists of 
"relating to itself while it produces itself"; that is as the foundation of its own substantial 
self-activity, "as value presupposed to itself as surplus value, or to the surplus value as 
posited by 
it. " 218 
Value, in its highest form of capital, is the subject predominant over the "different phases of 
this movement, as value sustaining and multiplying itself in it. " In this form of circulating 
capital, value, in this its highest form, acts "as the subject of these metamorphoses 
proceeding in a circular course - as a spiral, as an expanding circle - capital is circulating 
Capital. "219 
particular kinds, but rather as different characteristic forms of the same capital. " K. Marx. Grundrissc. 
Penguin. (1974. ) P. 621-622. This distinction in Marx's analysis is a further reflection, as we saw earlier in the 
twofold character of the labour embodied in the commodity, of the problem that political economy, due to its 
lack of dialectical method, had not scientifically grasped. Namely, the nature and substantial activity of value 
itself. Again, to reinforce the point, it has to be understood as the common genus that contains a specific 
contrariety, as its twofold form of specific difference and determination that expresses the parameters of the 
process of the subject. 
211 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 745. 
219 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 620. "Circulating capital is therefore initially not a 
particular form of capital, but is rather capital itself, in a further developed aspect, as subject of the movement 
just described, which it, itself, is as its own realisation process. In this respect therefore, every capital is 
Circulating capital. " This concept of circulating capital as the twofold activity of fixed and circulating capital 
is the general activity of capital; this can also be expressed as the general concept of capital, the dialectic of 
capital in its general form of working. 
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The product and airn of capital is profit, its own form of self-measure; this is the 
characteristic activity of capital as subject of the process, "capital relates to itself as self- 
increasing value, i. e. it relates to surplus value as something posited and founded by it. " 
Each of the circulation of the determinate moments of capital, in the production of surplus 
value and its realisation of surplus value in exchange, expressed as the turnover time of the 
life process of capital's cycle of reproduction and accumulation, is a twofold circular motion 
that takes the form of a self-expanding circle, a spiral. 
"After it has distinguished the profit, as newly reproduced, from itself as 
presupposed, self-realising value, and has posited profit as the measure of its 
realisation, it suspends the separation again, and posits it in its identity to itself as 
capital which, grown by the amount of the profit, now begins the same process anew 
in larger dimensions. By describing its circle it expands itself as the subject of the 
circle and thus describes a self-expanding circle, a spiral. " 
5. Rubin Revisited. 
The problem that arose earlier in the thesis with regard to abstract labour and the account of 
Rubin, was that of the exact nature of the relation of value creation in production and value 
realisation in exchange. The dilemma, inherited from Rubin's work, is that value is only 
realised in the process of exchange, where all private labours become part of the totality of 
social labour, and achieve this status only through the exchange process. 
We are then left with the tension that value does not really seem to exist except in the act of 
exchange, yet at the same time, value is created in production but only realised in exchange. 
The latter formulation is the correct one in my view, but the following question still remains 
to be answered. How then is this social substance of value created in private production and 
realised in exchange? 
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Rubin, following Marx in the C. C. P. E., posits that value is "latent" within the commodity 
form. Marx expresses this "latent" nature of value in this text in the following form. "Social 
labour time exists in these commodities in a latent state, so to speak, and becomes evident 
only in the course of their exchange. "22' 
The point though is what is the nature of this potentiality of value that is latent within the 
commodity form, what does Marx mean here by latent? Marx in volume one of Capital 
gives us a definite solution to this very problem, but before going on to expound this 
solution in Marx, let us have recourse to an ancient predecessor of Marx that may shed some 
light on this dilemma. 
A solution to this problem of the specific nature here of latent lies, in my view, in a 
distinction contained within Aristotle's concept of potentiality that is expressed in De 
Anima; this distinction takes the following form. Knowledge of, to take Aristotle's example, 
grammar is a potential that exists in a generic sense within humanity, each has the potential 
of acquiring this quality. There are also those who have already acquired this grammatical 
quality but it remains in an unexercised state or condition. 
"Thus, both the first two, (being) potential knowers, (become actual knowers), but 
the one by being altered through learning and frequent changes from an opposite 
disposition, the other by passing in another way from the state of having arithmetical 
or grammatical knowledge without exercising it to its exercise. "' 
This distinction, and here I opt for the latter form of Aristotle's, seems pertinent to the 
question of value creation and realisation in Marx for the following reasons. Marx's critique 
of value is not dealing with its elementary form of barter, nor for that matter with petty 
K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 746. 
K. Marx. A Contribution to the critique of political economy. Progress Publishers (1970) P. 45 
Aristotle. De Anima. Book two Chapter five. 417a2l. Clarendon Aristotle Series. O. U. P. (1963. ) 
P. 23. 
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commodity production, but with value in the historically developed form of the capitalist 
relations of production, a form that presents itself as a world of commodities. 
The earlier forms of the value expression, would be encapsulated in the first exposition of 
Aristotle's distinction within the latency of a potentiality, where the use value assumes its 
value form through a transition to its opposite in isolated or semi-developed forms of 
exchange. In the latter, more historically evolved form, this is no longer the case, even 
though it still manifests itself through the opposition of use and exchange value. However, it 
is now a fully developed process, the product of a determinate and specific mode of 
commodity production and exchange for capital accumulation. 
The dilemma and lacuna, contained in Rubin's exposition, is that this distinction is 
conflated and not fully thought through and developed in his analysis. In particular, this is 
revealed in the nature of the social relations of production based on capital accumulation. 
Alienated and commodified labour power, as the direct dialectical opposite of capital, and 
the substantial social relation and form that value creating labour takes, provides the 
solution to this problematic contained in Rubin's analysis. 
The reason it does so is that value, as a system, though it has evolved from petty commodity 
production, is no longer based on this earlier social relation. The social relations of 
production generated by capital are based upon the specific social relation of alienated and 
commodified labour. One, moreover, that presupposes the propertylessness of the labourers 
who are thus forced to sell their labour power; to alienate it in exchange to the owners of the 
means of production. This is achieved by alienating labour from its material conditions of 
production; by privatising them as an others alien property. 
Alienated commodified labour power, and this is central to solving the lacuna in Rubin, 
itself becomes socially distributed as the source of the total labour power of society; it is 
only in this alienated social form of labour power that abstract universal labour becomes the 
substantial power that creates value in the world of commodities. This essential and 
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antithetical pole of capital and value is expressed in the ownership and command of the use 
value of commodified labour power itself by capital, and, as Marx observes, it "consists in 
the subsequent exercise of its force. " 
As Marx also expresses this dialectic inherent in the social relation of production, it is not 
the worker who applies the means of production but the means of production that apply the 
worker. Capital thus universalises and commodifies human labour power and sets it to work, 
to create itself, to create value and surplus value. The twofold character of the labour power 
embodied in the commodity is not, however then, just manifested in exchange; it has its 
systematic source and roots in the determinate and specific social relations pertinent to the 
capitalist mode of production. 
This production for value realisation and accumulation is the source of the twofold character 
of the labour power employed in capitalist commodity production; this is the essence of the 
social relation of production under value. This twofold character of the labour power 
embodied in the commodity is, and has to be, reflected in the productive process of value 
and surplus value creation. 
Capital, within the confines of the productive process, takes the double form of constant and 
variable capital; that is, it takes the form of means of production and commodified labour 
power. This distinction within capital, unique to Marx, is a further reflection and 
development of the use and value aspects inherent in the twofold character of the labour 
embodied in the commodity. The only power that can both create and maintain value is 
commodified labour power, this alienated form of labour power is now a systematic power 
of capital itself. 
The valorisation process has to take place in the process of production where both poles of 
the commodity, as a use value and a value, are created. This is generated in the privatised 
nature or ownership of the productive process, where labour not only maintains past value, 
but also takes on additional value in the finished product or commodity. Living 
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coniniodified labour power, in the form of variable capital, is incorporated into dead 
objectified labour, the constant part of capital. Value, as capital, valorises itself by "sucking 
in" living labour. 
The two aspects of the production process; the creation of the use value and value, the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of the commodity, are then reflected within the 
productive process of capital itself by Marx. 
"If we proceed further, and compare the process of producing value with the labour- 
process, pure and simple, we find that the Iatter consists of the useful labour, the 
work, that produces use-values. Here we contemplate the labour as producing a 
particular article; we view it under its qualitative aspect alone, with regard to its end 
and aim. But viewed as value-creating process, the same labour-process presents 
itself under its quantitative aspect alone. Here it is a question merely of the time 
occupied by the labourer in doing the work; of the period during which the labour- 
power is usefully expended. Here, the commodities that take part in the process, do 
not count any longer as necessary adjuncts of labour-power in the production of a 
definite, useful object. They count merely as depositories of so much absorbed or 
materialised labour; that labour, whether previously embodied in the means of 
production, or incorporated in them for the first time during the process by the action 
of labour-power, counts in either case only according to its duration; it amounts to so 
many hours or days as the case may be. "" 
This social foundation of value, of alienated commodified labour power, as a human social 
relation of production that is expressed in things, in the product of production; as the social 
manifestation of the duration of time that the labour power has been embodied within the 
commodity. As such, the determination of the social nature of its value does not contain an 
atom of use value; the specific concrete labour and the use value created by it do not 
determine its value. 
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The very peculiarity of value, as a specific social form of labour, is that the amount of 
labour power that is embodied in the product, and measured in time, takes an objective and 
abstract social form, as a value. This is not only true with regard to the product and the 
result of the production process, the commodity form, but this is also rooted within the 
production process itself for Marx. 
"We now see, that the difference between labour, considered on the one hand as 
producing utilities, and on the other hand, as creating value, a difference which we 
discovered by our analysis of a commodity, resolves itself into a distinction between 
two aspects of the process of production. ""' 
The twofold forms of labour take on a twofold character as they are subsumed by value in 
the production process. From the point of view of capital in both its constant and variable 
determinations, subsumed labour manifests itself in the following respective forms in 
Marx's analysis of the process of valorisation, that of "contained" and "applied" labour. 
"The labour which is contained here in the means of production is a particular 
quantum of universal social labour and displays itself consequently in a certain 
value-magnitude or sum of money, 'in fact' in the price of these means of 
production. The labour which is applied is a particular additional quantum of 
universal social labour, and displays itself as additional value-magnitude and sum of 
money. ""5 
The social expression of that employment of the force of alienated labour power being the 
creation of both value and surplus value. This distinction is of fundamental importance as 
this alien social command over labour is the only source that has the ability, or the power, to 
"I K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 190. 
221 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 19 1. 
21-' K. Marx. Results of the Immediate Process of Production. Contained in Value Studies by Marx. 
New Park. (1976. ) P. 95-96. 
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create the potentiality and reality of value and surplus value through its concrete productive 
activity. This it does, as we have just seen, in its specific manifestations of the dialectical 
doubling of form in the process of production, as the specific difference of constant and 
variable capital. 
A process where that totality of human labour power is expressed socially as value, by its 
reduction to the simple human or average labour power pertaining to the specific market 
society in question, with each unit of value as a determinate quantum of exchange value. 
This employment and commodification of labour power in the production process is, as 
Marx notes, "the differentia specifica of capitalistic production. " 
"Labour power is sold today, not with a view of satisfying, by its services or its 
product, the personal needs of the buyer. His aim is augmentation of his capital, 
production of commodities containing more labour than he pays for, containing 
therefore a portion of value that costs him nothing, and that is nevertheless realised 
when the commodities are sold. Production of surplus value is the absolute law of 
this mode of production. Labour power is only saleable so far as it preserves the 
means of production in their capacity of capital, reproduces its own value as capital, 
and yields in unpaid labour a source of additional capital. "" 
In order to do so, capital must posit and overcome an essential barrier to surplus value 
creation, that between necessary labour time and surplus labour time. This driving 
contradiction, inherent to the process of surplus value creation and realisation, will have its 
determinate effects in the necessary changps within the organic composition of capital in its 
constant and variable components. 227 
221 K. Marx. Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) P. 580. 
227 "Capital, as the positing of surplus labour, is equally and in the same moment the positing and the 
not-positing of necessary labour; it exists only in so far as necessary labour both exists and does not exist. " K. 
Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 401. 
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The result of this dialectical shift in the organic composition of capital expresses itself in the 
historical tendency for the rate of profit to decline. This dialectical law is the most important 
law of political economy for Marx, and is also the fundamental expression of the finite and 
transitory nature of the existence of value and capital. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE. 
THE CONTRADICTION OF METHOD AND SYSTEM. 
1. The General Form of Working and Laws of Dialectics. 
The thesis has attempted to locate and analyse some central issues in dialectics that could 
shed some light on not only the nature of Marx's materialist inversion of his idealist 
predecessor, but also what still remains rational in Hegelian dialectics, despite the mystical 
veil that it is enveloped within. Through the analysis of elements of the key primary 
theoretical texts and some written correspondence, the rational kernel that remained of 
Hegel's dialectic was posited as the combined relation of the general form of working and 
the laws of dialectics. 
The thesis has consequently attempted to discover some of the fundamentals pertaining to 
the operation and relationship of both these combined elements. Two other primary 
constituents that were necessarily integrated into this investigation were the category of 
substance and the source of the principle of change and alteration that is immanent within it, 
namely contradiction. 
This, in turn, gave us the basis and foundation for the laws of motion pertaining to a 
dialectical methodology. The core of the nomological analysis being applied to cognising 
the specific and determinate categorial and ontological forms of motion that make up the 
principle of change and alteration contained in the process of substantial change. Dialectics, 
as a method, is the attempt to theoretically analyse the interconnections of the ontological 
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categories necessary for understanding the nomological nature of substantial entities whose 
activity integrates them into an organic and systematic whole. 
The thesis has therefore attempted to locate the general form of working and the laws of 
dialectics contained in the Hegelian account within these broad parameters; with the motor 
force of the dynamics fuelled by the interconnected movement and relation of the laws of 
dialectical contradiction. The analysis of these core elements of a dialectical process, 
contained in the laws of motion and change should, in turn, have allowed us to develop a 
better understanding of what constitutes, for Marx, the rational content that still remains of 
Hegel's dialectic. 
The general form of working of dialectic being expressed, in its systematic form, in the 
ongoing and inclusive process of the nomological movement of the primary contradiction 
contained and developed within a substantial and systematic whole. It is through the 
positing and resolving of the determinate contradictions and specific differences, contained 
and expressed in the inclusive and interconnected forms of its substantial activity, that 
substance becomes subject. As the active, autonomous, and self-moving agent of its own 
substantial process of self-realisation. 
Consequently, this methodological interconnection is also expressed in the relation of the 
parts of a system to the workings of the system as a whole. With the relation of part and 
whole manifested and sublated in the interrelationship of the laws of motion of dialectics. 
The main laws generated by dialectics in Engels account are expressed in the following laws 
of motion. 
l. The law of the transformation of quality into quantity and vice versa. 
2. The law of the interpenetration of opposites, that is, the mutual penetration of polar 
opposites and their transformation into each other when caff ied to extremes. 
3. The law of the negation of the negation. 
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4. Spiral, or self-expanding form of development. 22" 
In line with the above relation of the categories and the laws expressed by Engels, the 
evolving totality of these laws can also be interpreted as the systematic coherence of a 
substantial form in its principle of change and alteration. As a substantial totality 
individuating itself as a subject, and containing a specific difference that is the determinate 
manifestation of its universal nature and the expression of the contrariety contained within 
its laws of motion and form activity. 
The logical and conceptual evolution of the subject aims at reflecting that systematic totality 
in its real process. This it does by way of outlining the generic forms of the substantial and 
essential categorial relations that allows the theoretical method to be both applied to, and 
explain, the phenomenal appearance in its specific and concrete determinations and laws 
relevant to the subject matter under investigation. 
Thus, with the method divested of its mystical aura, and the logical systematic whole not 
forced on nature, society and history, then it can, in turn, be derived from and applied to, 
real nature and real society in their evolutionary and systematic changes. This required a 
revolutionary break from the idealist glorification by Hegel of his logical system; it also 
required the dialectical criticism of this idealist systematic whole itself from a materialist 
perspective. 
This process was first undertaken by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts. We have, though, come 
a long way from this earlier critical analysis of the dialectic of negativity in Hegel, and its 
inversion from the pseudo-essence of speculative thought to the real essence of objective 
labouring activity. The culmination of this long journey, undertaken by Marx, lies in his 
critique of political economy and the mode of production founded on capital accumulation. 
" F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 17. 
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At the same time, and notwithstanding this, the application of the dialectical method to 
political economy by Marx, as I have also attempted to demonstrate, required digging deep 
into the resources contained in Hegel's systematic dialectical thought in order to begin to 
bear genuine scientific rewards. 
The thesis has also attempted to elucidate that Marx's application of the dialectical method 
to political economy, is itself a logical and conceptual outcome of Marx's own critical 
inversion of this idealist dialectic of Hegel. Marx's development of the concept and general 
form of working of capital is an exemplar of this inverted form of dialectical method of 
Hegel applied to political economy. "' 
"It must be kept in mind that the new forces of production and relations of 
production do not develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from the womb' 
of the self-positing Idea; but from within and in antithesis to the existing 
development of production and the inherited, traditional relations of property. While 
in the completed bourgeois system every economic relation presupposes every other 
in its bourgeois economic form, and everything posited is thus a presupposition, this 
is the case with every organic system. This organic system itself, as a totality, has its 
presuppositions and its development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating 
all elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the organs which it still lacks. 
This is historically how it becomes a totality. The process of becoming this totality 
forms a moment of its process, its development. " 230 
The apparently Rxed and ongoing activity of the system, in this case not only capital as a 
mode of production and circulation, but also Hegel's reified system of logic, were shown to 
both be relative historical products and not absolute truths about the human condition. Both 
11 "The exact development of the concept of capital [is] necessary, since it [is] the fundamental 
concept of modem economics, just as capital itself, whose abstract, reflected image [is) its concept [dessen 
abstraktes Gegenbild sein Begriffl, [is] the foundation of bourgeois society. Ile sharp formulation of the basic 
presuppositions of the relation must bring out all the contradictions of bourgeois production, as well as the 
boundary where it drives beyond itself. " K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 331. 
230 K. Marx. Grundrisse. Penguin. (1974. ) P. 278. 
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of these systematic forms belied the real source of the movement and development of their 
own specific internal contradictions and laws of motion. 
Marx was the only radical theoretician of the nineteenth century that was capable of 
combining the critiques of both the social forms and modes of capital, articulated in 
classical political economy, and the closed idealist philosophical system of Hegel. These 
two forms of theoretical advancement were amongst the highest intellectual products that 
were generated by the bourgeois social relations of that period. 
Both of these forms of Marx's critique were, from 1844 onwards, fundamentally 
interconnected; the latter form, as the thesis has attempted to show, led to the development 
of a materialist methodology for the former. By synthesising both, Marx was able to make 
the theoretical advances that he did in the materialist understanding of human historical 
development. 
The fundamental contradiction in Hegel's work, expressed by Marx and Engels, is that 
between the dialectical method and Hegel's idealist system. This contradiction is now the 
subject matter for further investigation; an investigation that can begin to draw together the 
elements already analysed in the contradiction between the rational and mystical sides that 
pertain to Hegel's dialectic. 
2. The Contradiction of Method and System 
Engels expressed what he regarded as his own and Marx's relation and debt to Hegel's 
philosophy, in the following fashion. The relation is described by him in terms of how he 
and Marx both "proceeded from as well as how we separated from it". 
However, Hegel's "powerful" thought could "not be disposed of by simply being ignored. " 
Nor could it be treated in the same manner as Feuerbach, who "broke through the system 
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and simply discarded it. But a philosophy is not disposed of by simply discarding it. " What 
was required, according to Engels, was the following strategy to be adopted. 
"It had to be "sublated" in its own sense, that is, in the sense that while its form had 
to be annihilated through criticism, the new content which had been won through it 
had to be saved. ""' 
The analysis of this contradiction lies at the core of Engels critical summation of Classical 
German Philosophy. Hegel then, was "not simply put aside" by Marx and Engels; their 
criticisms, themselves dialectical in their scope and nature, entailed going well beyond that 
of Feuerbach's. "On the contrary, one started out from his revolutionary side", that is, from 
the dialectical method. However, in its idealist form "this method was unusable" for 
application to a materialist account of science. "' 
This was due to two primary factors, firstly, the idealist point of departure and result, and 
secondly, the related problem of the apparent foreclosure of any further form of 
development. This twofold and combined error, expressed in both his cyclical account of 
nature, and in his cognising the evolution of human historical objectivity in the idealised 
form of spirit; both forms being enveloped in Hegel's system of absolute thought. 
As a result of these idealist presuppositions of Hegel, the dialectical method, in this form, 
bequeathed itself with some unresolvable contradictions and unforeseen evolutionary 
difficulties. 
In Engels view, the central contradiction contained in Hegel's idealism is the contradiction 
between the open-ended, the ever-changing and evolving nature that is the inherent logic of 
"I F. Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy. Marx-Engels Selected 
Works. Volume 2. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 325 and 333. 
232 "But these constructions are only the frame and scaffolding of his work. If one does not loiter here 
needlessly, but presses on farther into the immense building, one finds innumerable treasures which today still 
possess undiminished value. " F. Engels. Ludwig Feucrbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy. 
Marx-Engels Selected Works. Volume 2. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 330. 
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the method, and the closed, final, and absolute nature of the system. The two are ultimately 
incompatible, and the unfolding of this primary contradiction of Hegel's idealism sowed the 
seeds and the groundwork for its logical and scientific supersession into a materialist form. 
The Hegelian system was then suffering, in Engels criticism, from one internal and 
"incurable contradiction"; this being that it was working with the proposition that human 
history was the result of the process of evolution that was ongoing and lacked a final 
absolute form. Conversely, it also maintained that Hegel's system was the final and absolute 
form of knowledge of this systematic and universal whole. 
This, in itself, is in contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectical reasoning, that of 
constant motion, change, and evolution. The inversion of this idealist method and content 
poses the logic of evolution as the new, open-ended, natural and social content of that 
dialectical method. The core of this "incurable contradiction" in Hegel's method is that the 
dialectic is, in its essence, critical and revolutionary; it is in this sense and in this sense only, 
that it is absolute. 
"It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can 
endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, of 
endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is 
nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of 
course, also a conservative side: it recognises that definite stages of knowledge and 
society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The 
conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is 
absolute - the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits. "" 
This inherently revolutionary character, in an absolute sense, was a "necessary conclusion 
from his method" that Hegel, as Engels expresses it, "never drew with such explicitness. " 
211 F. Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy. Marx-Engels Selected 
Works. Volume two. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 328. 
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Consequently, this intrinsic logical dynamic of dialectics is not so "sharply delineated" in 
Hegel. This revolutionary result is the only logical conclusion of the application of a 
dialectical method to all processes of development whether natural or social for the 
materialist. 
The Hegelian system is a system that regards the alienated form of the idea, nature, as a 
development in space but outside of time. The reason for this, according to Engels, is that he 
was compelled to fashion a philosophical system; a system that contained an absolute and 
eternal truth that itself marks the end of the idealist account of the historical process of spirit 
and mind. 
Nature is, in the Hegelian cosmology, cyclical and eternal. Engels critique of this centres on 
this logical and idealist form of expression in Hegel, where nature "displays simultaneously 
and alongside of one another all the stages of development comprised in it, and is 
condemned to an eternal repetition of the same process. " 
"This absurdity of a development in space, but outside of time - the fundamental 
condition of all development - Hegel imposes upon nature just at the very time 
when, geology, embryology, the physiology of plants and animals, and organic 
chemistry were being built up, and everywhere on the basis of these new sciences 
brilliant foreshadowings of the later theory of evolution were appearing (for instance 
Goethe and Lamarck). But the system demanded it; hence the method, for the sake 
of the system, had to become untrue to itself. "" 
234 F. Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy. Marx-Engels Selected 
Works. Volume two. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 339. This viewpoint of Engels is also reflected in 
Trotsky's criticisms of what he regards as the most important law of dialectical thought that is both contained 
in Hegel and discovered by him, the law of the transformation and interpenetration of quality and quantity. 
"Hegel himself undoubtedly did not give the law of the transition of quantity into quality the 
paramount importance which it fully deserves. Hegel relied upon the Kant-Laplace theory, but he did not yet 
know either Darwinism or Marxism. " L. Trotsky. Trotsky's Notebooks. C. U. P. (1986. ) 1933-193S. P. 88-89. 
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The historical irony of this is at the same time that Hegel imposes this system on nature, 
scientific developments were already blowing asunder a closed system that balanced the 
dialectical concepts in an absolute idealist manner and form. The deathblows that natural, 
evolutionary science inflicts on idealism exposes the contradictions of the hermetically 
sealed system of Hegel's dialectical thought. It also poses the conditions for the 
development of its contrary polar opposite and subsequent materialist supersession. 
This idealist inversion of real nature and real human history took its heavy toll on the 
dialectical method. In that the idealist content of the system is both in contradiction with, 
and at the same time ideologically "smothered", the open-ended nature of the "revolutionary 
side" of the dialectical method of cognising the processes of development and change. 
"Thus", according to Engels, "ultimately, the Hegelian system represents merely a 
materialism idealistically turned upside down in method and content. "235 
What though, does Engels means by this statement; what is the content and method posited 
by Engels a reference to here? Furthermore, how is this criticism integrated and understood 
in conjunction with his earlier criticism of the contradiction between system and method 
contained in Hegel? 
To answer the questions posed by Engels remarks is also to develop Engels own variations 
on the central theme of the thesis; the issue of comprehending the nature and consequences 
of the inverted critique of Hegel's idealist dialectic. How though was this method rendered 
usable from its idealist and mystical form and applied to materialist science? 
Well, the method is clearly dialectics, and the central contradiction here was the constraints 
of the idealist straitjacket on ftirther development; one that is ultimately in opposition to the 
11 F. Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of Classical German Philosophy. Marx-Engels Selected 
Works. Volume two. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P336. This formulation by Engels is also the source and 
inspiration for Lenin's study of Hegel's Logic. "I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is 
materialism which has been stood on its head (according to Engels) - that is to say, I cast aside for the most 
part God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc. " V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Volume 38. Progress Publishers. 
(1972. ) P. 104. 
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inverted, open-ended and constantly changing evolution of the materialist model. In terms of 
method then the following is clear from Engels, the system subverts the method and makes 
it untrue to itself. The method becomes contained within the idealist parameters of the 
logical system. 
The open-ended nature of the movement of a dialectical contradiction is therefore limited to 
the positing and resolving of the primary contradiction of the dialectic of subject and object 
contained and sublated within an idealist logical and systematic whole. A contradiction that 
is resolved by hypostasising thought and reason itself, as an absolute whose source 
ultimately lies outside nature and human consciousness. 
The method for Hegel, as we have already seen, is both the general form of cognition and 
what he termed the objective substantiality of things. The method, as the self-movement and 
self-activity of the notion, is the universal form of the content; that content is the system of 
logic. The content of this idealist method is systematic logical thought treated as the 
absolute, as the autonomous subject of the process. 
In terms of content, then the absolute idea is the movement behind the universal form of the 
categories of objective' and subjective logic. Nature and society become inverted as the 
product of the systematic and universal interconnection of the logical thought categories. In 
this sense the system could be described as materialism turned upside down in content; that 
is, in its ontological presuppositions, as the laws of motion of the categories, and the point 
of departure and return of their idealist circularity of movement. 
The categories generated by this logical expression are hypostasised outside of real time and 
imposed on real nature, but these same categories are derived from their objective, natural, 
and ontological expressions; the mystified content of the hermetically sealed idealist 
account of logic is thus nature and society. The categories, as Marx expressed it in 1844, 
being torn from real nature and real mind, and posited as the point of departure and result of 
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the whole process. Engels variation is, in my view here, merely reflecting this earlier 
critique of Marx. 
The materialist dialectic, as the logic of evolutionary change and development, has for its 
content, not the idealist logical philosophical system of categories, but natural and social 
history. This is the new content that is generated from the materialist critique of Hegel's 
system; here substantial form activity no longer has an idealist-conceptual teleology, 
whether natural or social, but an evolutionary form of material, natural, and social 
development. In this sense the system could also be described as materialism turned upside 
down in terms of content. 
Engels point is further stressed in that it is the idealist nature of the system that is imposed 
upon, and imposes the logical forms and laws on, not only nature, thought, and history, but 
on the dialectical method and the "new content" itself. That is, the idealist system also 
imposes itself on the general form of working and the laws of dialectics. It is, moreover, in 
this sense that the system is describable as materialism turned upside down in method and 
content. 
On the other hand, to dialectically, but only partially, counterbalance the sublating nature of 
the materialist critique, Hegel's system entailed that for the first time, and here is its great 
merit for Engels, that the whole world, natural, historical, and intellectual is conceived as a 
process. That is, it is conceived as in constant motion, change, transformation and 
development; the attempt is then made to cognitively trace out the internal connections that 
makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development. 
This nomological absolute has then to be reflected in the analysis of a systematic form; but 
not as a systematic form that is a reified thought totality, a closed system of logical thought. 
The system, in its relation to nature and society becomes open-ended and evolving. 
Moreover then, not only does the systematic account have to be a reflection of the specific 
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form, whether natural and social, but it also has to be reflected and applied to the forms of 
decline, transition, and supersession that take place in both nature and human society. 
The revolutionary side of Hegel's dialectic, for Engels, attributes the world as being 
composed of a complex series of processes of coming to be and passing away, that at the 
same time entails despite contingency, accident, and even retrogression, that a progressive 
development asserts itself in the end. This continual process of change and development 
through contradiction operates in a nomological fashion. 
The mystified form of Hegelian dialectic, for Marx, glorified the existing states of affairs, 
but the "rational form" of dialectic, in line with the materialist methodological inversion, 
presented the direct opposite of this idealist conceptual apotheosis. The following is Marx's 
own variation on Engels distinction between the relative and absolute nature of dialectical 
change, here with regard to a systematic social form. 
"In its rational form it is a scandal and an abomination to bourgeoisdom and its 
doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative 
recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of 
the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every 
historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into 
account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets 
nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary. " 116 
The above remarks of Engels and Marx, in my view, also admit the following inference as 
regards the relation of the absolute and relative nature of necessity involved and inherent in 
all substantial and systematic being by the objective operation of the dialectical laws. Given 
that constant change is the only absolute of dialectics, as such it is the only absolute in terms 
of substantial necessity, whether natural or social. 
"I K. Marx. Capital. Volume one. Lawrence and Wishart. (1974. ) Afterword, to the second German 
edition. P. 29. 
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Consequently, all forms of substantial being are themselves relative and transitory; the laws 
of dialectics that apply to it apply then in a relative manner, the only absolute of the process 
is that substantial change is in a constant process of coming to be and ceasing to be, and no 
system, natural or social is immune from this form of change. Therefore, all other forms of 
substantial necessity based on a dialectical account of law are relative and transitory in their 
operation. 
All motion and movement, are in this account, expressed as the dynamic combination of the 
relative and the absolute or constant; this is fundamentally entailed in the dialectical account 
of motion. For example, if human historical development is posited as the constant of the 
social process, the historical evolution and successive developments of the modes of 
productive activity of social labour are the relative and evolving forms of the expression of 
this historical constant. 237 
That there are laws that underpin all social forms are due to natural necessity, they do 
though, take on specific and evolving forms of development. The development of the social 
form of labour, for example, takes on an evolving and ongoing progression in Marx's 
historical account. This relative and, in so far as human social development still has 
potential for further evolutionary change, constant element contained in Marx, is itself 
founded and dependent upon the continuing operation of nomological and natural necessity. 
Marx, in a letter to Kugelmann, makes a distinction between the historical constancy of 
natural laws, and the relation between this and their historically specific social and human 
forms of expression. This is reflected here in his view of the dialectical relation of the 
successive modes of production and their specific social forms of distribution of labour. 
231 Lenin asserts a similar and related view in the following form. "The distinction between 
subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc. ) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the 
difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute 
within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute. " V. I. 
Lenin. Notes on dialectics. Collected Works. Volume 38. Progress Publishers. (1972. ) P. 360. 
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"It is self-evident that this necessity of the distribution of social Iabour in specific 
proportions is certainly not abolished by the specific form of social production; it 
can only change its form of manifestation. Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. 
The only thing that can change, under historically differing conditions, is the form in 
which these laws assert themselves. ""' 
What is interesting in the above is the combination of natural necessity and its evolving 
social forms of expression. What changes is how the law asserts itself, what specific and 
evolving social forms it takes. The economic categories are then only the abstract 
expressions of the actual and real relations; they are neither the source for the real categories 
nor can they be posited as eternal laws as they are historical, specific, and transient in their 
forms of expression. 
As such, they are the specific social expression of the natural and general laws that underpin 
human productive activity, relative laws that remain true only as long as these economic 
categories take that historically specific form of social expression. Only so long, that is, as 
the contradictions within its specific form of self-activity can continue to re-create and 
positively resolve the conditions of its existence, and thus affirm itself as the specific form 
of the subject of the movement. 
The dialectic contained in value and its mode of organising the productive activity of social 
labour not only arises in opposition to all previous historical social forms, it has itself a 
limited historical life span and process. The laws of motion of dialectics aims to show how 
substantial systematic processes arise and establish themselves in their specific nomological 
forms of activity. It also shows how, in its rational form, through the further development of 
these very same laws of motion, the specific form of the substantial and systematic subject 
is ultimately subordinate to laws of decline and evolutionary transition. 
11 K. Marx. Letter to Kugelmann. IP July. 1868. Collected Works. Volume 43. Lawrence and 
Wishart. (1988. ) P. 68. 
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"The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena 
with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is the law of moment to him, 
which govern these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual 
connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law 
of their variation, of their development, i. e., of their transition from one form into 
another, from one series of connections into a different one ..... The scientific value 
of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, 
existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by 
another and higher one. ""' 
The contradictions have their own inevitable logic of supersession contained within it, the 
dialectic sweeps away all existence that comes before it. There can be no idealist resolution 
of these objective material contradictions if one holds onto the logic of the material polarity 
and opposition as an ongoing and evolving development of a totality, without hypostasising 
or fetishising it as a closed and fully realised system. 
These laws being historically specific and evolving, arise, mature, decline and develop into 
a higher mode and form of social organisation. Marx himself expresses the following 
theoretical consequence for the evolutionary criticism of an idealist account of a system 
when it is applied to a social form. 
"But there is also something else behind it. Once interconnection has been revealed, 
all theoretical belief in the perpetual necessity of the existing conditions collapses, 
even before the collapse takes place in practice. Here, therefore, it is completely in 
the interests of the ruling classes to perpetuate the unthinking confusion. "240 
231 K. Marx. Afterword to the second German edition of Capital. Volume 1. Lawrence and Wishart. 
(1974. ) P. 27 and 28 respectively. 
240 K. Marx. Letter to Kugelmann. 11' July. 1868. Marx Engels. Collected Works. Volume 43. 
Lawrence and Wishart. (1988. ) P. 69. 
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This materialist and evolutionary foundation for the dialectic also raises a central question 
of the critique of Hegel's idealist systematic form with regard to method and content. This 
question has been lurking in the background of the thesis almost since its inception. Does 
the nature of a dialectical view of contradiction itself become altered with its inversion of 
ontological foundation? How does the materialist grounding of the dialectic affect Marx's 
contention, expressed earlier in the thesis, that Hegelian contradiction is the source of all 
dialectic? 
3. Dialectical Laws as the Logic of Evolution. 
One can also pose this question, of the problematical nature of contradiction, in a way that 
ties in with the inference that was previously made from Engels critique. Namely, in terms 
of the status of substantial necessity in relation to the absolute nature of change itself, vis a 
vis the relative and transitory forms that it takes in social, natural, and material being. 
Given that Hegel integrates the laws of motion of dialectics, the systematic movement of the 
positing and resolving of contradiction into a logical and idealist totality, as the explanation 
of the motor force of the logical and systematic whole actualising itself, then the following 
question can be generated ftom this. 
How does the conceptual and reflexive integration of the objective operation of the laws of 
dialectics, into an idealist thought system, affect the fundamentally revolutionary content 
and f6fin of those laws of contradiction? Hegel's idealist balancing of concepts entails the 
idealist balancing of the contradictions into a systematic whole. 
Alternatively posed, in what way are the laws of dialectics, if you will excuse the phrase, 
perverted by the idealist system that is itself, to draw out the inference from Engels, the 
inverted and mystified form of a materialist method and content? 
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On the one hand, dialectical laws, as the laws of motion of a systematic totality, do operate 
in any given organic systematic totality. On the other hand, there is in a materialist form of 
dialectic, the view that any organic, natural and social system inevitably exhausts itself in its 
specific forms of motion and activity. If further development is to take place, then there are 
required laws of motion that can explain this evolutionary movement into a new specific 
form of nomological motion and activity. 
This entails that there are also in any organic system the operation of laws of decline and 
supersession. This intermediate process of transition being a fundamental determination and 
category that has to be more fully integrated into the concept of processes of movement and 
change in the materialist account of nomological forms. 
The laws of dialectics have to, in order to be consistently logical and rational in their 
materialised form, encapsulate this absolute form of change as a historical process; in the 
form of a materialised subject that has laws of being that arise, mature, decline, and 
supersede into a higher evolutionary form. 
The relative necessity of the laws of motion of a systemic whole gives way, through the 
development of the contradictions contained within that specific form of relative necessity, 
to the conditions that allow the emergence of a new and higher form of systematic 
expression. The absolute nature of change thus manifests itself in the transition from one 
systematic relative form to a new systematic relative form; one that arises out of the 
conditions created by its predecessor. 
The system, whether natural or social, itself posits its own demise and supersession; the 
system is thus, ultimately in contradiction with itself. The only other possibilities and 
parameters within this dialectical process being either that the evolutionary development is 
itself regressed, or the onset of stasis in the specific and determinate forms of nomological 
activity entails that, due to the contradictions remaining unresolved, its evolutionary 
possibilities have exhausted themselves and extinction ensues. 
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System and its supersession are outwith the scope of Hegel's dialectical laws and forms in 
the Logic; the aim primarily is to outline the universal categories and concepts in their polar 
forms of relations and universal interconnections that determine and make up a substantial 
whole. A substantial whole that Hegel contends is generated from this systematic logical 
totality. 
The need to blunt the method favours the former at the expense of the latter. In the Logic, 
which is the main centre of attention here, there is no theory of the laws of motion of a 
system in decline and transition, only in its arisal and maturity into a conceptually evolved 
systematic whole. The absolute, as the logical idea, by its very divine nature, does not 
decline and give rise to a higher form. 
The limiting of the dialectic to a system without supersession is due to the idealist necessity 
for enclosing the alienated philosophical expression as a speculative form of systematic 
totality that is infinite and eternal. That is, it is outwith real space and real time, and, 
consequently outwith real natural and social history. Absolute reason, in this its highest 
product, as a form of alienated science, is outwith all real development. This is also another 
reason why Engels argues that the laws of dialectics were imposed on nature and history by 
Hegel rather than deduced from them. 
What Hegel contributes are these dialectical laws as a logical systematic whole; but a logical 
systematic whole that is absolute and fixed, impervious to all outside activity from whatever 
quarter. Marx, in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 reflected this criticism at the outset of the 
thesis, where the result of the entire compass of philosophical abstraction was the dialectic 
of pure thought; as a self-enclosed totality of thought that eternally revolves within its own 
circle, hermetically and conceptually separated from real nature and real mind. 
The new dialectical content, including that of the laws generated by Hegel's thought, as 
Engels put it, had to be saved and retained, but the idealist form of the laws of dialectics put 
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on an evolutionary materialist foundation. The laws of motion of contradiction, and hence 
the laws of dialectics underpinning any system, have then to be open-ended and evolving. 
The fundamental theoretical question, to return to it then is, does a materialist dialectic, and 
hence view of contradiction and laws of motion and development, differ in any substantial 
sense from an idealist account of contradiction? This, despite the fact that Hegelian 
contradiction is the source of all dialectic? How can these seemingly contradictory aspects 
of Marx's view be reconciled? 
The further and related question generated by this is whether the systematic operation of the 
laws of Hegelian dialectics can theoretically accommodate, in a generalised form, the 
process of decline and supersession into a new systematic form of operation. Are they 
capable, in their present nomological. expressions, of capturing this process of decline and 
supersession, or do these nomological forms have to be either re-jigged or added to, or both, 
in order to capture this process of decline and supersession? 
4. Law and Systematic Totality. 
The first thing to ascertain is how these general laws of dialectics actually operate in a 
systematic fashion for Hegel. This entails working out how the dialectical laws of motion in 
Hegel operate as a systematic whole, in order to investigate if and if so how these same laws 
could possibly accommodate decline and supersession. Let us then look at the former before 
going on to discuss the latter. How then do these laws proceed to interconnect, interact and 
progress towards a substantial whole? 
Laws of dialectics, to give them their general character, are themselves the general processes 
that express the laws of motion that underpin the movement and development of the specific 
ontological contradiction contained in a systematic subject. 
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The relation of these nomological forms is that they express the laws of motion of the 
systematic movement of the contradiction contained in the determinate activity of the 
subject under investigation. The driving force for the whole structure is the methodical 
unfolding of the movement of the positing and resolving of the specific contradiction 
applied to the predicational forms of the universal categories, qualities, and relations 
inherent to all substantial being. 
In broad terms, the substantial ontological divisions of motion in Hegel are those of 
immediacy, mediation, and being for self. These stages of substantial motion find their 
reflection in the further conceptual divisions of the universal, the particular, and the 
individual. In turn, the conceptual categories of the universal, the particular, and the 
individual are reflected in the primary ontological categories of the Logic of Hegel, namely, 
being, essence, and notion. 
Furthermore, there is a direct and respective correlation between these three central 
categories of the Logic and the three core laws of dialectics. What we have is the 
development and movement of a contradiction seen in its necessary ontological and 
nomological divisions. 
In line with the divisions outlined by Engels, the category of being relates primarily to the 
law of transformation contained in the dialectic of quality and quantity. The category of 
essence relates primarily with the law of the interpenetration of opposites. Finally, the 
category of the notion relates to the law of negation of negation. This third law figures, in 
Engels analysis, "as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. ""' 
However, these three analytical distinctions of the nomological forms of activity should be 
understood in general terms, and not viewed as rigid, separate, and unconnected in both 
their relation and application. The three separate expressions of nomological activity operate 
241 F. Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Progress Publishers. (1982. ) P. 62. 
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in all three primary logical categories within their evolving and developing ontological and 
predicational limitations. 
That is, their interrelation is determined by the operation of the primary logical category, in 
this case, being, essence, and notion, and its specific conceptual forms of predication, with 
the dominant law in operation in the three logical categories maintaining its relation and 
own determinate form of expression that, at the same time, pertains and relates to the laws 
as a systematic whole. 
Furthermore, the contradictions within each of the three primary ontological categories are 
themselves the product of the posited and resolved contradiction that marks off each 
successive stage of the determinate development of the substantial subject. This driving 
ontological contradiction, and its determinate forms of inner interconnections and external 
relations, are the expressions and reflections of the developing and evolving relations and 
connections contained within the laws of dialectics. 
We have already seen some evidence in Hegel that would tend to support this view of the 
dynamics of the process. When we were discussing the dialectic in Hegel's method for 
developing the categories from their simple to more complex forms; here the conceptual 
evolution contained not only the positive form of the category, but also its own negative 
form. Moreover the resolution of this categorial contrariety lay in the unity of both forms 
and their transition into a higher form of category, which then posits its own form of 
negation, and so on, and so on. The dynamic of this process continues till the systematic 
whole of categories is established. 
The positing and resolving of contradiction is then the motor force that operates on both a 
systematic level, and at the level of each of the specific dialectical laws that make up that 
systematic whole. It is, therefore, also in operation in the categorial relations that make up 
each primary ontological category and specific dialectical law. That is, each of the laws of 
dialectics has its own specific form of that architectonic of negation and negation of the 
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negation inherent in the dialectic, and contained in the process of sublating that specific 
stage of the contradiction. 
The law of the negation of the negation is the foundation for the whole system because it is 
the law that underpins and resolves the contradictory activity of both the determinate parts 
that make up the whole, and resolves their integration into a systematic and substantial 
whole. As the architectonic of negation and negation of negation operates in the specific 
parts and in the systematic whole, it necessarily both sublates and retains the other 
dialectical laws. 
What is the key to a fuller comprehension of this process is to ascertain how the analysis of 
contradiction operates at each stage of its ongoing and interconnected development with the 
other dialectical laws. That is, these nomological divisions should not, and this is of 
fundamental import, be viewed or interpreted as being abstractly kept apart; they do, in fact, 
interrelate and universally interconnect. 
This they do in a twofold form. The primary law in operation contains the others as a 
subordinate or secondary expression of its own specific nomological form. Secondly, each 
of the dialectical laws successively builds upon and integrates and sublates its nomological 
antecedent. 
In my analysis, the law of the transformation of quality into quantity, and vice versa, also 
contains its own variations, pertinent to the development of its own specific ontological 
categories, of both the law of the interpenetration of opposites and the law of the negation of 
the negation. 
These operate, as outlined above, in the generalised dialectical form of the negation, as the 
positing of the positive and negative poles of the relation, and the negation of the negation, 
that resolves that polar contradiction in their higher unity in a new dialectical category. This 
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dynamic pertains to all the predicational categories, and allows them to posit and resolve the 
contradiction pertaining to its specific and determinate nature. 
That is, though the law of quality, quantity, and their transition to measure, is the primary 
law in operation in the category of being, the outlining of the movement of the contradiction 
in this law also requires, though subordinate in their ontological and predicational 
expression at this point, these generalised methodological forms of the law of the 
interpenetration of opposites, and the law of the negation of the negation. " 
The law of the interpenetration of opposites both sublates the law of the transformation of 
quality and quantity, and their dialectical resolution and higher unity of measure; at the 
same time it contains the law of the negation of the negation necessary to resolve the 
contradictions posed in each successive categorial development of the contradiction 
contained in the category of essence, where the law of the interpenetration of opposites is 
now the operational and nomological. primary form. " 
Finally, the law of the negation, as well as operating as the resolving of the specific 
categorial contradictions contained in the ontological forms of predication relevant to the 
other two dialectical laws, also sublates the previous two laws and contains them as 
moments or determinations of its own form of systematic operation. "' 
242 The dynamic contained in the category of being, for Hegel, is the process of how a specific form 
and totality of being coheres itself as a universal form and by doing so makes the transition to its essential and 
universal form. The characteristic and defining activity of this category and law of the dialectic of quality, 
quantity, and measure both "brings out the totality of being" for Hegel, and "abolishes" the immediacy of the 
form of being. 
241 The dynamic contained in the category of essence, for Hegel, is that it brings out the contradiction 
contained in being, and poses the contradiction as an objective, external relation. "In essence everything is 
relative. " Essence is the sphere, for Hegel, where the contradiction in being is made explicit. 
2" The conceptual evolution of Marx's value theory outlined in the thesis materially reflected this 
totality of process. The law of the transformation of quality, quantity, and measure was the primary law in 
operation in the analysis of the substance and form of value. The application of this dynamic lay at the heart of 
Marx's analysis of how the commodity form, through the dialectical opposition and evolution of the relative 
and equivalent forms of value, coheres itself in the universal value form of money. The operation of the 
negation of the negation lay in their dialectical result of measure, the unity and resolution of quality and 
quantity. 
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The importance of the relation of the parts to the whole, in this case each of the specifically 
defined general laws, have also then, to be related and integrated within the evolving and 
systematic ontology that integrates the totality as a whole. The law of the negation of the 
negation plays this fundamental role in both the relations within the parts, and the relation of 
the parts to the whole. 
From the subject's simplest initial universal form, to a complex totality of determinate 
forms and specific relations that expresses the process of the development of the primary 
ontological contradiction pertaining to its substantial and specific determinate nature. The 
laws of dialectics, if they are to be validated as a correct scientific method, should be able to 
encapsulate the dynamic forms of motion of those determinate, particular, and opposing 
forms of activity contained in the contradictory evolution of a systematic and specific 
subject. 
The question now is whether and if so how, do these dialectical laws operate in the process 
of decline and supersession? Furthermore, if they do continue to operate in the process of 
decline and transition, then how does this operation affect the relationship, outlined above, 
within the systematic relations of the Hegelian laws of dialectics themselves? Moreover, 
how does this impact on the fundamental contradiction in Hegel's idealist dialectic, that 
between method and system? 
The law of the interpenetration of opposites was the primary law in operation in the twofold forms of 
the circulation of the commodity and money forms. The interpenetration of the opposition of commodity and 
money, of purchase and sale, in the twofold forms of exchange is Marx's application of this Hegelian law. The 
operation of the negation of the negation finds its expression in the circularity of motions contained in c-m-c 
and, in particular, as it is the refluxing act of a single subject, m-c-m. 
Finally the law of the negation of the negation was the primary law in operation of capital as a 
systematic interrelation of production and circulation for value's self-expansion. This does not, of course, rule 
out the operation of the other laws of dialectics in each of these processes, but as now the sublated 
nomological expressions of the active determinations and relations as a systematic whole. 
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5. Lenin, Trotsky, and the "Algebra of Revolution" 
Trotsky defined dialectics as the logic of motion, development, and evolution. In his view, 
the abstract laws and formulas of Hegelian Logic expressed the view that everything 
becomes the way it is as a result of law-like development. ' These abstract formulas being 
the general laws and ontological forms inherent to any process of motion and change. It is 
this very foundational area of dialectical method that I have attempted to elucidate as a core 
constituent of the thesis. 
There is here, in the analysis of this evolutionary process, an interesting distinction between 
Trotsky and Lenin that can be drawn out between their respective views on the laws of 
dialectics, and on what they consider to be the essence and core of the nature of dialectics 
itself. The character of this apparent difference between Trotsky and Lenin can be 
characterised in the following manner and form. 
For Trotsky, the transformation of quantity into quality was the fundamental law of 
dialectics, in that it outlined the essential form for all evolutionary change and 
development. "' Though Trotsky poses the dialectical transitions of quality and quantity as 
the expression of the movement of qualitative change and transition, he also makes the point 
that this logical kernel of evolutionary development of "the transition of quality into 
quantity and the reverse presupposes the transition of one quality into another. """ 
Lenin, on the other hand, considered that the unity and struggle contained in the 
interpenetration of opposites was the most important law of dialectics; this doctrine of the 
"I L. Trotsky. Trotsky's Notebooks. 193 - 1935. C. U. P. (1986. ) P. 96. 
`6 "It must be recognised that the fundamental law of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into 
quality, for it gives [us] the general formula of all evolutionary processes - of nature as well as society. " L. 
Trotsky. Trotsky's Notebooks. 1933 - 1935. C. U. P. (1986. ) P. 88. See also P. 90. 
247 L. Trotsky. Trotsky's Notebooks. 1933 - 1935. C. U. P. (1986. ) P. 89. 
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unity of opposites is regarded by hirn as the essence and core of dialectics . 
24' The difference 
between them lies in the following relation. Lenin views the transition of quantity into 
quality and vice versa as itself an example, one that is ultimately subordinate to, the unity 
and interpenetration of opposites. "' 
However, the law of the dialectical transitions of quality and quantity and vice versa is, and 
here Trotsky is undoubtedly correct, absolutely indispensable and the central law in 
operation for the analysing of the contradictions and evolutionary ruptures and 
transformations that pertain and inform all natural, social, and cognitive processes and their 
interrelations. Without this law playing a fundamental role, no coherent analysis of the 
leaps, ruptures, and transformations would be able to be cognitively appropriated. 
Nevertheless, as the transition of one quality into another not only presupposes, as Trotsky 
notes, the transition of one quality into another; then Lenin's emphasis on polar opposition 
would also appear to have real validity in this area, as the process favoured by Trotsky, is 
interpreted here by Lenin as only a specific expression of the law of the interpenetration of 
opposites. In this particular case, according to Lenin, the law is manifested through the 
dialectical opposition of the categories of quality and quantity. 
Again, like Trotsky's nomological preference, there is undoubtedly a large measure of truth 
in this that is undeniable, but there is also the danger of reducing and collapsing dialectics 
into the law of the interpenetration of opposites. This would, like Trotsky's emphasis, be 
tantamount to an error in my view, especially when this specific law, though absolutely 
fundamental and essential to dialectics, is at the same time, and like Trotsky's preference, 
still part of a wider nomological process. 
11 See V. 1. Lenin. Collected Works. Volume 38. P. 222. "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the 
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and 
development. " V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Volume 38. Progress Publishers. (1972. ) P. 223. 
"" V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Volume 38. Progress Publishers. (1972. ) P. 222. Points 9 and 16. 
Point 9: "9) not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, 
property into every other [into its opposite? ]" - Point 16: "16) the transition of quantity into quality and vice 
versa ((15 and 16 are examples of 9))" 
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A process that is contained within the systematic expression of all three laws of dialectical 
motion, and which are consequently expressed in the manifestation of evolutionary change 
through contradiction. To their credit, what Lenin and Trotsky are both attempting to grasp 
is what they regard as the essence of evolutionary and revolutionary change from the 
perspective of dialectics; in that sense both highlight differing but fundamentally important 
aspects of this process of evolutionary and revolutionary transformation inherent within all 
processes of change. 
One could, however, dispute that the attempt to posit the essence of dialectics, in the form of 
the primacy of one of its nomological forms, is not necessarily the best way to proceed in 
analysing the interrelation of the evolving totality into a new qualitative form of expression. 
Certainly, it would be unacceptable, without thoroughly and critically analysing the 
interrelation and development of the laws of dialectics as a totality, before a coherent 
argument could be put forward as to the primacy or otherwise, of any specific form of 
expression of the laws of dialectics in the process of decline and transition into a new 
systematic form of activity. 250 
The real question regarding this characterised distinction between Lenin and Trotsky is the 
following one; is this transition of one quality into another quality the same thing as the 
expression of the law of the interpenetration of opposites? Does the transition of one quality 
into another rest solely on the law of the unity and struggle of the interpenetration of 
opposites as Lenin would logically have to maintain, given his preference in nomological 
primacy? The answer to this, in my view, is both a yes and a no. 
11 As to whether Lenin and Trotsky had definitively carried out this work seems doubtful from the 
evidence we have at our disposal. This did not, however, stop both from highlighting two differing but 
fundamentally key areas of importance in a brief but illuminating manner. The question is why pose the 
relationship here in terms of a nomological and ontological priority of any specific form of expression of the 
laws of dialectics? 
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One could argue though, against the differing positions of both Lenin and Trotsky, that in 
order to grasp the full picture of systematic evolutionary change, it is not only, as in 
Trotsky, that quantitative alterations to quality lead to the transformation into a new quality. 
Nor, as in Lenin, that it is the interpenetration of opposites that is presupposed as the force 
and law in operation behind the transition of one quality into another. Both are, in a sense, 
right, and at the same time wrong. 
My preference is to attempt to analyse the process of evolutionary change as the combined 
account of the systematic movement of the laws of dialectic, but to view their nomological 
connections in a form that is different from Hegel's idealist analysis of the laws of motion of 
a systematic whole. This requires attempting to understand those interacting laws, and how 
they operate in different forms and relations, in the process of evolutionary transition. That 
is, in the form of the decline of one systematic form and its transition to another systematic 
form. 
In my analysis the law of the negation of the negation also plays a vital role in this process 
of the development of a new qualitative transformation. This form of the dialectic of 
negativity also lies behind the presupposition of the transition of one quality into another 
quality. Nevertheless, in order to do so, the law of the negation of the negation, as we shall 
see, requires a twofold interpretation of the operation and expression of the law; one that is 
not reflected in the logical evolution into a systematic idealist totality in Hegel. 
Lenin, however, also makes a further distinction within his emphasis on the importance of 
the law of the interpenetration of opposites; a distinction, that is itself both useful for the 
present discussion, and derived from Engels view of dialectics as a form of absolute change. 
The distinction is of that between the relative and the absolute expression of the forms of 
operation of the dialectical law of the interpenetration of opposites. 
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"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, 
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is 
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute. ""' 
This formulation of Lenin's is precisely the core of what needs to be systematically 
developed in order to begin to answer this important question of laws of transition. Engels 
criticisms of Hegel's idealist system are also pertinent here to the beginnings of an 
understanding of this complex process. The question then becomes what are the processes 
here that lie behind the relative becoming absolute, and at the same time positing a new 
form of the relative? 
Dialectics is about the laws of motion of an evolving contradiction. The movement of these 
laws of dialectical contradiction provides the ontological foundations for the ongoing 
activity of a specific and systematic subject. What is more problematic is how the dialectical 
laws operate in the process of decline and transition into a new systematic form; this is the 
nub of the theoretical dilemma, inherited from dialectics. 
Hegel's blunting of the dialectical method, and hence the nature of contradiction itself in the 
interests of an idealist system, cannot resolve or contradict the very nature of dialectical 
change itself. Engels expresses this contradiction in Hegel's dialectical thought process in 
the following form. 
"Thus the Hegelian proposition turns into its opposite through Hegelian dialectics 
itself, All that is real in the sphere of human history becomes irrational in the process 
of time, is therefore irrational by its very destination, is tainted beforehand with 
irrationality; and everything which is rational in the minds of men is destined to 
" V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Notes on dialectics. Volume 38. Progress Publishers. (1972. ) P. 360. 
Lenin also makes the point that this dynamic of mutually excluding opposites and their reciprocal relation 
"furnishes the key to the "self-movement" of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the "leaps, " to 
the "break in continuity, " to the "transformation into the opposite, " to the destruction of the old and the 
emergence of the new. " (Ibid. ) P. 360. 
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become real, however much it may contradict existing apparent reality. In 
accordance with all the rules of the Hegelian method of thought, the proposition of 
the rationality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other proposition: 
All that exists deserves to perish. "" 
The difficulty in analysing the laws of motion of evolutionary change is highlighted by the 
fact that the process of decline, transition and supersession to a new form, is more 
dialectically complex than the analysis of the operation of the laws of dialectics when they 
are applied to the systematic operation of a determinate subject. This process is, and has to 
be in my view, necessarily reflected in the more complex interrelation of the laws of 
dialectics that pertain to the decline and supersession of a systematic whole. " 
Before investigating this further, let us see how Hegel describes the process of the 
transformation of quantity into quality. There are, for Hegel, two possible outcomes in the 
quantitative process inherent in measure. Alteration in this process can effect the 
quantitative aspect of measure in either of two ways. The quantitative aspect of the 
dialectical relation may be altered without it effecting a change in the quality of measure, or 
the changes in the quantitative relations alter the quality of measure itself. 
"A quantitative change takes place, apparently without any further significance: but 
there is something lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts 
as a kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality .... If the quantity present in measure 
exceeds a certain limit, the quality corresponding to it is also put in abeyance. This 
however is not a negation of quality altogether, but only of this definite quality, the 
place of which is at once occupied by another. This process of measure, which 
252 F. Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy. Marx and Engels. 
Selected Works. Volume 2. Lawrence and Wishart. (1950. ) P. 327 -328. 
" The only person who has done any serious work on this central theoretical question of dialectics is 
H. H. Ticktin. In particular see his articles in Critique, numbers 16,17,26, and 30-31. 
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appears alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a sudden revulsion of 
quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal (Imotted) line. "254 
This is why Trotsky posits that this process contains a presupposition, the transformation of 
one quality into another quality. The question is what processes are involved that lead to this 
quantitative change that posits a new form of quality? There could be no new emergent and 
determinate quality, in my view, without the operation of the law of negation of negation 
also being integrated into this process. 
This dialectical law is also inherent in all evolutionary change, and, as such, it necessarily 
has to be integrated into the account of the process, in order to more Mly express the 
quantitative and qualitative break and transition from one form of the relative unity of 
opposites, and the positing of a potentially higher form of a new relative unity of opposites. 
The process of decline and transition requires to be analysed, to borrow a proposition from 
Engels, in "accordance with all the rules of the Hegelian method of thought. " The 
theoretical problem is in understanding the nature of the development of the contradictions 
that both posit a certain form of substantial activity at one moment in time, and at the same 
time also posit its ultimately ongoing inability to continue to resolve that contradiction; the 
dialectical nature of this process leads to the potentiality for the contradiction to now resolve 
itself in a higher and opposite form. 
A new form that is already contained within, and whose very conditions of existence are 
developed by, the old form; this is the crux of the theoretical problem in dialectics 
bequeathed by the work of Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky. To pose the question 
and solution to the problem in another manner we need to consider the following. 
" G. W. F. Hegel. Logic. O. U. P. (1975. ) Paragraph 108z. P. 159, and Paragraph 109z. P. 160 
respectively. 
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The resolution of the contradictions contained in any systematic dialectical form is resolved 
through how the subject both posits and resolves its contradiction, that is, through the 
operation of the law of the negation of the negation. By doing so, it affirms itself as the 
autonomous subject of the whole process; this is how it dialectically operates as a 
determinate and specific form and systematic mode. 
This would be an example of the unity of a relative form of opposites, to pose it in Engels 
and Lenin's terminology. This is one form of the expression of the law of the negation of the 
negation as applied to a systematic whole. 
To take an example from Marx's critique of value and capital to illustrate this, here we find 
the following dynamic. Marx's analysis of capital, in the first few chapters of volume one, is 
the attempt to develop the conceptual understanding of the dynamics that underpin the 
subject of value as a systematic whole. What Marx outlines is the concept of value and 
capital. In that sense, value both posits its contradiction or negation, and at the same time 
overcomes it or negates it, by doing so it affirms itself as the determinate subject of the 
process. 
Capital, in its classical form, the form conceptualised by Marx in volume one of Capital, is a 
system based on value that both posits and resolves its contradiction by pumping out surplus 
value from the direct producers. The system can do this in its developing and mature forms 
of expression. Commodity and money, production and circulation manifest themselves as a 
dialectical unity of opposites, and capital as the subject of the process that takes these 
twofold forms, can operate in its laws of motion without the system and its laws being 
fundamentally challenged. 
Here the dialectical expansion takes a spiral form, where the development of the forces and 
relations of production, not without generating their own forms of tensions, bitter struggles, 
and episodic setbacks, nevertheless, continues to develop and extend the material conditions 
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for value in its characteristic activity and principle of change and alteration to operate in its 
own determinate forms of the dialectical laws of motion. 
The laws of motion of the system do this through the umbrella of the law of the negation of 
the negation. The expression of this law, that integrates all the determinate parts of the 
process into a systematic whole, is not however fixed or static in its nature. Neither is it also 
the product of the movement of the ideal category either. 
As dialectics is change that is inherently absolute in its nature, then nothing can ultimately 
stand in the way of the unfolding of the contradictions within any determinate form of 
substantial and systematic activity. Hegel's idealist balancing of the contradictions 
contained in the concepts cannot prevent, the real contradictory movements that affect all 
forms of material and substantial polar interpenetration, from developing and changing their 
nature. .% 
The dialectical contradictions in its material conditions of activity are themselves changed 
and transformed by the very nature of the systematic activity itself. The systematic 
nomological activity of the determinate forms of the subject increasingly finds it 
problematic to posit and resolve the real material and social contradictions within its 
activity. 
The material poles of the contradiction, unlike their idealist forms of expression, do not 
remain in the same symmetry or determinate form of relation; as a conceptual unity of 
opposites that is automatically resolved through the negation of the negation. The material 
poles of the contradiction are in a process of constantly evolving and changing, there is then, 
also an inherent asymmetry in their material relations and operation; no amount of idealist 
balancing of the concepts can therefore halt this changing relationship of the material poles 
of the contradiction. 
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Like the distinction between the relative and absolute nature of change, the symmetry of the 
poles are relative and transitory, their asymmetry is absolute. This entails that the polar 
relation itself is constantly in an evolving process of being, as Trotsky would correctly posit 
it, subject to quantitative and therefore qualitative alterations. 
These quantitative material changes within the polar opposition characteristic of its activity, 
are changes that threaten the very qualitative nature of that systematic polar opposition. The 
polar forms, through acting upon each other to resolve the contradiction of the subject are 
thus subject to alteration, in both a quantitative and qualitative fashion. 
These quantitative alterations must then impact on the qualitative nature of the negation of 
the negation that characteristically resolves them as a systematic unity. However, it could 
also be argued that the negation of the negation is the dynamic that leads to these 
quantitative shifts in the alteration of the poles that posits a potentially new qualitative 
nature of the subject. 
As dialectical laws outline the movement of the positing and resolving of the contradiction 
inherent to a determinate and systematic subject, it necessarily already contains within the 
operation of the systematic movement of the laws of its fundamental contradictions, the 
seeds of its own destruction. 
To briefly return to the example of Marx's critique of value; it was by showing the 
contradictions within the determinate forms of expression of value and capital that Marx 
was able to do not only one, but two things. 
He not only showed how value as abstract labour sublates concrete labour and its product in 
order to pose its own systematic activity, at the same time he showed how the systematic 
positing and resolving of this contradiction also posited the ongoing material dynamic for its 
further development; dynamics that are expressed in its own specific and determinate forms 
of decline and supersession. 
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As the forces and relations of production historically develop, then the inverse of this 
systematic positing and resolving of the contradictions begins to manifest itself, that is, 
value as capital finds it increasingly problematic to posit and resolve its contradiction of 
creating value and surplus value. Here, not only is the spiral form of development of its 
arising and mature forms curtailed, but the ability to continue to negate its own specific and 
determinate forms of opposition is increasingly undermined, by the very conditions posited 
by the system's own development of the forces and relations of production. 
This process is manifested in the decline of the substance of value, abstract labour and the 
money form, and a growing crisis in the ability of the system to maintain the rate of profit. 
This is the phenomenal reflection of the changes within the organic composition of capital 
in the production process, with the quantitative emphasis of capital shifting to the 
development of the forces of production at the expense of the living labour employed in the 
production process. 
This inherent bias or asymmetry, generated by this shift in the quantitative relation of the 
polar opposites of constant and variable capital in the production process, is manifested in 
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall or decline. That is, capital can no longer operate in 
its classical form, and value finds it increasingly more problematic to characteristically act 
as value. Capital, from being a systematic unity of production and circulation for value 
accumulation is driven to take on the increasingly parasitic and ideal form of finance capital. 
The system of accumulation becomes increasingly prone to more periodic and longer 
expressions of the slumps brought on by overproduction and underconsumption, where 
commodity production and its realisation in money, fail to mutually interpenetrate rather 
than, as before, displaying a vitality and unity of a systematic process. This is manifested in 
conjunction with the growing inability of capital to halt the above tendency of the rate of 
profit to decline. 
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These phenomenal expressions, in turn, entail that the relative unity of opposites tends to 
pull apart or become mutually exclusive, rather than mutually reciprocal. This is reflected in 
the increasing antagonism of the polar oppositions in their entire characteristic forms and 
relations. Those of concrete and abstract labour, of use and exchange value, of production 
and circulation, and ultimately in the social relation between capital and commodified 
labour power. 
The result of this process is the decline of the laws of motion pertaining to the specific and 
substantial nature of this systematic activity. The polar opposition of the contradiction is, in 
its old characteristic principle of change and alteration in decline, and a new form of polar 
opposition, a new principle of change and alteration is evolving and arising from within it. 
The problem is though, to understand the dynamic nature of the shift within these evolving 
twofold forms of polar opposition that develop within the driving contradiction pertaining to 
the determinate forms of a systematic totality. 
This evolutionary shift is qualitatively different from the polar interpenetration pertaining to 
the nomological activity of a systematic whole, in that the new qualitative forms of the 
polarity only emerges as the result of, not only as Trotsky correctly points out, the dialectic 
of quality and quantity, nor solely, in Lenin's postulation, of the growing struggle of 
mutually exclusive opposites, it also requires something more. It requires the integration of 
the law of the negation of the negation into this process of qualitative and quantitative 
transformation. 
What we have here is an evolving process, one that ultimately manifests itself in the inverse 
expression of all the Hegelian laws of dialectics. One that will, for an adequate and fuller 
explanation of the process, fundamentally require the systematic integration of all the laws 
of Hegelian dialectics. This is due to the unfolding of the following dynamic that is reflected 
in the nomological forms of the principle of change and alteration of the subject. 
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The decline in the systematic activity of the laws of motion of the subject creates the shifts 
in the material and social conditions that manifest themselves in the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the very nature of the subject itself. What we in fact have is a conflict 
between two differing forms of polar opposites, one that was formally dominant but now 
declining, and one that is emerging in, its proto-forms of expression, from the real material 
changes in its conditions of existence. 
Both these irreconcilable and asymmetric polar expressions of the contrary forms of the 
laws of motion of dialectics are, however, still fundamentally interrelated as they are the 
manifestation of the further evolution of the primary and essential contradictions 
characteristic of the subject in its further evolutionary change, expressed in the form of a 
transition from one social form of nomological activity into another nomological form of 
social activity. 
This is a more complex form of dialectical opposition and interpenetration of opposites. The 
polar opposites are themselves in the process of doubling in form, though still asymmetric in 
their contradictory forms of expression. These contradictions, of what are ultimately 
mutually exclusive and irreconcilable opposites, are themselves uneven and combined in 
their qualitative and quantitative forms of development. It is the unfolding of this dynamic 
that leads to the absolute struggle of polar opposites, reflected in the increasing 
contradictions within the old polar opposition. All these forms of expression are 
symptomatic of a system in decline. 
In the process of this evolutionary change and transition, the laws of dialectics manifest a 
tendency to invert into the opposite forms of their systematic expression. This movement 
towards the opposite and inverse form of motion, encapsulated in the contradiction between 
the law of value and the law of planning, first manifests itself in the decline of the old 
characteristic forms of active motion, and the positing of the arising out of it, its potentially 
contrary form of motion. This it does, for Marx, through the further development of the 
material poles of the contradiction. 
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The dialectic of quality and quantity no longer resolves itself in its characteristic measure. 
The relative unity of opposites become increasingly mutually exclusive rather than 
reciprocal, and finally, the law of the negation of the negation no longer resolves these other 
forms of dialectical laws in the systematic manner that formerly posited the totality of the 
relations characteristic to the laws of motion and activity of the determinate dialectical 
forms of the subject. 
It is the systematic operation that is undermining itself; as the law of the negation of the 
negation is the form that is ftindamental for the construction and operation that coheres the 
laws of motion of the system as a whole, it must manifest itself as a key aspect of the 
process of, not only decline, but also transition to a new form. 
The result is a terminal crisis and inability for the laws to continue to operate in positing and 
resolving the particular activity of the systematic subject. This development posits the 
conditions for the necessity of an absolute struggle of these mutually exclusive opposites 
that are no longer, as in the classical or mature form, mutually reciprocal. 
That evolutionary leap is itself, with all its quantitative and qualitative changes, only fully 
resolved when the new form negates its old form, and at the same time posits a new set of 
conditions whereby it can now develop its own specific and systematic form of the negation 
of the negation. It is through this process that the law of the transformation of quantity into 
quality congeals into a new form of existence, a new qualitative form of dialectical 
interrelation and interpenetration of opposites that has its own systematic form activity and 
specific characteristic determination. 
This process also entails that for the new relative form of the law of the interpenetration of 
opposites to successfully emerge, there also has to be another form of the determinate 
expression of the law of the negation of the negation; that is, in the process of superseding 
the old oppositional form and its replacement with the actualisation of its more evolved 
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potentiality. This is the second form of the law of the negation of the negation that operates 
in the process of transition, of decline and supersession. 
This manifests itself in a new form of qualitative measure, a new form of the 
interpenetration of opposites, and a new form of the negation of the negation. The 
expression of the law of the negation of the negation is then fundamental for the analysis of 
the process of the decline and transition to a new and higher systematic form of the 
historically evolved subject. 
This process only culminates when the dialectical laws, taken as a whole, congeal into a 
new systematic form. A new form that has grown within the central contradiction of the old, 
and whose conditions of existence have been posited and developed within the old form. 
These are the necessary conditions for the dialectical processes whereby evolutionary leaps 
can begin to assert themselves in an absolute rather than relative sense. 
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